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FOREWORD 
This study was carried out at the request of the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy of the European Parliament. It follows on from a 
preliminary study completed in February 1994, used as the basis for a resolution tabled by 
Mr Speciale and adopted by the European Parliament on 6 May 1994. It covers the 12 
Member States of the European Union prior to the latest enlargement. 
The part of the study on public service tasks allocated to undertakings was produced, 
for 9 Member States, on the basis of research conducted by the CIRIEC, Centre 
International de Recherches et d'Information sur l'economie publique, sociale et 
cooperative, international scientific organisation headed by Professor THIRY and having at 
its disposal a network of experts in various EU Member States. The author wishes to thank 
all nine experts for their patient research carried out on the basis of questions put to them. 
The statistics on public undertakings are those of the CEEP. They were compiled and kindly 
passed on by Mr BIZAGUET. Two trainees/Schuman scholars from the European 
Parliament's Research Directorate, Ms EBBERS and Mr de ALMEIDA, made considerable 
contributions to the research on public service undertakings in Germany and Portugal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the 1930s and 40s onwards European countries had an economic system where 
public undertakings played an important if  not decisive role in certain sectors. Some of these 
undertakings, brought into public ownership (usually State ownership) for various reasons, 
accidental or ideological, competed with private undertakings producing similar goods and 
services, in the framework of commercial law and the market economy. Many of them had, 
however, been allocated specific tasks by the authorities: working in a given sector they 
were supposed to maintain in the public interest activities that are not always profitable 
according to the criteria of the market economy. Quite often these activities were known as 
"public services". The undertakings in question had a duty to carry them out. In return these 
same undertakings enjoyed special rights, sometimes exclusively, outside commercial law in 
any case, considered necessary for accomplishing their tasks. 
The position of public undertakings in the economy and their "public service" role 
were called into question in the 1980s. First of all there was a trend of hostility towards 
public undertakings per se, stemming from a desire to trim back the role of the authorities in 
the economy both by virtue of a liberalist principle of generally reducing that role and for 
the sake of economic efficiency. From this point of view, public undertakings, especially 
those resulting from nationalization, were attacked as the extreme stage of State control of 
the economy: by owning and running undertakings, the authorities were usurping the 
rightful role of individuals. From its birthplace, the United States, this trend gradually 
gathered momentum in all European countries; the last to be affected were France, Portugal 
and Greece, where the public sector was the biggest as a result of a recent wave of 
nationalization measures, something unheard of in other Member States. This trend took the 
form of a privatization policy which has already put into private hands much of the State's 
economic ownership. This privatization is almost complete in Great Britain, well advanced 
in Germany, and in full swing in France, Italy and Portugal. 
There is a second trend of similar inspiration and comparable effect: deregulation or, 
more accurately, liberalization. This consists, regardless of the type of ownership, public or 
private undertaking, in cutting back as far as possible public actions that run counter to 
market mechanisms. This refers, of course, to the tasks and obligations allocated to 
undertakings by the authorities for the sake of the public interest and the special rights 
granted in exchange. The whole set of "public service" rules is being challenged as it is seen 
as a hurdle to the free action of the vital factors of the market economy, starting with 
competition between undertakings. In fact it is not just public undertakings but the very 
notion of "public service" which is contested here, regardless of how that service is 
provided: directly run by the authorities, entrusted to public undertakings or even delegated 
to private undertakings. It is not, therefore, merely a case of criticizing the public 
management of a given service and demanding that it be privatized and transferred to the 
private sector. The principle of public service itself is rejected on the grounds that many of 
these activities, traditionally regarded as public services because they are in the general 
interest, are not in the public interest at all, are really activities like any other and should, 
subsequently, be left, without any State intervention, to the freedom of private initiative: 
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they should only exist if  the market deems them of use - i.e. profitable. This argument that 
certain activities have lost their vital importance has been boosted by technological 
developments which, in certain sectors (especially telecommunications), have led to the 
creation of new services which no longer seem to depend on public services, either because 
they are not sufficiently vital to be seen as "in the public interest" or because they may be 
provided easily and cheaply without State intervention by undertakings operating in 
accordance with market rules. 
Europe has played its part in both these trends. Probably not by encouraging 
privatization, since EU law is in principle neutral as to the balance between private and 
public ownership and the EEC Treaty leaves such decisions entirely to the Member States. 
What has had an effect, however, is the very project of a customs union, gradually 
transformed into a single market, and the obligations on Member States to achieve it: bans 
on any measures tantamount to quantitative restrictions on trade, the removal of obstacles to 
the freedom of settlement or the provision of services, tight controls on public aids or 
violations of business competition rules, etc. The common aim of all these requirements -
removing obstacles to intra-Community trade - inevitably collided with the machinery set 
up by States before European construction began in order to make national adjustments, for 
the public interest, to the effects of the market economy. This was often the aim of public 
undertakings which enjoyed special rights deemed necessary for carrying out their "public 
service" tasks. European construction as envisaged by the Treaty of Rome definitely did not 
predetermine the kind of economic policy to be pursued by a future united Europe: in 
principle it did not prevent it from being either pro- or anti-interventionist and, for 
example, from one day creating EU -level public services on behalf of the nEuropean" 
public interest. But pending that future common economic policy, the construction of 
Europe as a single market brought in its wake a challenge to national public services 
whenever they threatened to delay it. 
As a result, this dual trend of privatization and liberalization, bolstered by the very 
nature of Community integration, presents a challenge not only to public undertakings but 
also to ''public service" itself. It calls for a re-examination of the legitimacy of  this 
concept, i.e. the question of whether certain economic activities do indeed serve the public 
interest and, by extension, should be set up and run by the authorities. Of  course, such an 
exercise requires that the field of our investigation be established. It must be made quite 
clear that the public services being dealt with are economic activities, a convenient two-
fold definition that encapsulates the subject. "Activity" to distinguish public services from 
other forms of State intervention in the economy such as laying down the rules and laws 
applied to undertakings, general economic controls (macro-economic policy), or financial 
support for certain sectors, etc. "Economic" to exclude non -mercantile State activities, 
such as so-called administrative, social or cultural public services (the police, justice, 
social welfare, education, etc.) offering services funded by taxation and usually free of 
charge. Economic public services produce commercial goods or (more often) services that 
are acquired at a price. 
This study will be limited to those commercial public services that operate on the 
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basis of ''networks" or "grids", i.e. very large-scaleinfrastructures. Vital for the 
population, unwieldy by nature and having specific technical, legal and economic features, 
these infrastructures and the activities which they support largely depend on the public 
service. This study will, therefore, concentrate on undertakings offering 
11network public 
services" in seven sectors seen as the most significant because of their economic and social 
importance and because they are "public services" in virtually all the Member States. They 
are: 
- electricity, gas and water distribution; 
- national railways and local public transport; 
-postal services and telecommunications. 
In each of these sectors the way they are organized in the different Member States 
will be explained: the general legal framework applied, the undertakings operating therein, 
the public service tasks and obligations and the special rights granted to operators. 
In this analysis of the concept of public service in general and network public 
services in particular, the study will obviously not deal with public undertakings as such but 
will consider all public service operators, public and private alike. 
The study will go on to consider the European dimension of public service. This 
means first of all examining European Union powers in the matter and the attitude of 
Community institutions on the basis of those powers towards various public service 
activities. Thought will then be given to the possibility of a common European policy based 
on a joint concept and intended, if not to create European public services. at least to preserve 
national public services and sufficiently harmonize them so as to guarantee a minimum level 
of services in the general interest of everyone in the Union. 
Before considering that aspect. the ultimate goal of this study, the current situation 
must first be examined: 
public undertakings in Member States, their situation in the economy and their 
organization (Part One); 
the concept of public service as it exists, more or less. in the Member States and the 
tasks and obligations actually imposed. in accordance with the principle of public 
service, on undertakings, whether public or private, operating in network activities 
(Part Two). 
This leaves the final part to deal with European Union powers and actions vis-a-
vis public services, followed by the content and instruments of a more ambitious European 
policy in this matter. 
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PART ONE 
SITUATION OF PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
CHAPTER I. CONCEPTION AND ORGANIZATION :METHOD OF PUBLIC 
UNDERTAKINGS 
The concept of public undertaking covers a wide variety of situations, if  only because 
a whole host of different reasons have led to the creation of  public undertakings in European 
countries ever since the beginning of their heyday, i.e. the mid 19th century. Public 
undertakings were set up by granting legal status to bodies which to date had been mere 
services run by state departments; through increased intervention by authorities (such as 
municipalities) in economic activity (gas, electricity, transport, savings banks); compelled 
by the needs of war or economic crisis. which forced the State to take over essential 
activities in the national interest; in order to run, in the public interest, activities regarded as 
"natural monopolies" (railways, water, gas and electricity distribution,  telecommunications); 
in pursuit of general nationalization policies often with an ideological basis; the better to 
attain regional development targets; and, finally, on occasions in order to manage 
international activities involving several States or governed by international bodies. There 
are many more cases where the causes were simply accidental: such as sequestration or 
reparations following wars, for example
1
• 
Section I. Definition of public undertakings 
This diversity naturally means that it will not be easy to define such an undertaking. 
In general, national legislatures have rarely sought to do so. Several attempts have been 
made, on the other hand, by international or Community authorities: 
I.  First of all, the United Nations. For their part the UN regard public undertaldngs as 
being "companies and quasi companies which are under the control of government bodies, 
control being defined as the ability to determine the undertaking's general policy by the 
choice of its management, if necessaryt'. The definition goes on to state that: 
"A government may have control of a company 
1)  by ownership of more than half the voting shares or controlling over half the 
shareholders' voting rights; 
2)  by special legislation, decree or regulation giving it the power to determine 
1.  Cf the !JISt two chapters of the work by Mr  A. Bizaguet: "Le secteur public et les privarisat:ions". QSJ. 
Presses Universitaires de France. Republished in June 1992. 
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the company's policy or appoint its management".  2 
ll.  For their part the Community institutions have endeavoured to define public 
undertakings whenever the exercise of their powers has called on them to do so. 
A.  The Court of Justice was the first institution to act. Back in 1962 
(Mannesmann judgmenf), it defmed a public undertaking as any undertaking placed directly 
or indirectly under the dominant influence of the State or a local authority and which has 
separate assets and its own budget and accounts. This definition emphasizes the concept of 
dominant influence more than ownership. Indeed it seems to imply, by insisting on separate 
assets, on the existence of a legal personality. In other decisions, however, the Court has 
asserted that a body exercising economic activities of an industrial or commercial character 
need not have a legal personality distinct from the State in order to be regarded as a public 
undertaking (Decoster"). 
B.  The European Commission had to come up with its own definition in the 1980 
Directive on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public 
undertakings
5
• In this directive a public undertaking is defined as any undertaking over 
which the public authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence by 
virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or the rules which 
govern it. The key factor here is "dominant influencen, which is broader than that of 
ownership as it may take other forms. The Directive also states the exact point beyond which 
each of these indicators constitutes a dominant influence. It says that the authorities are 
regarded as exerting a dominant influence when they. directly or indirectly in relation to an 
undertaking, hold the majority of the undertaking's subscribed capital, control the majority 
of the votes in connection with the shares issued by the undertaking or can appoint more than 
half of the members of the undertaking's administrative, managerial or supervisory body 
(e.g. board of governors). 
This Commission defmition is used as a reference for all Community legislation 
applicable to public undertakings: e.g. see the Council Directive on public markets in so-
called excluded sectors, the very sectors where public undertakings still dominate6• 
ill.  It is clear from these definitions that ownership of the capital by a public body (the 
2.  Definition taken from the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA): United Nations, A 
system of national accounts, Studies in Methods, Series F No 2 rev 3, 1968. 
3.  Case 19/61, judgment of 13 July 1962, Rec. 675. 
4.  Case 69/91, judgment of 7 October 1993, Rec. 93 I 5335. 
5.  80/723/EEC of25 June 1980, OJ L 195 of 29.7.80, p. 35. 
6.  Council Directive 90/531/EEC of 17 September 1990 on the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors. OJ L 297 of 29  .10.  90. 
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State or another official authority) is no longer regarded as the sole criterion for a public 
undertaking. We have to add cases where a public body exercises a dominant influence over 
the undertaking without holding all the capital. This influence may thus consist of various 
means, ranging from ownership rights, obviously, to: 
1)  powers to appoint management (chairman and members of the board of 
directors); 
2)  the ability to influence key decisions through the special rights exercised by 
public authority representatives on the board of directors (such as the right of veto). 
But these definitions are inadequate to demarcate the concept and give a precise idea of what 
is meant by public undertakings, since they only relate to the term "public". We also need to 
look at the word "undertaking" to define the field that we are investigating. An undertaking 
exists when all the following factors are to be found: 
1)  Compulsorily, an initiative and control by the State or other public bodies 
(federal states, local authorities) according to the criteria set out above; 
2)  but other factors, too, setting the public undertaking apart from other 
activities governed by the authorities: 
a)  A public undertaking must have a minimum of autonomy vis-a-vis 
the authority which created it. This certainly implies budgetary and accounting autonomy. It 
should, logically, imply a legal personality: it seems excessive to consider undertakings to 
include simple State services or territorial authorities under the hierarchical control of the 
authority with staff normally comprising civil servants. The Court of Justice, however, has 
been seen to acknowledge that this could be the case and so it should probably be accepted in 
the case of major economic public services which in some countries were until recently 
directly State-run (railways, post and telecommunications); 
b)  It must have industrial or commercial aims: i.e. to produce and sell 
goods or services, and act as a manufacturer or trader; a body, even with legal personality, 
whose aims are administrative, cultural or social, and hence non-commercial, such as a 
school, university, hospital or prison, is not a public undertaking; 
c)  Its management and operating procedures must closely resemble those 
of private undertakings, i.e. private law must apply to at least part of its arrangements 
relating to staff, contracts and property. 
Section II.  Legal forms of public undertakings 
Even if we can agree on the features defining public undertakings, their legal forms 
are seen to vary enormously. 
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To give no more than a brief account of this variety, an initial distinction could be 
made in respect of the division of ownership: i.e. between undertakings entirely owned by 
the State or other public authorities and those where the public authorities simply hold no 
more than the majority share (at least half) of the capital, the remainder being held by 
private individuals or entities, so-called mixed-investment undertakings. 
A more conventional and legally more rewarding criterion is whether they fall 
mainly under ordinary or special law. In most Member States, a distinction is made in the 
legal system between public or private law. But even in States which do not use this legal 
terminology, i.e. the United Kingdom and Ireland, a distinction is nevertheless made 
between undertakings subjected to ordinary commercial law and those which are governed 
by the special legislation which originally set them up and determines their exceptional 
operational rules. This distinction is, therefore, valid for the whole of the Union. 
I.  Undertakings falling basically under special law (public law or special 
legislation) have been given various names at various times and in different countries: 
state-owned company with legal personality, independent operator, independent public 
undertaking, public establishment, public corporation, national undertaking, and so on. 
They share the following features: 
1)  They come, in most cases, entirely under public ownership; 
2)  They are bound to the principle of specialization; i.e. they cannot 
operate outside their specific field, laid down by the law; 
3)  They cannot go to arbitration to settle disputes in the way that private 
companies can; 
4)  They are immune to private forms of enforcement (such as attachment 
or seizure); 
5)  They cannot be made bankrupt; 
6)  They are very closely supervised by the appropriate ministry and their 
accounts, often kept by public accountants, are audited by public bodies, often judicial or 
even parliamentary; 
7)  Their staff is often covered not by labour law but by a special legal 
system, a "statute" (if not that of civil servants at least that of .. public employees 
11
); 
8)  They may, in certain cases, conclude contracts not governed by the 
rules of ordinary law. 
They are covered by ordinary law only in respect of some of their workforce (e.g. 
the blue collar part) and certain aspects of their relationship with suppliers, users or 
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customers. 
II.  The other category comprises undertakings set up under ordinary law, 
whether their capital is entirely or only majority public-owned. They are normally, like 
private undertakings, limited liability companies sometimes with an indication of their origin 
(state company, national company, public company, nationalized company) and more rarely 
companies taking other forms, i.e. with cooperative or mutual status. These undertakings: 
1)  may go to arbitration and are subject to private enforcement and 
banlcruptcy; 
2)  apply private accounting rules; 
3)  have a staff generally subjected to labour law  apart, possibly, from 
some of the management; 
4)  are unable to conclude administrative contracts not subjected to 
ordinary law. 
ill.  Most undertakings belong to one of these categories or the other, although there are, 
of course, examples of "mixed" undertakings with features of both systems in endless 
permutations. It could be added that public undertakings may exist in other forms, e.g. 
economic lobbies or associations, but far more seldom. 
Section ill.  Relationship with public authority 
The dominant influence of public authorities which, as we have seen, defines public 
undertakings, is exercised in very many ways, varying greatly one to another, but always 
serving objectives intended to distinguish public from private undertakings. 
I.  Intervention methods of authorities in public undertakings 
A)  Intervention instruments 
1)  Firstly, control of the management bodies of undertakings. The 
authorities control the appointment of top managers: 
either directly, having been given the right to make 
appointments under the law setting up the undertaking; 
or indirectly, by having (through the special law setting up the 
undertaking or simply using rights granted to holders of capital, in the case of undertakings 
governed by ordinary law) enough representatives on the collegiate body (general meeting, 
board of directors or supervising board) to choose those managers. 
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2)  Secondly, financial interventions 
a)  The authorities may act here in their capacity of shareholders: 
increasing or reducing capital; 
b)  They may also consist of budgetary appropriations paid to the 
undertaking for the purchase of equipment or to cover operational costs, a facility reserved 
by definition for the authorities. 
3)  Thirdly, by controlling decision-making in the undertaking by 
vetting or approving certain decisions: investment, markets, charges, managerial salaries, 
technical options or accounts. 
B)  Intervention bodies 
The bodies entrusted with implementing the instruments of public influence include: 
1)  administrative bodies: the authority itself or bodies specialised in this 
supervision. (In French the word "tutelle"  - guardianship or tutelage - is used to describe 
vetting procedures, in particular). 
2)  legislative bodies: parliamentary assemblies, entrusted, above all, with 
approving decisions already taken. 
3)  judicial bodies: courts of audit, in particular; invariably supervision after the 
event. 
C)  The influence of the authorities is automatic when they have full ownership of 
the undertaking. When they are only majority owners, this influence is guaranteed by the 
means listed above. It is far harder to exert when public ownership is minority - let alone 
non-existent. This would then clearly be a situation covered by ordinary law with power 
belonging entirely to the owners. For the authorities to intervene in undertakings without 
owning them the law must give them powers falling outside ordinary law, such as for 
appointing managers or approving decisions. This is very rare other than in exceptional 
times, such as a crisis or war, when States sometimes take over undertakings without 
acquiring ownership thereof (e.g. sequestration). However, with recent privatizations in 
certain European countries, we are seeing companies where the capital is practically all 
private but the State retains the power to interfere. This power, linked to a "golden share", 
is essentially negative in nature: it means being able to veto certain major decisions by the 
undertaking, in particular allowing it to fall into "foreign" hands (capital increases, takeover 
bids, etc). Can we regard this right of intervention as sufficient to enable us to talk of a 
public undertaking, despite the privatization? This would be going a bit far, as the right is 
essentially negative and should only be relevant in certain circumstances. It cannot exercise 
the "dominant influence" required by the definition of public undertakings which clearly do 
not, in practice, exist where there is at the very least no majority ownership of the capital. 
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n.  The aims of public intervention 
The influence of the authorities in public undertakings necessarily serves aims 
differentiating these undertakings from private ones, without which their very existence 
would not be justified. 
That is true even for public undertakings whose activity could also be performed by 
private initiative and are therefore subjected to ordinary law. Free of special obligations and 
enjoying no prerogatives, they only apply, in principle, the rules of competition and 
profitability. Yet, in their case, unlike that of their private competitors, those rules are not 
exclusive. They also fulfil certain tasks which, without being public service tasks because 
their activity does not bear the features of such a service, are nonetheless governed by public 
interest or, at least, by State policy - economic and social policy, in particular: e.g. the 
execution of a specific industrial policy or setting an example in respect of social policy. 
This is obviously all the more applicable in the case of  public undertakings whose 
activity is serving the public in the sense of our definition of this concept: i.e. an activity 
producing goods or services in the public interest and entrusted to do so by the authorities. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion to be drawn from these various attempts to define and analyse public 
undertakings can be annotated as follows: 
1)  they are bodies of varying legal nature covered by ordinary law or special 
legislation and appearing in a wide variety of forms and designations; 
2)  they are set up by the authorities (State or local authority) which exert a 
dominant influence over them, essentially by dint of their ownership rights, and possibly by 
other means too; 
3)  they enjoy substantial autonomy to act vis-a-vis those authorities, 
nonetheless, thanks on the whole to their legal personality; 
4)  they produce and sell goods and services with certain aims set by the 
authorities without necessarily performing a public service task. 
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CHAPTER II. POSmON OF PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS IN THE ECONOMY 
The attempts to define public undertakings just outlined are of legal and 
administrative interest. But they are not enough for statisticians. For them to come up with 
figures fully reflecting the reality facing public undertakings, they need an operational 
definition, i.e. one precise enough to assign each practical case to a given category. In order 
that these figures should be comparable from one country to another and suitable therefore 
for working out European aggregates, the definition must also be the same one for all 
national statistical institutes. No such definition yet exists (cf. the EUROSTAT
7 project to 
draw up highly refined criteria for a European definition) which means that the figures at 
our disposal for assessing the importance of public undertakings in the European Union are 
of relative value only. 
However, as this study does not call for the degree of precision sought by the 
professionals, we shall be satisfied with the adequate degree of accuracy offered by the work 
of the CEEp8, which acts as a very good basis. Every three years the CEEP conducts a 
survey to assess the share held by public undertakings in the economy as a whole - or 
rather the non-agricultural economy, i.e. leaving out agriculture and administration. It 
carries out this survey via the national statistical organizations. In view of the work involved 
in processing the figures, it is published about two years after the year in which it is based. 
Thus the 1993 survey, whose results were published in 1994, is based on the late 1991 
figures. 
Section I.  Overall position 
Table 1 shows the results of this survey. The relative position of public undertakings 
is assessed in terms of what seem to be the three most important criteria (dimensions): 
- workforce; 
- added value; 
- gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), i.e. investment. 
The figures for these three quantities are expressed as percentages. The authors of 
the survey also merged these percentages (by arithmetical mean) to obtain an aggregate 
figure giving an accurate picture of the relative size of public undertakings. 
This average figure for the European Union as a whole is about 12%, and represents 
the size of the public undertakings sector in the Member States as a whole. We do have to go 
beyond this overall figure, although it is useful as a general indicator. 
7.  Statistical Office of the European Communities 
8.  European Centre of Public Enterprises 
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1)  First of all, we note that this overall figure conceals substantial differences between 
the three basic criteria: 
- the percentage for the workforce is noticeably lower; 
- the percentage for GFCF markedly higher; 
- that for value added lies in between the two. 
The first conclusion is that the productivity of public undertakings is above average, which 
is probably not the conventional wisdom, and they have a proportionately very high 
investtnentrecord. 
2)  The other main lesson to be learned from these figures is the difference from one 
Member State to another: 
- there are four countries where public undertakings account for up to a fifth of the national 
economy: Portugal, Greece, Italy and France; 
- three others lie around the European Union average: Ireland, Denmark and Germany; 
- Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands follow with 8 or 9%; 
- the UK and Luxembourg bring up the rear with 4% or less. 
Section II.  Development over time 
Table 2 shows the development in the relative importance of public undertakings in 
the European Union over the last 20 years or so (1973 -1991). Two opposite trends may be 
noted: 
growth over about the first half of the period, clearly corresponding to decisions to 
strengthen the public sector in a certain number of Member States: nationalization in 
Portugal, France and Greece; everywhere, to some extent, the impact of the crisis with a 
downturn in the output of the private sector while public undertakings in contrast kept 
activity going, often at the request of governments; 
a greater decline over the second half of the period, essentially caused by the wave of 
privatizations, a worldwide trend which has affected nearly all the Member States, to 
different degrees: very marked in the UK and now almost spent, clear but coming much 
later and not yet complete in France and Portugal. 
In other words, the figure is lower at the end of this period than at the beginning. This fall is 
expected to continue, given the number of privatizations forecast for the next few years. But 
the number of public undertakings in the Member States ought then to settle at around 10%, 
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the natural floor. 
Section ill.  Position sector by sector 
The importance of public undertakings in Europe varies widely, of course, from one 
industry to the other. Table 3 gives an idea of this sector-by-sector variation, using the 
workforce as the yardstick: 
- public undertakings predominate in transport and telecommunications with 58% and in 
the energy sector with 55%. They have a near monopoly in the railways, air transport, ports 
and airports, postal and telecommunications services, electricity, gas, nuclear energy, coal, 
sea transport, urban transport and oil; 
in the services they account for a large share, especially in financial services (banks 
and insurance) where they make up 20%; 
on the other hand, they are very poorly represented in manufacturing industry, at 
3.4%. 
These figures do, of course, need to be differentiated by country, which reveals inter alia: 
the smallness of the public energy sector in the UK and the Benelux countries; 
the relative size of the public sector manufacturing industry in France and Italy, 
negligible in the other countries; 
the public sector's virtual monopoly in transport and telecommunications in Italy and 
the size of the banking and insurance public sectors in Portugal and Greece. 
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1993 Survey 
(1991  financial year) 
Country 
Ftancc 
FRO  (1) 
finly 
UK 
Spain 
Portugal 
Uelgium 
Netherlands 
Greece 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Public sector In the 
commercial non -
agricultural economy of 
Europe (3) 
(1) without former GDR 
Public  undertakings  and  public service activities in  lhe European  Union 
Table 1 
IMPACT OF WORKFORCE, GROSS VALUE ADDED AND GFCF OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
UNDERTAKINGS IN THE COMMERCIAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY IN EUROPE 
Workforce  %  %  %  %  Mean  Mean 85 
(1000)  Workforce  V.A.  GFCF  mean of3  88  (2) 
(2)  (2)  (2)  crilerla  (2) 
1783  13.4  15.1  24.2  17.6  18.3  24.0 
1687  8.3  10.0  14.9  11.1  11.6  12.4 
1485  13.5  20.0  23.5  19.0  19.6  20.3 
747  4.3  4.0  5.0  4.5  7.4  12.7 
407  6.0  8.0  12.8  9.0  10.0  12.0 
216  10.6  21.5  30.0  20.7  24.0  22.7 
200  9.8  7.5  8.4  8.6  10.3  11.1 
157  5.1  8.0  9.2  7.5  9.6  9.0 
179  14.7  17.0  30.0  20.6  20.8  23.2 
115  8.2  8.7  17.6  11.5  11.9  11.4 
67  8.7  ll.5  16.9  12.4  14.4  15.3 
5  3.2  5.2  4.6  4.4  4.9  4.5 
7048  8.9%  10.9%  15.6%  11.8%  13.3%  15.3% 
(2) % public sector in commercial non-agricultural economy in Europe 
(3) not including fonner GDR 
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Mean 
82 
(2) 
22.8 
14.0 
20.0 
16.2 
12.0 
23.9 
12.1 
9.0 
22.3 
12.0 
15.1 
5.0 
16.4% Public undertakings  and public  serv~ce act~v~t~es in the European Union 
Table 2 
CHANGE IN IMPORTANCE OF THE PUBLIC UNDERTAKING SECTOR IN THE 
COMMUNITY OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS (%of non-agricultural commercial economy) 
eod 1973  end 1979  end 1982  end 1985  end 1988  end 1991 
Workforce  8.3  11.9  12.8  11.5  10.6  8.9 
Value added  11  13.2  14.1  13.4  12  10.9 
Investment  22  22.5  22.9  21  17.3  15.6 
Mean  13.8  15.8  16.6  15.3  13.3  11.8 
impact 
Source: CEEP 
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Table 3 
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF WORKFORCE IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION UNDERTAKINGS IN THE 
COMMERCIAL NON-AGIUCULTURAL ECONOMY IN EUROPE 
(in '000  ) 
Country  ENERGY  INDUS'In.Y  TRANSPORT  FINANCIAL  O'fliER 
AND  SECI'OR  SERVICES 
TELECOM.  AND 
TRADES 
Work fmce  %in the  Work force  %in the  Work force  %in the  Work force  %in the  Work force  %in the 
industry  industry  industr.r_  industry  industry 
Prance  202  88.0%  465  11.1%  783  58.8%  193  32.0%  140  2.4% 
FRO (l)  290  63.0%  120  1.1%  930  60.0%  279  30.0%  68  2.0% 
lloly  172  89.0%  312  10.0%  705  82.5%  249  50.0%  48  2.0% 
UK  103  23.5%  8  0.2%  262  34.0%  13  1.0%  161  3.0% 
Spain  61  45.0%  79  3.0%  228  50.0%  20  6.0%  19  1.2% 
Portugal  26  36.9%  40  3.0%  92  41.0%  49  65.3%  8  0.8% 
Belgium  to  27.3%  5  0.5%  160  64.3%  24  7.4%  1  0.3% 
Netherlands  2  3.5%  - - 154  42.2%  1  0.1%  - -
Greece  35  90.0%  6  1.3%  76  37.8%  40  60.0%  22  4.0% 
Denmark  18  90.0%  3  0.6%  89  53.6%  - - 6  1.0% 
Ireland  14  68.0%  3  1.1%  46  52.0%  4  5.0%  - -
Luxcmbou~g_  - - - - 3  32.8%  2  9.3%  - -
Public sector  933  55.0%  1041  3.4%  3728  58.0%  874  20.0%  473  1to2% 
of the 
Twelve 
(2) 
(l) without fonncr GDR 
(2) Public workforce and % employed by non-agricultural commercial industries in Europe (not fonner GDR) 
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Total national 
public sectors 
(work force) 
1748 
1687 
1485 
747 
407 
216 
200 
157 
179 
I 
115 
67 
5 
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PART TWO 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS ALLOCATED TO UNDERTAKINGS 
IN THE :ME:MBER STATES 
Having described the concept and position of public undertakings in European 
countries, we shall leave aside these undertakings as such and focus on the other half of the 
couple forming the subject of this study: economic public services. We must first of all 
define the concept of "public service
11  itself and clarify the principles and ways and means. 
We shall then endeavour to describe the special legal system applied to undertakings 
providing the public service, made up of tasks and obligations, on one hand, and special 
rights, on the other. They will undoubtedly include many a public undertaking but also a 
good many private undertakings running public services: our survey must therefore cover 
all of what might be called "public service operators". 
CHAP1ER I.  THE BASIC MACHINERY OF PUBUC SERVICES 
Section I.  The concept of public service 
This is a central concept found in most States based on the rule of law. The 
expression is used in particular by the continental European countries where the legal 
tradition is characterised by a pronounced difference between public and private law. 
However, if we take not the term itself but its basic meaning, it will be found  under other 
designations, even in legal systems based on the Anglo-Saxon tradition which themselves 
also have the concept of public interest or general interest, under the name, for example, of 
"public utility" or 
11public interest". It can therefore be assumed that this concept exists in all 
Member States. 
I.  Defining public service 
A public service is an economic activity falling under the public interest and 
invariably determined, created and controlled by the authorities and subject in varying 
degrees to legal arrangements standing outside ordinary law. regardless of the type of body, 
private or public, entrusted with effectively pro'\liding it. It is worth taking a further look at 
the various points included in this definition. 
A)  Public services are primarily activities. Regardless of the way in which 
they are run and the bodies providing them, they exist by dint of their function: to produce 
goods and, above all, services, for the public. This is how they differ from other forms of 
State intervention (or other authorities) in the economy which are not production activities. 
1)  They must first of all be distinguished from economic regulation, dictated 
by the desire to safeguard safety, health or the environment: for example, health and safety 
rules at work, rules applied to the manufacture of industrial goods (especially foodstuffs), 
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building regulations, etc. In this regulatory function, authorities pursue a different aim than 
that borne in mind when creating a public service. When regulating it is not their intention 
that the activities in question, for example car production, chemicals or food, should 
necessarily be guaranteed: the existence of these activities relies on private initiative rather 
than on the authorities and it is possible that private initiative would see no point in taking 
part in them, in particular because it would not benefit from them, in which case the goods 
in question could be supplied, for example, by imports. The authorities only wish to ensure 
that these goods and services, if  they are produced at all, are produced in accordance with 
certain rules. On the contrary, the public service consists, from the authority's point of 
view, in ensuring that certain goods and services, which it sees as vital (electricity, water or 
gas distribution, for example) will actually be produced and supplied to the public. In the 
function of regulation we cannot really speak of any attack on the freedom of enterprise 
(otherwise known as freedom of trade or industry): the entrepreneur does not need the 
authorities  • authorization to start up an activity but must merely comply with any rules 
applied to that activity. In the public service, the system of freedom of enterprise is 
abandoned: these are activities defined by the authorities and which, if  not guaranteed by the 
authorities themselves, can only be guaranteed by an undertaking if the authorities agree and 
only under their supervision; 
2)  A distinction must also be made between the public service and public 
interest tasks not involving the production of goods and services: striking the key economic 
balances, intervening financially to help ailing sectors, etc. For these tasks, the State may, 
in addition, as we have seen, make use of certain public undertakings: while not running 
public services or having any such obligations they may then be entrusted with helping to 
execute a general, economic or social policy; 
B)  Public services are an economic activity. That is why they can be entrusted 
to undertakings. The assets produced - goods or services - are commercial assets supplied 
to the public at a price and are, therefore, similar to the goods and services produced by the 
rest of the economy. These goods and services differ from the services of general interest 
provided free or nearly free of charge by the authorities and which also are public services, 
but non-economic public services - often known as administrative, social or cultural 
public services: for example, the services provided by the courts, the police, the schools 
system, hospitals or prisons; 
C)  Public services rely on the existence of a public need. As such, this may 
be distinguished from purely private need, that of individuals, determined by them 
individually and expressed in a market where demand is satisfied by supply which in turn 
seeks to satisfy it. A public need is, on the contrary, regarded as that of the people as a 
whole, being approximately the same for all, and being fundamental. These characteristics 
all mean that it cannot be formulated by individuals as such or met by private initiative; 
D)  The public need and the public service run with the purpose of meeting it 
can be determined and organized by the public authorities alone, in the performance of their 
task of representing the community. Only the public authorities can devise, define and 
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organize public services. They may,  of course, entrust them to a separate - public or 
private - body to be managed but will always retain responsibility for their nature, scope 
and even justification; this is because public services are not immutable and the public 
authorities may, in time, be called upon to terminate them when the need which led to their 
creation ceases to exist. This responsibility is all the more justified when, above all, it 
concerns activities that would not exist unless they were performed by the authorities 
because they are not profitable, something that obviously discourages private initiative; 
E)  Public services, either operated directly by the public authorities or 
entrusted to separate bodies, are generally accompanied by public authority legal 
prerogatives, ordinary law would be ineffective: for example, the right to compulsory 
purchase, the right to use public property, special operating rights which may include a 
monopoly, the collection of charges, the right to conclude administrative contracts (with 
clauses not covered by ordinary law); 
F)  The body entrusted with providing the public service is allocated a task 
generally carrying specific obligations and must be subjected to a certain degree of 
supervision by the public authorities which may, for example, vet managerial appointments 
or control prices and charges. 
n.  Principles of public service 
Thus defined, a public service can be expressed by basic principles, normally three 
in number: 
A) Equality 
Since public services are regarded as meeting a general (i.e. if  not universal at least 
very broad and, at the same time, basic) need, one which the community must provide for 
all, they need to be offered on an equal basis. All users should have access to them on the 
same terms, the only admissible differences in treatment being justified by objectively 
different situations relating to the service in question. This principle generally has two 
consequences for the operator: 
the obligation to provide the service to everyone or, at least, the greatest 
possible number, in what is generally known as a service obligation, which 
is more or less universal; 
the obligation to practise a uniform basic price, sufficiently low to be 
accessible to all, which often means practising equalization, the uniform 
price being lower than what it should be in areas where the cost of the 
service is high and higher in areas where the cost is low (the latter 
"subsidizing" the former). 
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B)  Continuity 
As public service is regarded as being vital for the community it should be provided 
without interruption. It must be available at all times to the public and operated regularly 
and punctually. The operator has to run it  at all costs, even at a loss. Operators must 
therefore organize their activity, especially supplies and investment, so as to be in a position 
to meet any demand and never to run out of supplies. This calls for planning, of course, in 
the more or less long term, depending on the type of activity. Of course, this "supply 
obligation" is quite different from the obligation on ordinary commercial activity: traders 
also have an obligation, to sell, but it is much less far-reaching since it is limited by stocks; 
there is no duty to renew that stock to meet demand. This principle of continuity has long 
been the justification for banning strikes in the public services. 
C)  Adaptability 
This means that public services, created to meet a public need, must adapt to the 
developments in that need and, ultimately. disappear if  that need ceases to exist. Since the 
initiative and definition of the service is the exclusive duty of the authorities it is logical that 
they should be able unilaterally and at any moment to change the rules of its organization 
and operation and withdraw it when it is no longer needed. 
Ill.  Variability of public service 
Of course, the concept of public service, clear and firm enough in principle, is 
highly variable in its actual content. There is no such thing as an intrinsically public service. 
What we mean by public interest and more precisely the activities thus described may 
change according to several factors. 
1) It may vary according to the view governments take of society, whether leaning 
towards the liberalist or collective approach. We can, therefore, imagine two theoretical 
extremes: 
pure liberalism where the public interest is reduced to practically zero: the 
idea of public service tends to disappear and with it, moreover, that of the State; all that is 
left is individual interest and private initiative; 
pure collectivism where every human need can be said to be a matter of 
public interest and, therefore, has to be met by setting up a public service. This is the case, 
in particular, of any economic activity. 
In fact, reality lies between these extremes and a variety of intermediate situations 
exist. 
2)  The consistency of public services in a given activity obviously reflects the 
economic level reached by a societv, since each country offers its citizens services in 
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proportion to its resources. The density of electrification, the abundance of available water, 
the frequency and comfort of trams and buses, the speed of the mail and the number of 
telephone call-boxes, will obviously vary according to development level. Nevertheless, a 
public service will exist whenever the authorities, according to the means at their disposal, 
endeavour to bring within reach of the population services regarded as vital for the 
community which they govern. 
3)  The extension of the concept also depends on technical developments. The 
birth of the railway was an opportunity to establish a new public service but was done 
gradually considering that this new means of locomotion was regarded as something to be 
available for everyone. Similarly the telephone was not at the beginning thought to be a 
sufficiently vital means of communication for it to be made accessible to the population as a 
whole by turning it into a public service. On the other hand, it is possible that technical 
progress might render useless the maintenance in public service of a given activity: this is 
true of new telecommunication services which can easily exist according to the rules of 
private initiative and of competition because they can be supplied en masse at reasonable 
prices, without the need for action by the authorities and governed exclusively by market 
economics. 
4) Whereas the fundamental principles of public service enumerated above (equality, 
continuity and adaptability) are valid as a general rule, they apply to each sector differently: 
- The obligation to supply, stemming from the principle of continuity, is 
particularly far-reaching for electricity distribution where the very nature of the product 
requires at all times, at risk of interruption, a perfect balance to be struck between demand 
and supply. 
- The obligation to connect, following on from the principle of  equality, may not 
exist for the whole of a national territory and be absent from certain regions (gas 
distribution) or from certain towns (not all urban areas have public transport: that depends 
on the local authorities in question). 
- Even when ensured for the whole territory, supplies may be truly universal, as in 
the case of water, electricity, post and telephones where all users are served "at home", or 
simply general, with more or less dense networks and variable levels of services, such as 
railways (rail networks vary in density and trains do not always stop at all stations). 
There is, therefore, no lasting and universal criterion for deciding whether and to 
what extent an economic activity will be organized as a public service. The decision, 
dependent on time, location and the activities in question, is up to the authorities and, by 
extension, the communities they represent. But despite all these many variations, one thing 
is constant: a public service will exist when a community feels that the supply of a good or 
service which is a public need is not satisfactorily provided by private initiative and must, 
therefore, be taken over, in one wav or another, by an authority. 
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Section II.  Defining and establishing public services 
By definition public services intended to meet a need in the public interest can be set up only 
by public authorities and must remain in their charge: they have a monopoly over the 
decisions setting them up, defining their scope, retaining supervisory power over them 
(responsibility), even if  they hand over their operation to independent bodies, and 
terminating them. 
I.  As a rule any initiative to set up public services must be taken by the State. It is the 
legislature that normally determines which activities will be public services. But in a federal 
State, like Germany, the federal States themselves may have a degree of initiative. 
IT.  Responsibility, on the other hand, i.e. the power to organize and supervise the 
service, may be conferred by law on various authorities: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Section ill. 
the central State: so-called national public services; 
federal States 'Within a federation; 
local authorities (regions or provinces, departments, municipalities): these 
are local public services. 
Public service management procedures and the imposition of public 
service obligations on undertakings 
A public authority deciding to set up a public service can always choose to run it itself: 
mobilising its own staff (public servants or outside labour) and resources. This is generally 
known as direct management or control. But, in many cases, it will prefer to entrust the 
management to a public or private undertaking while, of course, retaining control. This is 
indirect management or delegated management; reference is made to "delegating public 
services
11
•  In this case, the authority must defme the unde~g's  general task, i.e. the 
service entrusted to it: its "public service task
11
•  But it will also tend to impose specific 
obligations for the fulfllment of that task:  "public service obligations''. These tasks and 
obligations are fixed in the framework of different procedures or techniques for delegating 
public services. 
I. First, there are unilateral public service delegation procedures: the tasks and 
obligations are set by law or regulation. This is conventionally the case when operators are 
public undertakings. The legislation setting up the undertaking (by granting legal personality 
to a State department or nationalizing a private undertaking) also defines the public service 
task and the obligations pertaining to it. 
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IT. In other cases, there are contractual delegation procedures: tasks and obligations 
are included in a contract concluded between the authority and the undertaking entrusted 
with providing the service. This is necessarily the case when the operator is a private 
undertaking. But the contractual technique is becoming increasingly widespread in the case 
of public undertakings, if not for their general tasks, which mostly are still defined by law, 
at least for their detailed obligations. The type of public service contract varies according to 
the type of reciprocal obligations of the authorities and service operators and according to 
the way in which the operators are remunerated. 
A) The most usual type is that where the operator acts as an ordinary contractor, 
carrying out the activity entrusted to it at its own risk. The authority leaves it to the operator 
to provide the service but does not pay for it. The operator is remunerated through the 
activity, i.e. by receiving payments from the users. This situation has two variants: 
1)  In the first, the operator is entrusted not only with providing the service, 
but also installing it, i.e. constructing at its own cost the necessary infrastructures for its 
operation: for example, mains for water distribution. For this work, it is not reimbursed by 
the authorities and must rely on payments from users. These infrastructures do not become 
its property, however, but remain that of the authorities which resumes possession of them 
at the end of the contract. This technique is usually known as a public service concession, 
since the authority is known as the "conceding authority
11  and the operator as the 
"concessionaire 
11
• 
2) In the second version, the operator does not carry out the work needed for the 
operation of the service. This work is put at its disposal by the authority to which it usually 
makes a payment in return. This process is known as farming out, as the operator is the 
"farmer". 
Farming out tends, necessarily, to last a shorter time than concessions since, unlike 
"farmers", concessionaires must, in addition to operational costs, cover the initial 
investment costs. That aside, the difference between the two processes is one of degree not 
of nature. Otherwise, farmers and concessionaires alike have the same obligations and the 
same rights, usually set by a contract containing the vital principles and a set of 
specifications governing the detailed operational conditions of the service, in particular user 
charges. Concessionaires and farmers are obliged to operate the service according to very 
strict rules and are openly exempt from these restrictions in cases of force majeure but not in 
the case of fmancial difficulties, since the undertaking implies the acceptance of a certain 
amount of risk. If  the operator fails to meet these conditions, it is liable to disciplinary 
action taken by the administration, in the worst case consisting of unilateral termination of 
the contract. This is why it must comply "With service changes demanded by the contracting 
authority even if they contradict the clauses of the specifications. On this score, it should be 
noted that many of these clauses are only contractual in name: they are in reality service 
regulations imposed by the authority thanks to its power to defme the service; as such, they 
may be unilaterally changed by that authority. If these changes call into question the 
financial balance of the contract and if the operator has not been able to obtain from the 
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administration permission to increase its charges, its only right is that to compensation. On 
the other hand, it has at its disposal any assets (land, equipment) that the administration 
allocates to the service, may resort to expropriation and the establishment of statutory 
easements. 
B) In the second type of contractual public service delegation, the operator is only 
the manager, directly remunerated by the delegating authority. It receives no user charges as 
they are collected by the authority itself. However, in most cases its remuneration depends 
on the results of the service operation: it receives a percentage of the turnover. This is 
referred to as interested management. 
C) The final type of contract is that where the operator is remunerated by a price 
paid by the authority. It builds the necessary infrastructures for the public service and then 
operates the service for a certain length of time, while the charges are again collected by the 
authority. This process is known in certain countries as a "public works undertaking 
contract". It must be distinguished from public works contracts where the co-contractor of 
the administration does nothing more than construct the infrastructures without operating 
them and from services contracts by which the authority calls on an operator to provide a 
given service: in both cases, as we shall see below, no public service is performed. 
D)  Apart from these three main types, which themselves have variants, of 
course, there are other types of contractual procedures, quite varied in nature, devised by 
authorities to ensure that public services are performed by undertakings. These include 
contracts concluded for some years now between certain States and public undertakings in 
order to specify public service tasks and obligations which are defined in overly general 
terms in legislation or regulations: management contracts in Belgium; "planning", 
"programming" or "objective" contracts in France. Unlike unilateral procedures which, in 
principle, only concern public undertakings, contractual procedures may be used to entrust 
public services to private and public undertakings alike. However, in the case of a public 
undertaking the contractual aspect is on the doubtful side since, even if the public 
undertaking has a legal personality, it will not necessarily have free will since its capital lies 
mostly in the hands of the authority which also appoints its management and, therefore, 
exercises a "dominant influence". In most cases, therefore, it is the law setting up or 
nationalizing the public undertaking which defines the public service and sets the obligations 
imposed in its connection. Although the word "concession" may appear, it  has no 
contractual meaning. 
m.  An important point is the principle that the authority enjoys full freedom in 
the choice of operator for a public service. This is the main difference from public 
procurement contracts where the administration is entrusted, in principle, with calling for 
tenders for competition and concluding contracts with the undertaking offering it the best 
economic advantages. This requirement is justified by the fundamental differences between 
the two operations. 
A)  In a public procurement contract, the administration obtains a good, 
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for example vehicles or office equipment (i.e. a public supply contract), or a service, for 
example building a road or conducting a study (a public procurement contract for works or 
services) and pays a remuneration to the supplier or provider of the services out of the 
public purse. But the good or service supplied serves, above all, for the operation of the 
administration: there is not, strictly speaking, any execution of a public service, i.e. any 
supply of a service to the public itself. 'What is essentially important is to ensure the best 
possible use of public money in order to protect the taxpayers' interests. Besides, this is a 
one-off operation and so the effect is limited in time. 
B)  In public service contracts, the administration buys nothing and 
therefore makes, in general, no public expenditure. The aim is not to ensure its own 
operation but an activity of benefit to the public. Furthermore, this activity is seen to be 
lasting and, for technical reasons, is not appropriate for a series of different operators 
working in rapid succession over time; it  must be entrusted to the same undertaking for a 
long period. For this major public interest task, for which the authority bears exclusive 
responsibility, knowing that it  is linked to an operator over a long time, it understandable 
that this authority should have the greatest possible freedom in the choice of co-contractor. 
However, there is a trend at present to submit public service contracts to certain 
obligations that weigh down public procurement contracts. This is true of Community 
legislation. For example, Directive 93/37 of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts applies to concessions. These 
concessions clearly differ, however, from works contracts in that they consist not only in 
creating an infrastructure but also in operating it, i.e. running a public service, for example 
a motorway. The Directive applies to the concession contract, at least for certain advertising 
obligations: the authority which contemplates applying a concession must make that 
intention known by an announcement published in the OJEC and observe a minimum period 
between the publication of the announcement and the deadline for applications. 
National legislation also tends to stipulate the procedure for the contractual 
delegation of public services. German legislation has introduced the principle of limiting the 
duration of contracts to a maximum of 20 years. In France, a 1993 Act? also prohibits 
contracts of unlimited duration and compels the authorities concerned to issue calls for 
tender to two or more undertakings, without removing their power freely to choose from 
them. 
These legislative developments at Community and national level do not, therefore, 
go as far as to extend to public service delegation procedures all the restrictions applied to 
public procurement contracts: they only subject them to advertising obligations and limit the 
duration of contracts, generally leaving authorities full freedom in the final choice of 
operator. 
9.  Act 93-122 of 29 January 1993 on the prevention of corruption and transparency in economic dealings 
and public procedures (Official Gazette of the French Republic, 30.03.93). 
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Section IV.  Public service and public undertaking 
Analysis of the concept of public service and its methods of organization confirm in full the 
distinction suggested above between public undertaking and public service. The two 
concepts do not overlap in that there are public undertakings which are completely out of  the 
scope of public service whereas there are many examples of public services entrusted to 
private undertakings. 
I.  There are public undertakings which are clearly outside public service 
because their activities relate to goods and services that do not have to be provided by the 
authorities and that depe~d  solely on private initiative. As such these activities come under 
ordinary law and must compete with other undertakings, private ones in particular. This 
refers, in particular, to industrial public undertakings (car manufacture, aeronautics, steel, 
chemicals, etc) and undertakings in the financial sector (banks and insurance). In our liberal 
societies, the production of cars and the management of bank accounts are not regarded as 
public services. The rest of this study will leave aside these public undertakings and only 
take into consideration those managing economic public services which, in so doing, have 
taken over from the bodies which provided the same services before them: either public 
administrations (State or other public bodies) which have acquired legal autonomy, or 
private undertakings running public services which have been nationalized. 
II.  On the other hand, there are a good many private undertakings also 
performing public service tasks. There always have been, still are, and it can safely be said 
there are likely to be even more in the future. 'Whereas, ever since the wave of 
nationalization halfway through the century, undertakings running public services have 
mostly been public undertakings, the current privatization trend, when it mamtains, 
alongside activities subjected to competition, services operating in the public interest, hands 
these public services over to private undertakings  - i.e. a return to the situation prior to 
nationalization. 
The subject of the study, therefore, leads us to deal only with those public 
undertakings running public services plus any private undertakings performing similar tasks, 
i.e. the group of undertakings that might be called "public service undertakings" or, to use 
an expression taken from the Treaty of Rome, 
11undertakings entrusted with services of 
general economic interest  It. Nor should we forget those cases where the public service is not 
entrusted to an undertaking but directly run by the authorities themselves, which then also 
act as  npublic service operatorsn. 
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CHAPTER II  PUBLIC SERVICE APPLICATIONS IN THE MAIN NETWORK 
ACTIVITIES 
In order to perform their task, public service operators have obligations imposed on 
them and are granted special rights, outside ordinary law, as a counterpart to the 
obligations. 
Conducting a survey of these tasks, obligations and rights imposed on and granted to 
public service operators in the different Member States is no mean task for two reasons at 
least. 
1)  First of all because of the great number of authorities and undertakings in 
question since, apart from the State, a whole range of authorities may run public services 
and entrust their operation to undertakings: when you add on the local authorities in all the 
Member States, the result is tens of thousands of bodies in charge of public services. 
2)  The second reason is the variety, and even inaccessibility, of documents 
laying down the tasks and obligations of public services. It is a stroke of  luck when these 
tasks and obligations are set out and specified in written documents, legislative texts or 
regulations and contracts. Very often they are not written down but result from customary 
practice or general principles deternrlned by case -law. 
As we pointed out in the introduction, this survey will be confined to the so-called 
"network" sectors. They are the most significant economic public service sectors, primarily 
because they are massive services whose vital character for the population as a whole 
justifies their being run or organized so attentively by the authorities. They also often rely 
on highly unwieldy fixed infrastructures
10 which, on one hand, call for land occupation 
privileges (occupation of public land and easement rights) and, on the other hand, lead to 
situations of "natural monopoly" since their duplication would be a waste of money and 
create considerable legal and practical difficulties, and also because they are more profitable 
the greater the size of the activity. The concept of public service, with its balance of 
obligations and rights, therefore applies particularly well. 
We have selected the most important of these networks: 
public electricity and gas distribution; 
public drinking water distribution; 
national railway networks and local public transport; 
10.  The postal service is the exception here but it does nonetheless have a considerable network given the 
very large number of collection points and the daily delivery to all addresses. 
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postal and telecommunications services. 
We could have added certain forms of sea and air transport, ports and airports, toll 
motorways and bridges, urban heating services, water purification, refuse collection, 
funeral services, etc. We have selected these seven sectors, however, because they meet all 
of the following criteria: 
they affect most citizens; 
they are run as public services, with some nuances, in all Member States; 
apart from local transport and water distribution, where those in charge 
mostly belong to local authorities, they are services organized nationwide 
and are therefore easier to study. 
The following network-by-network surveys endeavour to specify, for each sector 
and each country: 
the general legal framework, i.e. the role played by the authorities and the 
way in which the public service is conceived overall; 
the sector structure, i.e. the operators providing the service; 
the public service tasks and obligations imposed on the operators; 
the special rights granted to them. 
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Section 1 - Electricity 
I- GERMANY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  In principle there are no restrictions on exports and imports. 
2)  On the other hand, production and transportation are subject to State controls, and 
State authorization for building new installations is required. 
3)  Distribution to consumers is regarded as a public responsibility: 
Land authorization for public supplies; 
each municipality is responsible for granting undertakings "concessions" 
or the right to distribute to the public within its territory. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
A.  9 "interlinked companies"  (commercial companies with a majority of public 
shareholders, Lander and local authorities): 
1)  provide the bulk of production as well as imports and exports; 
2)  operate most of the national transportation network; 
3)  supply regional and municipal companies; 
4)  sometimes distribute directly to the consumer. 
B.  Some 80 regional companies (commercial companies of which 60% of the shares are 
held by public bodies, 40% by individuals): 
1)  buy electricity from the interlinked companies or other regional companies 
or produce it themselves; 
2)  supply municipal companies and consumers. 
C.  Some 500 municipal companies (municipal corporations or commercial companies) 
provide the bulk of distribution to consumers, most of them in one municipality 
(some also produce electricity). 
35  PE 165.202 Publ~c undertakings  and public  serv~ce activities in the  European  Un~on 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Municipal concessions usually provide for the obligation to provide (both connect to 
the grid and supply without interruption) all domestic consumers on the municipal 
territory. 
2)  By law, domestic supplies must be as safe and cheap as possible. 
3)  Under an agreement between undertakings, distributors are obliged to buy up excess 
production of independent producers. 
4)  They must observe federal regulations setting supply conditions for domestic 
consumers, in particular general charges; their charges must be approved by the 
Land administration. (On the other hand, suppliers to large consumers are governed 
by freely negotiated contracts). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  No special rights for import or export. 
2)  Municipal concessions grant concessionaires a municipal distribution monopoly 
(network construction and distribution), for a fee. 
3)  Furthermore, production, transportation and distribution undertakings conclude 
between them demarcation agreements (territorial shareout), as an exemption from 
competition legislation. 
4)  The right to compulsory purchase to build the transportation and distribution 
network, when necessary. 
5)  Municipal concessions give the right to use the public highway for building lines. 
6)  Distribution undertakings are not expressly entitled to transportation but the owner 
of a network may not refuse access without a valid reasons (such as lack of capacity). 
I- BELGIUM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAl\1EWORK 
1)  In theory, there are no restrictions on imports and exports. 
2)  The construction of production and transmission installations is subject to approval 
by the federal authorities on the basis of the opinions of two public bodies, the 
Comite de Contr6le de l'Electricite et du Gaz (CCEG) and the Comite National de 
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l'Energie. 
3)  Distribution to small consumers (less than 1000 KW) is the legal responsibility of the 
municipalities which may exercise that responsibility: 
directly (corporations); 
or through "pure 
11  inter-municipal companies (comprising municipalities 
only) or mixed ones (comprising municipalities and an undertaking such as 
Electrabel); 
or by entrusting it by concession to a private undertaking (on the wane). 
4)  Distribution to large consumers is free of restriction. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
A. Production, imports, transportation 
1)  90% of production is carried out by a private undertaking, Electrabel, the rest shared 
more or less equally between the SPE (a public undertaking owned by a group of 
municipalities) and independent producers. 
2)  Energy flow management (production coordination, links with neighbouring 
countries, imports and exports) is performed by the CPIE, a limited company 
owned jointly by Electrabel and the SPE. 
3)  The transportation network belongs mainly to GECOLI, a cooperative owned jointly 
by Electrabel and the SPE and, to a lesser extent, to the producers. 
B.  Distribution 
82% of distribution to small consumers is carried out by mixed inter-municipal 
companies, 17% by pure inter-municipal companies and the remainder directly by the 
municipalities (corporations). Medium-sized consumers are usually supplied by inter-
municipal companies while the larger ones buy direct from the producers. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Municipal distribution undertakings are obliged (by their statutes or concession 
contract) to supply electricity to all small consumers in their area of activity. This 
implies the obligation both to connect and to supply without interruption, as they are 
responsible for power cuts and variations in voltage or frequency, and are obliged to 
pay damages (the onus of proof lies with the consumer). 
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2)  Distributors may buy their electricity without restriction but the charges for these 
purchases are determined by the Comite de Controle de l'Electricite et du Gaz. 
3)  The charges for sales to small consumers are set by the CCEG: in practice, they are 
identical for the whole country. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Each municipal distribution undertaking enjoys exclusivity in its area. The law allows 
electricity transportation or distribution undertakings to use the public highway (with 
authorization or permission from the roads department) and gives the right to compulsory 
purchase or to establish easements for installing works on private land. 
I- DENMARK 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  Imports and exports are unrestricted for transmission undertakings and subject to 
authorization over 100,000 volts for distributors. 
2)  For production, transmission and distribution, a ministerial licence is needed. 
3)  Production investment is subject to government authorization. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
production: almost all of it is carried out by 7 companies owned by the distribution 
undertakings; 
high -voltage transmission: 2 undertakings (East and West of the country) run by the 
production undertakings, each with its own network but cooperating with one 
another; 
distribution: a hundred or so undertakings, half of which belong to the 
municipalities, the rest being private. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Producers are legally obliged to supply electricity. They must submit annual 
development plans to the government which may impose obligations on them in 
terms of capacity, energy sources or storage. 
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2)  Distributors have no obligations: 
they buy directly from the producers at prices calculated by the 
transmission undertakings and taking into account transportation costs; 
they share costs so as to even out prices for small consumers across the 
country; 
however, these prices are subject to ministerial control. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Transmission undertakings have a monopoly in their area. 
2)  Distribution licences define the operation area and therefore create monopolies. 
3)  The infrastructures (transportation and distribution networks) have the right to 
occupy public land and to compulsory purchase of private lands. 
I- SPAIN 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  Production calls for a ministerial authorization. 
2)  Medium and high voltage transportation calls for an operation licence and ministerial 
authorization for each installation (declaration of public utility). 
3)  Distributors must obtain a concession from the ministry or autonomous communities 
(special administrative contract, usually for 75 years) and an authorization (issued by 
the various authorities) to set up their installations. A single operator cannot be 
producer and distributor simultaneously. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Production: 10 undertakings (including one public, ENDESA) supply over 90%, the 
remainder coming from independent producers. 
2)  High voltage transmission: carried out by a mixed undertaking, REDESA (51% of 
shares belong to public bodies). 
3)  Distribution 
90% by large private production undertakings; 
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the remainder by hundreds of small undertakings. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The transmission undertaking, REDESA, is legally obliged to run all production and 
the high voltage transportation grid (220 KV and above) giving the best quality of 
service and safety. 
2)  The concessions granted to distribution undertakings impose certain obligations, in 
particular to supply all end consumers. 
3)  Distribution charges are set annually by the government on a uniform national basis 
(different charges for different sized consumers). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Imports, exports and high voltage transportation are the legal monopoly of 
REDESA. 
2)  Distribution undertakings usually enjoy a monopoly in their area on the basis of the 
concession; in certain cities, however, several undertakings may operate 
simultaneously. 
3)  The law grants the right to compulsory purchase to set up production, transportation 
and distribution installations (after declaration of public utility). 
I- FRANCE 
GENERAL LEGAL FR..Al\ffiWORK 
The whole chain (import, production, export, transportation and distribution) is an 
integrated service entrusted by law to the EDF but only transportation and distribution are 
regarded as public services stricto sensu: 
national public service for transportation (State concession) 
local public service for distribution (municipal concessions) 
Production investment is subject to public authorization. 
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SECTOR STRUCTURE 
One operator dominates, namely the EDF (a State-owned public undertaking), supplying 
92% of all production and 96% of distribution. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Service obligation: the public distribution concessionaire must connect to the grid 
anyone applying for a connection (an obligation not written in law but usually 
featuring in the specifications of concessions). 
2)  Supply obligation: as the holder of the general supply grid concession, the EDF must 
ensure uninterrupted supplies for consumers and independent distributors. In other 
words, it must meet absolutely any level of demand and cannot run out of supplies. 
This calls for a continuous supply of the grid and, therefore, supply safety through 
long-term investment. 
3)  Equal charges: the charges must be the same for all consumers on national territory 
(provided they are in an identical situation within the distribution perimeter and with 
several categories according to the volume of consumption), which calls for costs to 
be evenly spread (equalization). Charges are set by the EDF within a ceiling set by 
the appropriate minister. 
4)  As a result of  its transmission and distribution monopoly, the EDF must transport 
independent producers' electricity between different consumption sites and buy up 
the production of independent producers. 
OPERA  TORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The EDF has, under law, an absolute monopoly for import and export. 
2)  It also enjoys a transmission monopoly (national concession for the transportation 
network). 
3)  It enjoys a production monopoly with some exceptions (railways, coal producers, 
small producers in existence at the time of nationalization, independent producers, 
hydroelectric power below a certain power, electricity produced under the 
supervision of local authorities by incinerating refuse). 
4)  It enjoys a distribution monopoly with the exception of municipal undertakings 
existing when it was set up (about 200, some of which are located in some large 
cities), which means that, apart from these exceptions, it is the compulsory 
concessionaire for municipalities. Within the concession area, the concessionaire has 
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exclusive distribution rights. 
5)  The EDF may, for its production, transportation and distribution installations, use 
the public highways (roads) and establish easements or even resort to compulsory 
purchase (after public interest has been declared by the authority). 
I- GREECE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
All production, transportation and distribution is regarded by the law as a public service for 
which the State is responsible. Investment is subject to government authorization. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Apart from "self-producers'' (2% of all production) and some independent producers, a 
single State-owned public undertaking, PPC (Public Power Corporation), is responsible 
for nearly all production and all transportation and distribution. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBUGATIONS 
1)  PPC is obliged to connect consumers without discrimination wherever their 
geographical location and at the lowest possible price. 
2)  It must ensure uninterrupted supplies. 
3)  Rates are set by government and are uniform throughout the country, with three 
categories of user: domestic consumers, commerce and agriculture, industry. 
4)  PPC must balance its books. 
5)  PPC must allow self-producers whose production site does not coincide with the 
consumption site to use its grid for transporting their electricity. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  PPC has a legal monopoly for importing, producing, transporting and distributing: 
a)  with some exceptions in the case of production: 
self-producers 
local authorities producing for their consumers (when the district is not 
connected to the PPC grid) 
some independents (within certain limits and provided they sell their 
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production to PPC) 
b)  without exception for transportation; 
c)  with virtually no exceptions for distribution - the production of 
independents and surpluses of "self-producers" must be sold to PPC 
(exceptions: local authorities for the energy that they produce; self-
producers but only if  the PPC connection price is too high or if  PPC fails 
to supply). 
2)  PPC has the right to the compulsory purchase of property in order to build the grid 
infrastructures. 
3)  Subsidies to offset public service obligations are legally permissible but in practice 
are never granted. 
I- IRELAND 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Electricity production, transportation and distribution may be regarded as public service 
activities. Investment is subject to government approval. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
A State-owned public undertaking, the Irish Electricity Supply Board (ESB), sees to almost 
all activity at all stages of production. There are a few private producers selling their 
production to ESB. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBUGATIONS 
1)  ESB is obliged to supply electricity on request to all consumers, including those in 
remote areas or on islands. 
2)  The charge for domestic consumers is set by the appropriate minister on an ESB 
proposal and is uniform throughout the country. There is a separate charge for 
industry. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  ESB enjoys an absolute monopoly for imports and transportation. 
43  PE 165.202 Publ~c undertakings  and public  serv~ce activities  ~n the European  Un~on 
2)  ESB enjoys a production and distribution monopoly but may delegate it. 
3)  For its installations ESB has the right to establish easements or to compulsory 
purchase. 
I- ITALY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The whole production chain is regarded as a public service activity which is, in general, the 
responsibility of the State which must, in particular, approve all investment. Distribution is 
nevertheless the responsibility of the municipalities, which grant concessions. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  ENEL, a public undertaking (a private law company owned by the State), accounts 
for 80% of all production, all transportation and 90% of distribution. 
2)  Self-producers account for 12%, the remainder being produced by independent 
undertakings, especially municipal ones. 
3)  10% of distribution not conceded to ENEL is carried out by municipal companies. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  ENEL must transport the electricity of self-producers (from the production site to 
the consumption site) but is not obliged to grant access to its grid to third parties. 
2)  All distributors must operate in the public interest, and ENEL must also ensure 
supplies to all users at minimum cost. 
3)  ENEL is not entitled to indulge in other activities than electricity. 
4)  A flat charge is set for the whole country by a government body (the Interministerial 
Prices Committee). 
5)  The Industry Ministry has signed a "programme contract" with ENEL, which 
includes service quality clauses and an obligation to set up a commercial inquiries 
unit and a repairs service. 
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OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
ENEL enjoys a 20-year legal concession for all its activities. 
1)  However, its monopoly is only absolute for import, export and transportation. 
2)  For production, the monopoly only refers to installations with a capacity of more 
than 3 million W and also exempts self-producers. 
3)  There is no nationwide distribution monopoly but all concessionaires have 
exclusivity in their concession area. 
4)  ENEL enjoys the right to compulsory purchase for infrastructures needed for the 
grid. 
I - LUXEMBOURG 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Production is only subject to the obtention of a State licence. However, transmission and 
distribution are regarded as public services and the State has granted their concession to 
CEGEDEL. State control of this undertaking (a private law company) is guaranteed by 
ownership rights (41% golden share) and its participation in the board of directors(it 
appoints two of its members and is represented by a commissioner who has right of veto 
over decisions). Imports are carried out by the State which sells imported electricity to 
CEGEDEL. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Production: it covers barely 10% of needs: mostly steel industry own-producers 
(SOTEL) and small amounts of hydroelectricity and co -generation. All the rest is 
imported. 
2)  Transmission and distribution 
mainly carried out by CEGEDEL; 
to a small extent by SOTEL (only for the steel industry). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  CEGEDEL is under the obligation to connect at uniform charges, although remote 
consumers must contribute to the initial outlay. 
2)  It is obliged to supply electricity and the rates are negotiated with the government as 
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part of an agreement. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Transmission and distribution are the legal monopoly of CEGEDEL. 
2)  For this purpose, CEGEDEL has sole rights to establish and operate installations and 
overhead or underground cables on public land or through compulsory purchase. 
3)  There are exceptions, however, to these exclusive rights: 
a)  They do not apply to steel companies, whose association (SOTEL) may 
freely import, establish transmission cables between different sites in 
certain conditions and distribute electricity to its members. 
b)  A few municipal distribution undertakings are allowed to operate. 
I  - NETHERLANDS 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The sector is under the general responsibility of the State which: 
1)  has subordinated the right to produce to the obtention of a licence with restrictions 
for distribution undertakings (they may not produce more than 3 million W, 25 
million if  they are using renewable energy or co-generation); 
2)  has entrusted the SEP (a company owned jointly by the production undertakings): 
a monopoly for most imports (electricity of over 500 V; low voltage 
imports are unrestricted for consumers and distributors alike); 
a monopoly for purchasing all electricity produced; 
high voltage transportation, but without a monopoly (in theory other 
undertakings may build lines). 
Investment must be approved by the various authorities. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Production: 4 undertakings owned by local authorities (provinces and 
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municipalities); the shares of two of them are also held by distribution companies. 
2)  Transportation: the network is owned by the SEP. 
3)  Distribution: 48 undertakings, two-thirds of which are companies whose shares are 
held by the local authorities, the remainder being municipal corporations. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The SEP must give distributors access to its grid, and can only refuse it if  there is not 
enough capacity. Access by third parties is also possible. 
2)  Distributors must buy the surpluses of own-producers when they are produced by 
renewable energy or by co-generation. 
3)  Distributors are subject to the general obligations of safety, continuity and quality. 
4)  Distributors have an obligation to serve and supply in their area: they must connect 
and supply all consumers on request (unless there is a risk of damaging the grid). 
5)  Connection and supply conditions, as well as selling prices for domestic consumers, 
are set by the distribution undertakings - there are basic charges and a maximum 
charge determined by the association of these undertakings (VEEN) and approved by 
the appropriate minister. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Distributors are legally entitled to be supplied by their regional producer. 
2)  Distributors have no exclusive rights: consumers may in principle be supplied 
wherever they wish; in practice only bigger consumers have the means to do so. 
I- PORTUGAL 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Legally, the transportation and distribution of electricity are a public service entrusted to the 
"Public Supply System" (SEP) which includes both EDP (Electricity of Portugal) and RNT 
(National Transportation Grid). Imports and expons are subject to government authorization 
and public distribution to the obtention of a licence. But EDP has lost its production 
monopoly and private undenakings may also produce electricity. They must, however, sell 
their surplus to EDP. 
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SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Most production is carried out by EDP, a public undertaking (fully State-owned; 
the State appoints its top management) in the form of a private law company. 
2)  The shareout of production and the high and medium voltage transmission system as 
well as interconnections are the responsibility of RNT, a formally separate 
undertaking but fully dependent on EDP. 
3)  Distribution: it is mostly carried out by EDP, and to a small extent by some 
municipal undertakings. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  EDP must buy up all the production of independent producers. 
2)  RNT is obliged to give access to the transportation grid unless there is a risk to the 
safety of public distribution. 
3)  Holders of public distribution licences must ensure a regular supply. 
4)  Distributors must not discriminate between consumers (equality of access to 
supplies). 
5)  Flat charges are set annually by agreement between EDP and the government (or 
local governments in the case of the islands); they differ according to voltage. The 
government sets the payment conditions. Large consumers may obtain special 
conditions by contract. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
For setting up their grids, transportation and distribution undertakings are entitled to use 
public land and have the right to compulsory purchase or to establish easements. But there 
are no provisions for compensation for their public service obligations. 
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I  - UNITED KINGDOM 
ENGLAND AND WALES 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  The system is not integrated, except in a small number of cases (then the 
undertaking's accounts must separate production, transmission and distribution 
costs). 
2)  Transportation and distribution have retained the character of a public service. 
3)  The authorities still intervene to a great extent: 
the government retains a golden share in the National Grid Company (the 
one it held in the regional electricity companies disappeared in 1995); 
above all, the Electricity Regulation Office and its head, the Director 
General of Electricity Supply, have considerable supervisory powers. 
Since there is no integration, producers and distributors must take part in a central pool run 
by the National Grid Company which sets prices every half an hour according to supply and 
demand. They are not obliged to sell to or buy from the pool but they may deal with each 
other outside the pool (apart from own-producers which must sell to the pool all their 
surpluses of over 10 million W). 
4)  The right to operate in the electricity sector is subordinated to the obtention of a 
licence: 
a production licence 
or a transmission licence 
or a public supply licence, which entitles the holder to supply all 
consumers within a given area and which is reserved for regional 
electricity companies; 
or a second tier supply licence which entitles, within certain limits, 
production undertakings to distribute or regional distribution companies to 
supply outside their area. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
A. Production: 
49  PE 165.202 Publ~c unaertakings  and  publ~c serv~ce activ~t~es  ~n the  European  Union 
1)  Nuclear electricity: Nuclear Electric, a private law undertaking in which 
the State is the only shareholder; 
2)  Conventional electricity: 2 privatized undertakings, Power Gen and 
National Power, accounting for 80% of total electricity production. 
B. Transportation: carried out in full by the National Grid Company, jointly owned by 
regional electricity companies, which owns the national high voltage transportation network 
and interconnectors with Scotland and France. 
C. Distribution: 12 regional electricity companies, private undertakings, seeing to nearly all 
distribution within their own areas. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The National Grid Company has a legal obligation to maintain and develop an 
efficient and economical transportation system. 
2)  Undertakings holding public supply licences (regional electricity companies) are 
obliged to serve and supply in their areas: they must connect on request and supply 
current to small users (less than 100 kW) according to their needs. This is not the 
case of holders of second tier supply licences. 
3)  Under their licences, regional companies may not produce more than 15% of their 
needs. 
4)  All undertakings holding a licence are obliged to grant access to third parties to their 
grids, within the limits of their capacities. 
5)  Public suppliers must enable their small consumers (less than 100 kW) to benefit 
from a non-discriminatory charge, since the regulator (Director General of 
Electricity Supply) can set a maximum charge. Medium-sized consumers (100-
10,000 kW) may choose between a public supplier charge and a price fixed by 
contract with a second -level supplier. Larger consumers (over 10,000 kW) must 
conclude contracts. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Imports: in theory all holders of a public supply licence or a second  tier licence may 
import electricity. 
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2)  Transportation: the holder of a 25 -year licence, the National Grid Company, has 
the monopoly over high-voltage transmission in England and Wales. 
3)  Distribution: each regional company has in its area (defined by its licence) a 
monopoly for supplies to small consumers, i.e. those whose consumption is less than 
100 kW. Consumers over this ceiling may turn to second tier suppliers (other 
regional companies or production companies) which may not, however, exceed 15% 
of the area market, without authorization of the Director General of Electricity 
Supply. In 1998 this ceiling is due to be abolished and all consumers will be able to 
choose their suppliers (ending the monopoly). 
4)  Undertakings holding a second tier licence may carry out work on the public 
highway (with the agreement of the appropriate authority) and have the right to 
compulsory purchase. 
SCOTLAND 
1)  Three main producers: Scottish Nuclear (State -owned), Scottish Hydro and Scottish 
Power (private undertakings). 
2)  Two producers (Scottish Hydro and Scottish Power) see to the transmission and 
distribution of electricity (integrated system with overall licences). each with its own 
area but granting third parties grid access. 
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Section II - GAS 
II- GERMANY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  Import and export are unrestricted. 
2)  Transportation is not a monopoly: in principle distributors may get supplies 
wherever they want. 
3)  Distribution is regarded overall as a public service. Distributors must have a licence 
issued by the Land and a municipality concession (concessions are granted, on 
payment, for a maximum of 20 years). 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Transportation is carried out by 8 undertakings which also control most imports. 
2)  Distribution is shared out between hundreds of undertakings most of  which come 
under local authority control, either directly run as corporations or in the form of 
companies in which municipalities hold all or most of the shares. Some of them are 
totally private. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Transportation charges are not controlled. 
2)  Within their concessions distributors are obliged to connect and supply all domestic 
users. 
3)  Distributors have a legal obligation to publish their conditions and charges, with at 
least two charges for domestic users. Otherwise pricing is unrestricted. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Since the transportation undertakings are spread over the supply areas, distributors 
do not, in practice, have a choice of supplier. 
2)  Distribution concessions give the exclusive right to construct and maintain within the 
municipal boundaries a distribution network for the end consumer: there is in effect a 
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distribution monopoly. 
3)  Concessions also give the right to use the public highway for laying mains. 
4)  Transportation undertakings also have access to the public highway for their mains 
and have the right to compulsory purchase. 
ll- BELGIUM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
All transportation and distribution is regarded as a public sendee. The Government is 
represented on the board of directors of DISTRIGAZ: its representatives may refer 
decisions contrary to the public interest to the minister, for cancellation. Inter-municipal 
associations define the distribution networks. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Fully integrated: a single undertaking, DISTRIGAZ, a private undertaking (previously 50% 
State-owned), sees to the purchase, storage, transportation and sale to big industrial 
customers and public distributors. The latter are the municipalities, in the form of mixed or 
"pure" inter-municipal associations (depending on whether they include participation by 
private undertakings as well as that of the municipalities). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  DISTRIGAZ must ensure continuity of supplies to distributors. 
2)  The distributors are themselves obliged to supply their customers. 
3)  The basic charges are defined by the minister upon the recommendation of the 
Comite de Controle de l'Electricite et du Gaz. These charges are equalized 
nationwide and are therefore identical for the whole country. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  DISTRJGAZ legally enjoys an exclusive conce,ssion for transporting gas by mains. 
Inter-municipal associations also have a distribution concession. 
2)  These concessions entitle holders to right of way on public land and, if  public interest 
has been declared, to the right to compulsory purchase or to establish easements. 
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II- DENMARK 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The transportation and distribution of gas are not regarded by law as public services. 
However. in order to import, sell, transport or store gas a licence from the Energy :Ministry 
is required. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Natural gas is extracted by private undertakings but is sold in full to Dansk Naturgas (a 
subsidiary of the State undertaking DONG) which transports and supplies all of it to 
distributors and also sees to a small part of the distribution. The five main distributors are 
inter-municipal corporations. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The law stipulates that the Energy Minister may impose on distribution undertakings the 
obligation to supply gas and may also control costs. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The Energy Minister's licence may grant a monopoly for a set period, at different 
stages from production to supply. Dansk Naturgas enjoys a transportation monopoly 
unti12012. 
2)  Distributors enjoy a legal monopoly for sales to large consumers. 
3)  To establish transportation and distribution networks, undertakings have access to 
the public land and have the right to compulsory purchase. 
IT- SPAIN 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAlv.IEWORK 
1)  The following are regarded as public services: 
transporting gas by medium or high pressure mains from production, 
processing or storage centres to the distribution network; 
the distribution of all combustible gas by mains to urban areas or a given 
territorial area. 
2)  At each stage in the process (production, transportation, distribution) administrative 
54  PE 165.202 Public  unde~tak~~gs and  publ~c serv~ce activit1es 1n  the European Union 
concessions are required. These are given, in the form of a contract (for a maximum 
of 75 years) by the State for nationwide installations (gas-pipelines) and by the 
autonomous communities for local distribution networks. 
3)  General planning and definition of the national gas-pipeline network is State 
responsibility. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
There is a single operator, the State undertaking ENAGAS. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Concession contracts set the conditions for creating the installations needed for 
providing the public service. 
2)  The law sets the principles for charges intended to achieve uniform sales prices for 
the public while maintaining the economic and financi81 balance of the 
concessionaires. 
OPERATORS~  SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Administrative concession contracts confer the right to compulsory purchase (after 
declaration of public interest). 
D- FRANCE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The whole sector was almost entirely nationalized and entrusted to Gaz de France (GDF) in 
1946 and is regarded by law as being a totally public service. The transportation of natural 
gas can only be carried out, under a State concession granted by the appropriate minister. 
by a public corporation or by a company which is either 30% State-owned or owned by 
public corporations. Public distribution is the responsibility of the municipalities which may 
distribute directly or concede it. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Gaz de France (GDF, a fully State-owned public corporation) runs the whole sector of 
combustible gas transported by mains (import, transportation, distribution and export). 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Generally speaking, GDF, responsible for the whole sector, must operate the public service 
regularly and punctually. This general responsibility is translated by special obligations. 
1)  Obligation to connect (or universal service). GDF must connect to the distribution 
network any consumer so requesting, without discrimination and in pre-established 
conditions (set out in the concession specifications). But this obligation is only valid 
within the perimeter of the existing distribution concessions. It does not mean that 
GDF must meet every request by a municipality to set up a new distribution network. 
2)  Obligation to supply (comes under the principle of continuity of public services). 
GDF must supply without interruption all connected consumers, with priority to 
users of public distribution (major industrial consumers are connected directly to the 
transportation network). This implies a long term supplies policy (i.e. imports, since 
national production has petered out: replacing industrial gas with natural gas) and a 
storage policy. 
3)  Obligation of equal treatment (principle of equality of access to public services). 
Domestic consumers must benefit from uniform charges regardless of their location 
in the country. To achieve that aim, prices are set not on the basis of the real costs of 
the concession in question but the mean costs of all concessions: i.e. the concept of 
equalizing prices nationwide. Prices are set, taking into account maximum general 
charges, by the appropriate minister. For industrial customers, prices are set 
globally. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
GDF enjoys a monopoly for the whole sector, with slight differences from one stage of the 
process to another. 
1)  Import and export: absolute monopoly, regarded as the necessary counterpart for the 
supply obligation. 
2)  Production: there is a monopoly except for natural gas, small undertakings non-
existent at the time of nationalization and undertakings already public at the time. 
3)  Transportation: 3 undertakings currently benefit from the required State concession: 
the Societe Nationale des Gaz du Sud-Ouest (private company in which 
GDF holds 30%, the remainder belonging to Elf-Aquitaine) for the 
South-West region; 
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the Compagnie Fran93-ise du Methane (50% held by GDF), for certain 
areas; 
GDF for most of the country. 
4)  Distribution 
Since gas distribution was nationalized for GDF's benefit with the 
exception of small undertakings and public undertakings existing in 1946, 
GDF is, apart from these exceptions, the compulsory concessionaire for 
municipalities: it is, therefore, in a position of virtually exclusive national 
distributor. 
Any concessionaire has a monopoly for public distribution in the area 
covered by its concession. 
5)  For building transportation and production networks, undertakings may use public 
land (in particular the public highways) and, if  there is no friendly settlement and if 
the public interest has been declared, have the right to establish easements or to 
compulsory purchase. Installations (gas mains) remain the property of the authorities 
(State for transportation, municipalities for distribution). 
II- GREECE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  The initiative to set up a public distribution network is left to municipalities. 
2)  Distribution may be carried out by municipal, private or mixed undertakings. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Public gas distribution is highly under-developed: it is limited to Athens and some large 
towns (Thessaloniki, Volos and Larissa). There are as yet no imports of natural gas and the 
network is being built. Imports, transportation and distribution to large consumers are 
entrusted to DEPA (Public Gas Corporation of Greece), a limited company which is a 
subsidiary of DEP, a public undertaking; distribution to small consumers is to be carried out 
by municipal or mixed undertakings.  · 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
To date there have been no set public service obligations. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
There are no nationwide exclusive rights. 
DEP  A has the right to compulsory purchase for building the network. 
The distribution operation deficit is met by the State. 
n- IRELAND 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The transportation and public distribution of gas by mains may be regarded as a public 
service. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
A single undertaking, the Irish Gas Board, State-owned, imports and transports gas. It also 
distributes it either directly or through four regional subsidiaries over which it bas complete 
control. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The Irish Gas Board is entrusted by law with the purchase, transportation and 
distribution of gas. 
2}  The 1GB must observe the customs and standards of a responsible gas undertaking 
but bas no service or supply obligations. 
3)  It must see to the proper functioning of mains and connections needed for supplies. 
4)  Rates for domestic users are subject to ministerial approval. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The Irish Gas Board's monopoly is only de facto. In theory, any other undertaking 
could build networks but the government could oblige it to meet the same 
construction and operation conditions as the IGB. 
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2)  As the legal successors to the old municipal distribution companies, the IGB
1S 
regional subsidiaries enjoy a monopoly for distributing gas in their respective areas. 
3)  In order to build mains, the 1GB has access to public land and the right to 
compulsory purchase. 
II- ITALY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  Production and imports are not regarded as public services. 
2)  On the other hand, storage is regarded as in the public interest and depends on 30-
year concessions granted by the State. 
3)  Public distribution is a municipal public service by law. Municipalities exercise these 
powers: 
either by operating the service themselves: directly (corporations) or 
indirectly (by setting up an autonomous municipal agency); 
or by entrusting the service to an external undertaking to which they grant 
concessions (usually for 30 years) and which may be a municipal company 
(exclusive public capital, a majority or minority share) or a private 
undertaking. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Production and imports are dominated by ENI, a State undertaking, and its 
subsidiary AGIP. 
2)  Transportation is carried out almost exclusively by the SNAM, another ENI 
subsidiary. which owns nearly all the network. 
3)  Public distribution is carried out by a large number of operators which buy the gas 
from the SNAM. 
4)  The SNAM sells direct to large consumers. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The transportation network is, in principle, at the disposal of distributors. Its owner 
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must allow gas produced in the country to be conveyed along it provided that it is 
technically possible. But it is difficult to determine a price for this facility given the 
vertical integration of the system (transportation is not separate from the overall gas 
activity sector). 
2)  Prices charged to domestic users are State-controlled: they are set by the 
Internrinisterial Prices Committee (  CIP) on proposals from the distributors, 
according to a formula intended to equalize prices nationwide. On the other hand, 
the transporters' selling price to distributors and industrial consumer prices are not 
restricted, although the CIP may approve them or reject them. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Production and imports are not subject to any legal monopoly: ENI'  s domination is 
de facto. 
2)  Municipal public distribution concessions enjoy exclusivity in the concession area. 
3)  Storage and transportation installations may be declared to be in the public interest, 
which entitles holders to the right to compulsory purchase and use public land. 
II - LUXEMBOURG 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Gas transportation and distribution are regarded by the law as being in the public interest. 
But access by consumers to gas is not possible throughout the country. Prices are set by the 
distributors. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
All gas is imported (no national production) by a single undertaking, SOTEG (SO% 
State - owned, 50% owned by the steel undertakings), which transports all gas. 
Distribution is shared out geographically between: 
2 municipal corporations (for Luxembourg and Dudelange); 
2 mainly public undertakings (State and municipalities, some private 
shareholders), SUDGAZ (for the southern municipalities) and LUXGAZ 
(for the rest of the country). 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  No obligation to serve the whole country: distribution is only carried out in places 
where it  is profitable. 
2)  In areas where gas is distributed, any residents so requesting must be connected and 
connected users must be kept supplied. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  No monopolies for imports, transportation or distribution. 
2)  As a transportation undertaking set up by law, SOTEG is legally entitled, albeit not 
exclusively, to use public land free of charge and exercise the right to compulsory 
purchase for laying mains (when the law declares it to be in the public interest). 
3)  Distributors also enjoy these rights. 
II - NETHERLANDS 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The transportation and public distribution of gas are regarded as public interest activities. 
The main transportation axes are defined by the State which grants concessions for laying 
mains. Public distribution is a municipal responsibility; municipalities either carry it out 
themselves, through municipal corporations, or entrust it to companies holding a special 
licence for that purpose. On the other hand, supplies to large consumers, directly carried out 
by Gasunie, fall outside the public service. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Gas production is in the hands of private undertakings. A single undertaking, Gasunie (a 
private undertaking with a sizeable State participation) buys, transports and sells to 
distributors all gas used in the country. Distribution is shared by forty or so undertakings 
which are either municipal corporations or, more often, companies owned by the 
municipalities or provinces. These distributors are grouped in an association (VEGIN). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS A.l\ID OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Gasunie is obliged to ensure continuous supplies, under an agreement with VEGIN. 
2)  Domestic consumer charges are set by distributors on VEGIN' s recommendation, 
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and the minister has certain powers of control (for setting maximum prices). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
There are no legal exclusive rights. 
1)  Gasunie is the only importer and owns the whole transportation network, but not on 
the basis of any legal monopoly. 
2)  It exclusively supplies distributors but merely under an agreement with them 
(VEGIN). 
3)  Distribution is covered by no monopoly. 
4)  Transportation or distribution concessionaires laying gas mains may, after 
declaration of public interest, have right of way on public or private land and have 
the right to compulsory purchase. 
II - PORTUGAL 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Transportation and distribution are regarded as public services and call for government 
concessions. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
A public undertaking (100% State-owned), Gas of Portugal (GOP), dominates: it 
transports all gas and distributes it, either by itself (in the Lisbon region) or through three 
subsidiaries (in the northern, central and southern regions). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Distribution undertakings must supply small consumers. 
2)  They may not merge. 
3)  Prices charged to small consumers are subject to ministerial approval. 
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OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  GDP is the exclusive supplier and transporter. 
2)  Distributors enjoy exclusivity for distributing gas in their respective areas. 
3)  To install their networks, concessionaires have access to public land and may force 
access to private land and have the right to compulsory purchase. 
D - UNITED KINGDOM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The Gas  ~ct  regulates gas supplies. Its provisions are applied by the appropriate minister 
and the Director General of Gas Supply. 
According to this legislation: 
Imports and exports are subject to ministerial authorization; 
the right to supply gas by mains in a given area is subordinated to "public 
gas supplier" authorizations, also granted by the minister. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
British Gas, a private undertaking (previously public), covers the whole sector: production, 
transmission and distribution. It is currently the only "public gas supplier". 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
As public gas supplier, British Gas must: 
1)  set up and maintain an efficient, coordinated and economically sound distribution 
network. 
2)  supply on request all consumers of less than 25,000 thermal units per annum situated 
at a maximum of 25 yards from a gas mains. 
3)  meet all reasonable gas demands within the limits of profitability. 
4)  publish charges for small consumers with no discrimination and for which the 
average does not exceed a maximum set according to a formula laid down by the 
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Director General of Gas Supply. 
5)  observe a "Public Supply Code" including, in particular, obligations to provide a 
regular service and maintain meters and rules on cutting off people who fail to pay 
their bills. Furthermore, the authorization granted to British Gas obliges it: 
to provide an efficient, round-the-clock telephone answering service in 
respect of leaks; 
to set up a user counselling service (for rational gas use and payment 
problems), especially for the elderly or the disabled. 
6)  The Director General of Gas Supply may: 
set the conditions in which public suppliers owning a transportation 
network must grant network access to another distributor, by increasing 
capacity if  necessary (conditions include: same type of gas, no problems 
for public supplier obligations, payment of a fee); 
in the framework of his charge control powers, impose on British Gas the 
obligation to publish performance figures. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
British Gas has the legal quality of ''public gas supplier". The law allows other undertakings 
to obtain a public supply authorization, in the long run, but this has not yet happened. 
1)  The law gives British Gas a 25 year monopoly for supplying consumers of less than 
25,000 thermal units per annwn located a maximwn of 25 yards from the existing 
mains. 
2)  As public supplier, British Gas has a legal right to lay mains on the public highway 
and, with the authorization of the appropriate minister, to compulsory purchase. 
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Section III - WATER DISTRIBUTION 
III - GERMANY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Water distribution is a public service for which responsibility lies with the municipalities; 
they may distribute it themselves or entrust it to companies. Prices are set by the 
municipalities. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
96% of operators are municipal undertakings, the others are mixed undertakings (public and 
private capital) and some private undertakings (this is rare). 
III-BELGIUM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Water distribution is a public service for which the municipalities have exclusive 
responsibility. They exercise it: 
directly: municipal service without separate accounts; 
by setting up municipal corporations, i.e. bodies without legal personality 
but with their own budgets and accounts; 
by joining up with an "inter-municipal" company (association of 
municipalities with legal personality), which may be "pure" (only 
municipalities) or "mixed" (association of municipalities and private 
undertakings); 
or, by granting concessions to third parties (inter-municipal associations 
or private undertakings). 
In all cases, the municipality owns the network and sets prices. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The operators are: 
in two-thirds of cases: the municipality itself, by direct management or through a 
municipal undertaking; 
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in 20% of cases, but covering 85% of consumers: inter-municipal associations; 
exceptionally: concessionaire undertakings. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Water distributors are obliged: 
to connect to the network any resident of a block of flats or house so 
requesting, upon payment for any supplementary costs incurred in the case 
of remote localities; 
to supply all subscribers. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Distributors may: 
exercise the right to compulsory purchase (the decision lies with the 
region); 
occupy the public highway (municipal, provincial or regional, with the 
permission of the authority in question). 
DI- DENMARK 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Water distribution is a public service, albeit not one organized by law. It is left to the 
municipalities to carry it out. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Operators are mostly departments within the municipal administration (without budgetary or 
accounting autonomy). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Distributors are obliged to connect and supply consumers. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Distributors have, in practice, exclusivity in their area, access to public land and the right to 
compulsory purchase in order to create their networks. 
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ill- SPAIN 
GENERAL LEGAL FRA.MEWORK 
Water distribution is a public service which is the responsibility of  local or regional 
authorities (municipalities and autonomous communities). The authorities may perform the 
service themselves or entrust it to municipal, multi -municipal or autonomous community 
public undertakings. Charges are always subject to the decision of the authority in question. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Operators are: 
in some cases, the authorities themselves; 
usually public undertakings owned by the municipalities, singly or in groups, or by 
the autonomous communities. 
Ill- FRANCE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Drinking water distribution is legally a public service for which municipalities, singly or in 
groups, have responsibility. Municipalities may: 
1)  perform the service themselves (direct management) 
through the municipal administration itself; 
by setting up a municipal body with budgetary and accounting autonomy; 
or, by setting up a full-blown corporation. 
2)  or delegate it to an undertaking (indirect management) by concession or by farming 
it out (or by other public service delegation procedures). 
In all cases, charges are set by the municipality. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  In a half of all municipalities, especially small rural ones: the municipalities 
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themselves, by direct management. 
2)  In the other half (representing 80% of the population) by private undertakings to 
which distribution is delegated, some of them sizeable (Lyonnaise des Eaux, 
Generale des Eaux, Bouygues, SAUR, etc). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Distributors must connect to the network and supply with drinking water all users within the 
area for which they are responsible, according to the usual principles of public service: 
equality of access, continuity of service, adaptation to developments in needs. In cases of 
concessions, they must make the necessary investment for establishing, maintaining and 
extending the network which remains, in any case, municipal property. Public service 
delegation contracts may compel contractors to make certain payments to the municipality: 
initial payment, operation charge, payment of annual instalments in respect of any debt left 
over from the old corporation. 
OPERATORS, SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The distributor has a monopoly in the area where it is responsible for distribution. 
2)  For laying mains, distributors have access to public land (authorization from the 
roads department), and have the right to establish easements and to compulsory 
purchase. 
3)  Network installation works may receive State subsidies. 
III- GREECE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Water distribution is regarded as a public service. It is the responsibility of municipalities. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
a State - owned public undertaking for the Athens region; 
municipal undertakings in certain towns and cities; 
municipal corporations in small municipalities; 
private concessionaires (this is relatively rare). 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Undertakings in charge of water distribution must supply all users in equal conditions within 
each category (households, industry, etc). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  All undertakings entrusted with water distribution enjoy a monopoly in their area. 
2)  They have access to State land and public land owned by other authorities and have 
the right to compulsory purchase. 
3)  Sometimes they receive subsidies. 
Ill- IRELAND 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Water distribution is legally a municipal public service. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Operators are always local authorities. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Municipalities are obliged to supply good quality water. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Municipalities enjoy a monopoly by definition. 
III- ITALY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Drinking-water distribution is a municipal public service. Municipalities may supply it 
themselves, through their own departments, by setting up municipal agencies, or by 
entrusting it to inter-municipal agencies or State bodies, or concede it to private 
undertakings. Prices are set by the municipalities. 
69  PE 165.202 Public undertak1ngs  and publ1c service act1vit1es in the European Union 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
direct municipal management: about one third of the water distributed; 
municipal agencies: about one quarter; 
inter-municipal agencies: 18%; 
State bodies: 18% 
private undertakings (such as Italgas): 6%. 
ill - LUXEMBOURG 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Water distribution is, by law, a municipal public service. Municipalities exercise these 
powers either alone or by forming syndicates. They may also concede the service to third 
parties provided the appropriate minister gives the go-ahead. Prices are set by the minister 
on the proposal of the municipalities. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Production:  apart from some municipalities with sufficient own resources, most 
are supplied, at least in part, by the Syndicat des Eaux du Barrage 
d' Esch-sur-Sfire (SEBES), a syndicate comprising municipalities 
(half the shares) and the State (the other half). 
2)  Distribution:  municipalities and syndicates thereof. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The municipalities are responsible for creating the distribution network. They must connect 
all users within built-up areas; anyone living far outside those boundaries must meet the 
extra cost. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Access to public and private land belonging to the authorities for infrastructure 
work: 
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by right and free of charge for SEBES; 
subject to government authorization in the case of municipalities and 
syndicates. 
2)  Compulsory purchase: 
by right for SEBES; 
with government agreement for municipalities and their syndicates. 
3)  Right of way on private land: acquired in return for payment. 
lll - NETHERLANDS 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Water distribution is a municipal public service and the authorities may concede the service 
to an operator. Charges are controlled by the authorities. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
two major production undertakings and some smaller ones; 
apart from one municipal corporation (Amsterdam)' distributors {thirty or so) are all 
public undertakings fully owned by municipalities or provinces (except Tilburg and 
Doom, where there are minority private shareholders). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Operators are obliged to supply all users, maintain the network and extend it to meet needs. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Distributors enjoy a monopoly within their particular area. 
2)  For installing the network, they have access to public land and have the right to 
compulsory purchase. 
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III - PORTUGAL 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
By law, public water distribution is a public service: 
1)  either solely municipal: the municipality provides the service itself or through a 
municipal agency or concedes it to an undertaking or consumer association; 
2)  or multi-municipal, with State intervention: the service is conceded by the State to a 
public undertaking (majority of the capital belonging to authorities) which also 
concludes a contract with each municipality concerned. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
As provided by law, operators include municipalities themselves, associations thereof, 
public or private undertakings and consumer associations. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
They are established by the concession contract. Generally speaking, concessionaires must 
provide a service, build and maintain the distribution network and pay a charge to the 
conceding authority. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Concessionaires have operation monopolies in their area. 
2)  Concessionaires may use public land (over- and underground) and have the right to 
compulsory purchase. 
3)  Concessionaires may receive public subsidies. 
III - UNITED KINGDOM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRMv.ffiWORK 
In the final instance, water distribution is State responsibility. In the case of  England and 
Wales, the State has withdrawn management from the old "water authorities" (public 
agencies) and entrusted it to private concessionaires. These companies are subject to the 
control of the Secretary of State for the Environment (although the golden share which used 
to enable him to prevent a single shareholder from holding more than 15% of a company 
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disappeared in 1995) and, above all, OFW  AT, the Water Industry Regulator, which is 
empowered to cap annual price increases and lay down quality standards. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
England and Wales: 88 private companies; 
Scotland: 9·authorities owned by regional councils; 
Northern Ireland: 3 public authorities. 
PUBUC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Distributors must: 
maintain a pricing system that satisfies consumers' interests, especially those in rural 
or remote areas; 
meet quality standards. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Distributors have a monopoly in their area and, for installing the infrastructures, have right 
of way on public and private highways. 
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Section IV - RAILWAYS 
IV- GERMANY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Powers for the public railways service are held by the State, in the case of long haul, 
and by the Under, in the case or shorter journeys. The network itself is owned by 
the federal State. 
2)  Deutsche Bahn, a public undertaking owned by the federal State in the form of a 
private law company (since 1 January 1994; previously it was simply a department of 
the federal Ministry of  Transport, without a legal personality), is by law a public 
interest undertaking, under the tutelage of the Minister of Transport. Infrastructure 
and transport service accounts have been separated. 
PUBUC SERVICE TASKS AND OBUGATIONS 
1)  By law, DB must provide the "best possible transport service": this obligation, 
especially valid for the passenger service, obliges it to develop its network. 
2)  It must exact uniform fares so as not to penalise economically vulnerable areas, 
especially in terms of transport, which means that loss-making services are 
maintained. 
3)  It must implement special low fares C'social") as demanded by the authorities. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Public service obligations must be offset by the authorities imposing them: i.e. the federal 
State, Lander or municipalities. 
IV- BELGIUM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  The SNCB, an autonomous public undertaking (since 1992) is the only operator. 
2)  Ownership of the railways network (lines and neighbouring land) has been 
transferred from the State to the SNCB. 
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3)  The construction of new lines depends on a State decision (ten-year investment 
plans). 
4)  The SNCB may take a line or station out of service with ministerial approval. It is 
free to decide how to use or dispose of assets. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
A.  General tasks are determined by law: 
domestic transport for ordinary passengers (international passenger 
services, goods and parcels deliveries are not regarded as public service 
activities; they are carried out on a purely commercial basis). 
acquiring, building, maintaining, operating and managing infrastructures. 
providing services for national needs. 
B.  Detailed obligations  are included in the management contract concluded with the 
State. 
1) Domestic passenger transport: 
a)  for the whole network:  160,000 train-km on working days 
100,000 train-km on other days 
b)  for "inter-city" links (between main stations): 
70,000 train-km and 16 trains in each 
direction on each link on working days 
55,000 trains-km and 12 trains in each 
direction on other days 
c)  for local links (between small stations): 
60,000 train-km and 4 trains in each 
direction on each link on working days 
30,000 train-km on other days 
d)  for peak-time or back-up services: 
20,000 train-km on working days 
2) Infrastructures: 
making investment (acquiring land, building tracks, purchasing rolling 
stock) provided for in the ten-year plan (submitted by the SNCB and 
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approved by the government), financed by the Ministry of 
Communications; 
maintenance, management and operation. 
3)  Serving national needs 
These are tasks carried out for other public services: 
international parcels service; 
transporting passengers or goods for ministerial departments; 
obligations towards civil and military defence 
certain lines or disused installations may not be disposed of, 
participation in international defence bodies entrusted with 
coordinating rail transport, 
participation in civilian and military exercises, 
setting up a permanent bureau dealing with defence problems; 
participation in organizing and executing police and customs controls and 
safety checks at the Cross-Channel terminal at Brussels-South. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The SNCB enjoys a monopoly for national and international rail services. 
2)  For building tracks and buildings needed for operations, it has the right to 
compulsory purchase. 
3)  To offset public service obligations it receives a financial contribution from the 
State. 
IV- DENMARK 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAI\.1EWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  The State (government and parliament) decides when to build or decommission lines. 
2)  Passenger transport is regarded as a public service. 
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3)  Operators: 
a State undertaking. Danske Statsbanen (DSB). a department (without legal 
personality) at the Ministry of Public Transport. owns· the national railways (five-
sixths of the whole network); 
local railways are run by a dozen private law undertakings. mostly State-owned or 
owned by local authorities. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The public service obligations defined by the State for the national railways and by the local 
authorities for local railways include infrastructure management. regular and good quality 
service and set fares. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Undertakings enjoy a monopoly on their lines. 
2)  They have the right to compulsory purchase for building new lines. 
3)  To offset their public service obligations they receive subsidies. 
IV- SPAIN 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
A public undertaking (fully State-owned). the national network of Spanish Railways 
(RENFE) is responsible for the whole network and all rail transport. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
These are now contained in a programme contract with the State: 
1)  Infrastructure management. 
2)  Providing certain passenger services. mainly over short or medium haul. 
exceptionally for long haul. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Monopoly and the right to compulsory purchase. 
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2)  Public service obligations are covered by corresponding State contributions. 
IV- FRANCE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  The only operator is the SNCF, a totally State-owned public undertaking (it became 
a "public establishment" in 1983; was previously a mixed economy limited company, 
almost totally State-owned). 
2)  The State decides ultimately whether new railway tracks should be built. 
3)  The railway tracks are part of State land (public railway land) and the rolling stock is 
owned by the SNCF. 
4)  The regional and local authorities participate in the organization of the regional rail 
links: 
these links must legally be included in the regional transport plan 
(established by the regional council); 
they are run by contracts between regions and the SNCF; 
any change to services (opening or closing a line, creating or removing a 
halt) calls for consultation of the regions, departments and municipalities 
concerned. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
A.  The public railways service is entrusted in full to the SNCF by law (1982 Special 
Domestic Transport Act, and the specifications adopted by decree in 1983). It 
comprises: 
1)  the infrastructure: the SNCF must "operate, adapt and develop, according 
to the principles of public service, the national rail network"; 
2)  the rail network: the SNCF "must operate the rail services on this network 
in the best possible conditions of safety, accessibility, speed, comfort and 
punctuality". It is the "set of services offered by the SNCF" which must be 
IT implemented according to the principles of public service, especially in 
terms of continuity and conditions of access for users" in order to nhelp to 
meet users' needs in the most advantageous economic and social conditions 
for the community, contribute to national unity and solidarity and national 
defence". 
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B.  The SNCF's general public service task is translated by obligations. The main ones 
are: 
1)  Providing services which are, stricto sensu, in the public interest, i.e. 
mainly passenger transport in order to satisfy the "right to transport" 
provided for by law. 
a)  Services of regional interest 
These are commuter links or .. public transport services": these include 
urban services (Paris region and major cities), defined in accordance 
with the authorities concerned (included in regional transport plans), 
inter-city links and rural train services. 
b)  National services or main -line links, defined by the SNCF under its 
own rules. 
2)  Applying social fares for certain passenger categories (families, soldiers). 
3)  Meeting certain national defence obligations (maintaining lines and 
buildings, transporting troops). 
4)  Fulfilling service quality conditions for passengers: 
extra services 
enough seats 
luggage transport 
information 
5)  Applying the principle of fare equalization. This principle applies to basic 
fares, which must be the same for everyone throughout the country, 
varying only according to the distance covered. Some nuances in time and 
space are now allowed. Fares are communicated to the Minister of 
Transport who may reject them within a week (they are regarded as 
approved after that deadline). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The SNCF has exclusive use of the national rail network. No other undertaking may 
offer transport services on the network without its agreement (by farming out lines 
or by means of operation contracts). 
2)  For constructing the lines and buildings needed for operations, the SNCF has the 
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right to compulsory purchase if  it has been declared in the public interest. 
3)  To offset its public service obligations, the SNCF receives contributions from the 
authorities: 
a)  from the State to cover: 
some infrastructure spending 
special low ("social") fares 
the deficit for operating regional interest passenger services 
national defence costs 
shortfalls when fare increase requests are turned down 
b)  from local authorities (regions, in particular, but also departments and 
municipalities) for the services they call on the SNCF to provide over and 
above the norm. 
4)  Bearing in mind this State funding, the SNCF must balance its books without any 
longer being able to count on State help. 
IV- GREECE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
All rail services are regarded as public services and therefore are State 
responsibility. The government has the ultimate say in creating or decommissioning 
tracks or rail links. Fares are subjected to it for approval. 
The Organization of Hellenic Railways (OHR), public undertaking (a limited 
company of which the State is the only shareholder), is the sole operator. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The OHR must: 
maintain infrastructures (which it alone owns); 
provide passenger services throughout the network regardless of 
profitability; 
charge uniform fares per user category. 
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OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
TheOHR: 
has a legal monopoly for urban and inter-city rail services (possible 
exemptions through legislation); 
has use of State public land needed for the rail service; 
has the right to compulsory purchase; 
receives State subsidies to offset its public service obligations. 
IV- IRELAND 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  The construction or decommissioning of lines requires a ministerial decision. 
2)  CIE, a State-owned public transport undertaking, whose management is appointed 
by the. appropriate minister, owns the rail network. 
3)  Irish Rail, a subsidiary of CIE, runs the network, owns the rolling stock and 
provides a transport service. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBUGATIONS 
1)  Obligation to maintain the railways. 
2)  Obligation to provide a passenger service throughout the country, even if  it makes a 
loss. Only ministerial decisions may decommission links, following public inquiries. 
3)  No obligation to equalize fares, but prices are subject to ministerial approval. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Irish Rail has a transport monopoly on the network but trams from Northern Ireland 
are allowed to use the tracks (and vice versa). 
2)  To build new lines, it has the right to compulsory purchase. 
3)  State subsidies to offset public service obligations. 
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IV-ITALY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  The railways are a public service for which the State has responsibility and may 
concede the management. 
2)  Most of the network (75% approximately) and the rail service has been entrusted to 
the State Railways, a totally public undertaking which for a long time was an agency 
with limited autonomy and was turned, in 1992, into a limited company. 
3)  The remainder is conceded to private operators. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBUGATIONS 
These are set out in a 
11 public service contract 
11  concluded between the State Railways and 
the I\£ni.ster of Transport. They include, in particular: 
safety obligations; 
health, safety and presentation conditions; 
compensation for passengers whose trains are very late. 
Rates are submitted for approval to the Minister of Transport. They are uniform for the 
whole country. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The State railways and concessionaires usually have a service monopoly for their 
particular area. 
2)  They have the right to compulsory purchase for building infrastructures. 
3)  Building tracks is subsidized by the authorities. 
4)  Public service obligations are covered by compensatory subsidies. 
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IV - LUXEMBOURG 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  The rail network is part of the State property. The State has fully owned the network 
since 1995. The National Company of Luxembourg Rail~ays (CFL), which 
previously owned the network, now merely runs it. 
2)  Building or decommissioning lines is State responsibility. 
3)  Network management and passenger transport are regarded as being public services. 
4)  The single operator, CFL, is a unique company - its capital is totally public 
(63.25% of shares belong to the Luxembourg State, 24.50% to the Belgian State and 
12.25% to the French State). The legislative reforms under way would give it 
limited company status without altering the capital shareout ratios. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The CFL must keep the rail network in a good state of repairs. 
2)  The State compels the CFL to provide a passenger transport service  - in particular 
this means that State approval is needed to decommission a service or set timetables. 
Under the new legislation specific obligations would be laid down in a contract. 
3)  Fares are set by agreement between the State and municipal authorities, as part of a 
"national price community". 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The CFL no longer enjoy a network operation monopoly. Other undertakings may be 
authorized to provide transport services. 
2)  The CFL have the right to compulsory purchase, on behalf of the State, for building 
lines or installations needed for operating them. 
3)  The State meets infrastructure costs and compensates for public service obligations. 
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IV - NETHERLANDS 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The Dutch railways (NS) are still a fully State-owned public undertaking but, since 1 
January 1994, have been operated as a commercial company and split into three autonomous 
units: infrastructure management, traffic control and transport service management. 
PUBUC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Rail network management will be withdrawn from NS which will have to pay a fee 
to use it. 
2)  Certain passenger transport services in the public interest are covered by public 
service contracts concluded with the tutelage authorities. 
3)  Third parties have theoretical access to the network but this has not yet been put into 
practice. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
The public service obligations imposed by the authorities must be financially compensated 
for by them. 
IV - PORTUGAL 
GENERAL LEGAL FRA!v.JEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCfURE 
1)  The government decides whether to build or decommission railway lines. 
2)  Railways lines are State property while rolling stock belongs to the Portuguese 
Railways Company. 
3)  Rail transport is a public service run under a system of concessions. 
4)  The sole operator is the Portuguese Railways Company (CP), which is a public 
undertaking (legally a public law corporation). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
According to the concession contract, CP must: 
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1)  maintain the rail network. 
2)  maintain the services necessary for the public interest, even if  they run at a loss: if 
they withdraw a public interest link they must provide alternative passenger 
transport. 
3)  submit their fares for government approval. 
4)  charge special fares for certain categories of passenger (soldiers, members of 
parliament and government). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The law now stipulates that the State may concede rail transport services to other 
undertakings than the CP and they may in turn "sub-concede" certain services. In 
practice the CP still enjoy a de facto monopoly. 
2)  To build the lines and buildings needed for operation, the CP have free access to the 
public land and have the right to compulsory purchase. 
3)  To offset their public service obligations, the CP receive State subsidies. 
IV - UNITED KINGDOM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  The construction of railway lines depends on a government decision. 
2)  Under the Railways Privatization Act (1993): 
responsibility for infrastructure is entrusted to a separate undertaking, 
Rail  track; 
rail transport operations are covered by "franchises" issued for 7 years by 
an ad hoc office to operators, which may be private undertakings. This 
office may decide whether a service may be withdrawn. 
3)  British Rail, a State-owned undertaking, has been split up into thirty or so 
independent companies: these companies, many of which have already been 
privatized, operate various services and lines. 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Railtrack is responsible for track upkeep. 
2)  Passenger service obligations are set out in the "franchise" contracts concluded 
between service operators and the "Office of Franchises" (e.g. maximum fares, 
frequency and quality of service). Operators may not charge different fares for 
customers in the same category. 
OPERATORS' SPECIALRIGHTS 
1)  "Franchises!! offer monopoly situations, except on certain lines where there may be 
competition. 
2)  When services run at a loss, "franchise" contracts include some level of subsidy. 
3)  For building infrastructures they may have the right to compulsory purchase. 
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Section V - LOCAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
V- GERMANY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  Operators must obtain a licence issued by the local authorities (by unilateral decision 
and not in the form of contracts) for a variable duration (maximum 8 years for buses 
and 25 years for trams and metros). 
2)  Operators may entrust certain services to sub -contractors. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Numerous operators, mostly private. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBUGATIONS 
Application of fares set by the authorities, sometimes with reductions for certain categories 
(students, the elderly, etc). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Public service obligations are offset by financial contributions from the authorities. 
V- BELGIUM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Local public passenger transport is a public service for which the regions are responsible. 
They have entrusted this service to operating companies which they have set up for this 
purpose and which may in turn sub-contract them to private undertakings. The right to 
operate a service requires an authorization for each route (in the form of a licence or 
concession) from the regional executive. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Wallonia: 
a holding company, the Societe Regionale W  allonne du transport public de 
personnes (SRWT), a totally public undertaking (100% region-owned). 
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5 public transport companies (TEC), one per sector (Brabant Wallen, 
Charleroi, Hainaut, Namur-Luxembourg, Liege-Verviers), public 
undertakings owned by SRWT (51%) and the sector municipalities (49%) 
in proportion to their population, each operates all passenger transport 
services in its own sector. 
2)  Flanders: one company (VVM), a public undertaking structured into 5 regional 
directorates, operates all local transport in the region. 
3)  Brussels-Capital Region: also one undertaking set up by the Region, the STIB 
(Societe des Transports Intercommunaux de Bruxelles), operates all public passenger 
transport. 
Some services have been contracted out to private operators. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
These tasks and obligations are stipulated by the decrees setting up the operating companies 
and by the management contracts that they have concluded with the regional authorities. 
Generally speaking, these companies must provide transport services throughout the area 
that they cover and meet the needs of all their population. 
1)  Wallonia 
a)  Quantitative objectives: operating companies must increase their passenger 
figures (set percentage for the duration of the management contract) and 
may not cut the amount of services on offer by more than 2% (in terms of 
kilometres) before regionalization, plus 10% of supply for each area 
(urban, suburban, rural) taken separately. 
b)  Qualitative objectives: information, bus-stop facilities, vehicle comfort, 
etc. 
2)  Flanders 
The operating company must ensure that the social function of public transport is 
fulfilled, i.e. satisfying the 
11right to mobility
11  especially for persons with mobility 
difficulties. Its transport services must meet the following standards: 
a)  Quantity: 
increased number of passengers 
minimum services per zone (expressed in kilometres) 
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b)  Quality: 
accessibility (maximum distance from the nearest bus-stop, etc) 
minimum frequency of services 
- rationality of routes 
comfort (enough seats) 
reliability (punctuality, regularity) 
information 
bus - stop or tram-stop facilities 
3)  Brussels-Capital 
The operating company must increase frequency of transport by at least 10% per 
annum. 
4)  In all cases, fares are subject to the approval of the regional authorities. They are 
uniform for a given region. Regular consultations are held to ensure coherence 
between fares and the different operating areas, especially where routes interconnect. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Operating companies have a monopoly in their area. 
2)  They may occupy public land (for bus -stops and stations, etc). 
3)  They receive from the regions: 
investment subsidies 
operation subsidies, set out in the management contracts; the principle is 
that expenditure must be balanced by revenue. 
V- DENMARK 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Local transport is regarded as a public service. The authorities responsible are mostly 
regional councils or, sometimes, municipal councils. They exercise their powers through 
public transport undertakings. 
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SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Operators are either public undertakings O'WD.ed by local authorities or private undertakings 
which are sub-contractors to the public undertakings. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Operators must maintain the equipment (when it belongs to the authorities) and provide 
services, even on routes running at a loss. 
OPERATORS  I  SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Operators enjoy a monopoly for the services entrusted to them. 
2)  If  necessary they have privileged access to public land (bus lanes, tram routes, etc). 
3)  They receive subsidies from the authorities to offset their public service obligations. 
V- SPAIN 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The authorities responsible are the municipalities and regions (although the State intervenes 
in bus transport crossing regional boundaries). They entrust the service to public 
undertakings under their ownership or to private undertakings to which they grant 
concessions. In all cases, they determine the service details (routes and timetables) and 
fares. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Operators are public undertakings O'WD.ed by local authorities, in the case of urban buses and 
metros, and private undertakings, in the case of inter-city buses. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Running a regular and uninterrupted service, observing rules laid down by the 
authorities: routes, frequency, fares, including reductions for certain passenger 
categories (large families, the elderly, etc). 
2)  Granting access to the service to all citizens. 
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OPERA.. TORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Operators have exclusivity for the services entrusted to them. 
2)  They have privileged access to the public land (occupation of land for railways, 
traffic privileges for road transport). 
3)  They operate at their own risk on the basis of fares set by the authorities and are not 
entitled to compensation except in exceptional situations. 
V- FRANCE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  The regular public transport of people is legally (domestic transport Act) a public 
service and citizens must have their recognized "right to transport" satisfied. 
2)  This public service is the responsibility of authorities known as "organizing 
authorities" which are: 
a)  in the Paris region: the Syndical des Transports Parisiens, which is an 
association of the State and the regional departments and municipalities. 
b)  elsewhere: 
for urban transport: municipalities and their groupings 
for inter-city and rural transport: the departments 
for regional interest transport: the regions. 
3)  These authorities are responsible for defining and organizing public transport: 
choosing the means of transport 
the consistency of the service: routes, stops and frequency 
choosing operators 
fares and ways of remunerating operators 
carrying out necessary infrastructures 
4)  These authorities may: 
provide the service themselves (a corporation, which may simply be the 
local authority department or a local public undertaking with legal 
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personality) 
or entrust it by contract to an outside undertaking: these contracts last 7-
10 years in general and may be of several types (concession, farming out, 
profit-sharing corporation, all-in management, etc). 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  In the Paris region, one public undertaking (State-owned), the RATP, provides 
most public transport services. The remainder are provided by the public railways 
undertaking (SNCF) and private undertakings. 
2)  Elsewhere: 
a)  Urban public transport is provided by: 
mainly private undertakings 
occasionally by undertakings that depend totally on the local authorities 
(corporations) or mixed economy undertakings (majority public capital) 
b)  Inter-city and rural public transport is provided almost solely by private 
undertakings. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
In all cases it is the organizing authorities that defme the consistency of the service. When 
they entrust it to an undertaking, this is translated by obligations for it which are set out in 
the contract and specified in the accompanying specifications. 
1)  Operators must provide the planned services, in quantity and quality terms (routes, 
location of stops, frequency. timetables, capacity and comfort of vehicles). 
2)  They must meet certain obligations towards users (information, in particular). 
3)  They must charge the fares set by the organizing authority either unilaterally or at 
the operators' proposal, never exceeding an increase maximum determined by the 
government. 
4)  Generally speaking, they must guarantee an uninterrupted service in all 
circumstances or else the contract may be terminated. Organizing authorities may 
unilaterally change the consistency of the service and the operational methods. 
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OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  In nearly all cases, operators enjoy a monopoly in the area and for the services 
entrusted to them. In the Paris region, the monopoly is entrusted by law to the RATP 
(it includes the metro lines and bus routes existing when the undertaking was set up) 
and the SNCF (for suburban railway lines). It also stems froni the contract between 
the operator and the organizing authority, but the contract may be preceded by a call 
for tenders. 
2)  Operators have special rights vis-a-vis the public highways (roads): 
the right of occupation to lay metro and tram rails and to install stops 
in some cases, traffic privileges: bus lanes, in particular. 
3)  Given their responsibility in defining and organizing the service, the authorities meet 
all investment costs, most of the time; they also retain ownership of infrastructures 
and any rolling stock they may have bought. 
4)  To offset their public service tasks and obligations, operators usually receive 
operational subsidies intended to cover general deficits inherent in the public 
transport of people and compensation to offset any fare reductions imposed upon 
them (mainly for social reasons). 
V- GREECE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  Local public transport is regarded as a public service. 
2)  Its content (routes and timetables) is entirely determined by the authorities: a special 
authority (OAS) in Athens, and the prefectures for the rest of the country. 
3)  The State sets fares for the whole country. 
4)  Apart from Thessaloniki, there are no contracts between authorities and operators. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Most operators are cooperatives of private undertakings supplying vehicles and 
drivers. 
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2)  In Athens, the service is provided by three State-owned public undertakings. 
3)  In Thessaloniki: private undertaking. 
4)  On Rhodes: municipal undertaking. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Operators must meet conditions set by the authorities. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGIITS 
1)  Operators have monopolies wherever they operate. 
2)  Fares are subsidized everywhere by the authorities to offset the obligations imposed 
on operators. 
V- IRELAND 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Public transport is organized on an essentially national basis. The local authorities play a 
very limited role. :Main responsibility lies with the state established and controlled CIE 
(Transport Authority of Ireland). Through this entity, the state defines the public transport 
service. There are also bus services run on a purely commercial basis. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  CIE, which also owns the national railways company (Irish Rail), provides most 
local transport services through its two subsidiaries: 
Dublin Bus, for the capital and its area; 
Irish Bus. for other towns, inter-city services and rural routes. 
2)  A number of private operators also provide bus services. especially in the 
countryside. 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The law calls on the CIE to provide efficient, safe and economically sound services. 
Certain categories (pensioners, students, etc) may travel free or pay reduced fares. 
School transport is the responsibility of Irish Bus. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
CIE has a monopoly for urban rail or bus transport; long distance bus operators face 
competition. 
The State offers financial compensation for public service obligations. 
V- ITALY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  Public passenger transport is regarded as a public service. The organizing authorities 
determine the content of the service (routes and timetables) and fares. They are: 
the municipalities, in the case of urban transport; 
the regions, in the case of rural and inter-city transport. 
2)  These authorities may offer the service directly or set up for that purpose public 
bodies. They may also entrust it to private undertakings, chosen possibly after calls 
for tender and to which they may grant renewable concessions. The authority make a 
financial contribution to investment and operational costs. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Most operators are local public undertakings. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
As a public service, public transport must observe the principles of equal access for users, 
continuity of service (regular and uninterrupted services) and efficiency. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Operators have exclusivity for the route entrusted to them. 
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2)  When the infrastructures require it, operators may occupy the public highway. 
V - LUXE:MBOURG 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Local public transport is regarded as a public service. The authorities responsible are: 
the city of Luxembourg for transport in the capital; 
the syndicate of municipalities of the canton of Esch, for public transport in that 
canton; 
elsewhere, each municipality for transport on its territory; 
the Ministry of Transport for inter-city transport. 
The authorities set routes, timetables and fares. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The operators are: 
1)  for urban services: public undertakings owned by the local authorities in question, 
e.g.: 
- A  VL (Autobus de 1a Ville de Luxembourg) 
- TICE (Tramways Intercommunaux du Canton d 'Esch) 
2)  for inter-city services: private bus undertakings operating on the basis of 10-year 
concessions, routes defined by the Ministry of Transport within the general road 
transport scheme. 
OPERATORS  I  SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Costs incurred to meet service requirements are met out of the municipal or State budget. 
V  - NETHERLANDS 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The organizing authorities are responsible for setting routes and timetables. They are: 
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a)  for urban transport; the municipalities which provide the service 
directly by their own undertakings, 
or by concluding contracts with regional transport companies (for 12 
years); 
b)  for inter-city transport; the State, which issues licences to transport companies for 
unlimited periods. 
In all cases, fares are set by the State. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Most operators are public undertakings owned by the municipalities or the State (which 
controls a group of "regional transport companies" by a holding). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Everywhere operators enjoy a monopoly and receive sizeable subsidies from the authorities. 
V- PORTUGAL 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The public transport of people is regarded as a public service. the authorities decide the 
routes, timetables and fares. They are: 
1)  the State for inter-city transport: to date, through a public bus undertaking 
(Rodoviaria Nacional) recently split into three companies ready for privatization. 
2)  the municipalities for urban transport: 
in cities, the service is provided directly by the municipality or by local 
public undertakings; 
in small municipalities, it tends to be entrusted to undertakings by 
concession. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
A wide variety of operators: 
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national public undertakings; 
municipal public undertakings, e.g. in the capital, the Lisbon Railways Company and 
the Metropolitan; 
private undertakings. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
They are defined in concession contracts. Generally speaking, operators must provide a 
service in pre-set conditions for routes, timetables and fares. 
OPERA.TORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Operators enjoy a monopoly on the routes entrusted to them. 
2)  Railways and metro operators in Lisbon may use the public land and have the right to 
compulsory purchase to build their infrastructures. 
3)  The authorities regularly compensate for public service deficits with subsidies. 
V  - UNITED KINGDOM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1)  Most services operate on a strictly commercial basis. This is the case of long distance 
coaches and most local bus services in England (apart from Greater London), Wales 
and Scotland. The authorities do not intervene (no contracts with operators). 
Operators decide their own service content (routes and timetables) as well as fares. 
2)  When the service is regarded as meeting a public interest need (beyond market 
requirements): 
either it is provided by a public undertaking owned by the organizing 
authority which defines routes, timetables and fares 
or the organizing authority entrusts it to a private undertaking after an 
appeal for tenders and a fixed -length contract is signed. The organizing 
authority sets the routes and timetables. Fares are set by the organizing 
authority or the operator. Facilities and rolling stock may belong to one or 
the other. 
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SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  Public operators 
a)  In Greater London: 
London Buses, London Underground and Docklands Light Railway, 
public undertakings fully owned by London Regional Transport, the 
organizing authority. 
British Rail, for suburban lines. 
b)  Local interest railways in the rest of  England, Wales and Scotland: 
British Rail 
Some railway companies owned by local authorities 
c)  In Northern Ireland, all public transport is run by State-owned public 
undertakings. 
2)  Private operators: provide most bus services in England outside London, Wales and 
Scotland, plus some bus routes in London. 
PUBUC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
They relate to routes, frequency and, sometimes, fares. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Public undertakings operate as a monopoly and receive subsidies from the authorities 
which own them to offset losses. 
2)  Private concessionaire undertakings enjoy a de facto monopoly, resulting from their 
concession (even if  by right another undertaking could, in theory, provide the same 
service without a concession, on a purely commercial basis) and receive subsidies to 
offset the extra commercial cost of the service. 
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Section VI- POSTAL SERVICES 
VI- GERMANY 
GEl\TERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Constitutionally the postal service (Postdienst) is a public service for which the federal State 
has responsibility. Along with the two other public undertakings for telecommunications and 
postal banking services, the postal service is still today, under the 1989 Act, an entity, the 
Federal Post Office (Deutsche Bundespost Postdienst), under the tutelage of the Minister of 
Post and Telecommunications. The minister's role is to ensure that the service operates in 
accordance with the principles and policy of the Federal Republic. On this score, he may 
issue directives and approve postal charges. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The postal service has, since 1989, been a public undertaking with a legal personality (it 
used simply to be a department in the federal Ministry of Post and Telecommunications). 
Privatization is being contemplated. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
A. Universal service 
The postal service is legally obliged to meet the community's postal service needs (i.e. those 
of the citizens, the economy and administration) and, for that purpose, to put sufficient 
resources, in accordance with technological and economic requirements, at the disposal of 
everyone in identical conditions. 
This universal service task includes the following services: 
1)  "letter mail": letters, postcards, electronic mail, parcels service for goods and books, 
mail advertising, unaddressed mail; 
2)  parcel delivery: small parcels up to a certain weight (20 kg} and certain dimensions; 
3)  press mail; 
4)  transfrontier services. 
All these services must be performed within a reasonable period and at prices accessible and 
identical for all (principle of equalization). 
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B. Confidentiality 
This is an obligation laid down by the Constitution and specified by law. It forbids all post 
office employee to open closed mail and to communicate its content to third parties. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
The postal service enjoys a legal monopoly for transporting addressed mail (collection, 
transportation and distribution), i.e. all dispatches containing written communications or 
any other information from one person to another, up to 1 kg. In practice, this includes 
letters, postcards and information mail and applies to transfrontier mail, too. Not covered 
by this monopoly are goods, small parcels, newspapers and magazines. 
VI- BELGIUM 
GENERAL LEGAL FR.Al\1EWORK 
The postal service is a public service for which the State is responsible; it is organized by 
law which entrusts operation of it to the public undertaking "La Poste". Rates are set by "La 
Poste" but the principles applied to rates are set out in the management contract concluded 
between it and the State. The minister in charge may reject rates presented for his approval. 
Postage stamps are issued by royal decree on the proposal of "La Poste". 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
In 1992 "La Peste" became an "autonomous public undertaking" (it was previously a 
"public interest body", under close ministerial tutelage) but remains in full State ownership. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
A.  General public service tasks are set by law. They are intended to "safeguard 
permanently the universality and confidentiality of written communications". They 
include: 
letter mail: the collection, transportation and distribution throughout the 
country of all correspondence or dispatches (personal or impersonal, 
handwritten or printed, sealed or unsealed, addressed or not); 
stamp sales. 
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B.  These tasks must be carried out in the observance of certain principles laid down by 
law or even the Constitution, and reiterated in the management contract: 
1)  Principle of equality: all users must have access to postal services in equal 
conditions, which means inter alia uniform rates throughout the country. 
2)  Principle of continuity: "La Poste" must provide a service in all 
circumstances. 
3)  Principle of confidentiality: the secret of correspondence, guaranteed by 
the Constitution. 
C.  To perform these tasks, "La Poste" is subject to specific obligations. 
1)  Some set or laid down by law or regulation: 
- to provide each municipality with at least one mail box; 
to carry out, in each municipality, at least one collection, dispatch and 
distribution of mail on each working day; 
to distribute mail to every home in the country; 
- to distribute electoral documents; 
- to distribute certain letter mail dispatches under franchise; 
- to distribute certain mail items on Saturdays. 
2)  others are listed in the management contract concluded between the State 
and "La Peste". 
- to distribute urgent mail the first working day after posting; 
- for other mail, to attain the objective of 80% on the following 
working day and 95% the day after that; 
setting latest collection times; 
making specific commitments to improve customer information and 
reception and service quality. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  "La Peste" has a legal monopoly for collecting, transporting and distributing sealed 
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and unsealed letters, postcards and some other addressed items, of up to 1 kg in 
weight, apart from rapid delivery services which are now open to competition. 
2)  When it was turned into a public undertaking, 
11La Paste" received full ownership of 
the buildings which the State put at its disposal when it was only a department. It has 
the right to compulsory purchase for new buildings, if  public interest is declared. 
3)  "La Posten traditionally is entitled to instal mail boxes on the public highway, with 
permission from the roads department. 
4)  "La Paste" receives a yearly State contribution to cover shortfalls resulting from 
rates imposed on it  for certain services (official paid, reduced rates for electoral 
documents and newspapers and periodicals). 
VI- DENMARK 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The postal services are a public service whose content is defined by law; rates are fixed by 
the government. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The postal service is provided by the Postal Services Division which is part (along with 
Telecommunications) of the Post and Telegraph Administration. 1bis is a department of the 
Ministry of Communications and has no legal personality, although it enjoys a fair degree of 
administrative and financial autonomy. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The postal service is legally obliged: 
1)  to collect, transport and distribute mail throughout the country - i.e.: 
addressed letters of up to 1 kg, 
mail addressed to the blind of up to 7 kg, 
parcels up to 20 kg, 
addressed newspapers and periodicals up to 500 g, 
unaddressed mail. 
The aim is to distribute mail within 24 hours, or 3 -4  days at reduced rate. 
2)  to produce and sell stamps; 
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3)  to observe correspondence secrecy. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The postal service has a legal monopoly for the collection, transportation and 
distribution of letters, postcards and other dispatches containing handwritten 
messages, up to 1 kg. The distribution of pre-paid dispatches is unrestricted. 
2)  The postal service may use public land for its facilities (buildings, mail boxes). 
VI- SPAIN 
GENERAL LEGAL FR.Al\1EWORK 
Constitutionally and legally, postal services are public services for which the State is 
exclusive!  y responsible. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The postal service is entrusted to the Autonomous Mail and Telegraph Body, an entity with 
legal personality set up in 1992 (previously it was just a department of the Ministry of 
Transport and Telecommunications). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The post office is legally obliged to collect, transport and distribute correspondence 
throughout the country: letters, postcards, periodicals, printed matter, small parcels (up to 
500 g). Distribution must be daily. The service is subject by law to the obligation to respect 
the inviolability of personal correspondence (a right guaranteed by the Constitution). Rates 
are set by the government. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
The post office enjoys a legal monopoly for the collection, transportation and distribution of 
letters (up to 2 kg) and postcards (up to 20 g)  as well as stamp and franking-machine 
distribution. 
VI- FRANCE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAl\.1EWORK 
The postal service is legally a public service entrusted to the Post Office. Public service 
tasks are defined by law and specified in a list of specifications which is a government 
decree. The undertaking is still under the tutelage of the appropriate ministers who still have 
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powers to decide on rates (increases are included in the "plan contract" concluded between 
the State and the Post Office). 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Since 1990 the Post Office has been a corporation under public law and therefore a legally 
autonomous public undertaking, whereas previously it was just part of the Post and 
Telecommunications Administration and had no legal personality. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
A. Public service tasks 
By law, the Post Office has the fundamental task of providing throughout the country: 
1)  the public mail service in all forms (what the specifications define as "the collection, 
transportation and distribution of correspondence and goods"); 
2)  the public service of transporting and distributing the press. 
The undertaking must also make a contribution to defence and State security. 
B. Public service obligations 
1)  These accrue from the usual principles of public service and are set by law or laid 
down in the specifications. 
a)  According to the principle of equal treatment, the Post Office must: 
set up a network of facilities covering the whole country: post offices 
and mail boxes on the public highway; 
apply the same basic rates throughout the country, through 
equalization; 
b)  According to the principle of continuity, the service must be provided 
uninterruptedly. Specifically mail must be collected from public mail 
boxes and distributed to homes on every working day. 
2)  The Post Office is also legally bound by the special obligation of respecting the 
inviolability and secrecy of correspondence. 
3)  The government may impose further obligations on the Post Office. 
105  PE 165.202 Publ~c undertakings  and public serv1ce act1vities 1n the European Union 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The Post Office has a legal monopoly for transporting letters as well as parcels and 
papers not exceeding 1 kg. 
2)  It has a monopoly for issuing stamps. 
3)  It has at its disposal its own public property and received free of charge full 
ownership of the real estate which the State previously put at its disposal when it was 
only a department. 
4)  For performing its public service tasks, it has the right to compulsory purchase. 
5)  It is fully entitled to instal on the public highway the facilities needed for its task 
(highway permission). 
6)  It receives a financial contribution from the State to offset its obligations to distribute 
the press and the supplementary public service obligations imposed upon it. 
VI- GREECE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The post office is a public service for which the State has responsibility. The management is 
appointed by the government. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The Hellenic Post Office is a public undertaking with legal personality, in the form of a 
company with the State as sole shareholder. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The post office must maintain offices throughout the country and provide a full postal 
service. Rates must be approved by the appropriate minister. 
OPERA  TORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The post office enjoys a legal monopoly for transporting domestic and international 
mail, i.e. personal 'Written correspondence, letters or postcards, up to 2 kg. 
2)  For its infrastructures (offices, public mail boxes, etc) the post office has privileged 
access to the public land and the right to compulsory purchase. 
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3)  The post office's deficit, covered by the telecommunications organization in the past, 
will probably now be met by the State. 
VI- IRELAND 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The post office is a public service under the tutelage of the minister who appoints the 
management and controls rates. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The Irish Post Office is a public undertaking in the form of a private law company all of 
whose shares are held by the State. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBUGATIONS 
The post office must by law provide a postal service throughout the country and abroad, 
fully and efficiently, and at the lowest possible cost for the user, even where the service is 
not profitable. It must respect the secrecy of correspondence (infringements are criminal 
offences). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The post office has a legal monopoly for collecting, transporting and distributing 
mail items up to 2 kg: i.e all items apart from telegrams, periodicals and parcels 
(unless the periodical or parcel contains a personal communication). The post office 
or tutelage minister may, in principle, grant derogations to this monopoly. 
2)  The post office has the right to compulsory purchase. 
VI- ITALY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Legally the postal service is a public service, for which the State - or rather, the Ministry 
of Post and Telecommunications  - has responsibility. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Since 1993 the Italian post office has been a public economic body, with legal personality (it 
was previously simply a department of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications). 
There are plans to turn it into a commercial law company in 1996. 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The post office must provide a postal service throughout the country. The recent 
,,programme contract
11  between the post office and the State includes a npublic postal service 
charter~~ which includes the following obligations: equal treatment of users, rapid response 
to requests, easy access to offices (for the disabled), etc. The post office must observe 
correspondence secrecy and rates are set by the government. 
OPERATORS, SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The State (and the post office, on its behalf) have the monopoly: 
of the collection, transportation and distribution of correspondence, letters 
and postcards), of up to 2 kg; 
of transporting parcels of up to 20 kg between large towns; 
However, the post office may concede to third parties certain services covered by the 
monopoly: i.e. distributing express mail and transporting letters and parcels. The 
collection, transportation and distribution of pre-franked mail is not restricted. 
2)  For its infrastructures, the post office has access to the  public land and has the right 
to compulsory purchase. 
VI - LUXEl\mOURG 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The postal service is legally a public service for which the State has responsibility. The State 
concedes operations to the Post and Telecommunications Undertaking which remains under 
the tutelage of the appropriate minister. Postal rates are decided by the government. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
In 1992, the Post and Telecommunications, previously simply a government department, 
became a public establishment entitled tithe Post and Telecommunications Undertakingn  -
i.e. a fully State-owned public undertaking with legal personality. The post office is a 
separate division of this undertaking. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Given its general responsibility to operate the postal service, the post office must find the 
resources to collect mail (enough mail boxes and daily, at the very least, collections), 
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transport it (with the aim of delivering mail the day after mailing) and distribute it (once a 
day on working days). It is legally entrusted with producing, issuing and selling stamps. The 
Constitution obliges it to respect correspondence secrecy. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The post office has a legal monopoly for transporting letters and postcards of up to 2 
kg, letters being defined as written communications sent in one copy and not 
reproduced by mechanical or photographic means. 
2)  When it was turned into a public undertaking, the post office received full ownership 
of the buildings which the State used to put at its disposal when it was merely a 
department. For new buildings, it no longer enjoys any privilege and is subject to 
ordinary law for purchasing or renting premises. 
3)  By tradition the post office is entitled by the authorities to instal mail boxes on the 
public highways (permission from the roads department). 
.  4)  Certain loss -making services may receive State compensation. 
VI - NETHERLANDS 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The postal service is a public service for which the State has responsibility. Organized by 
law, it  is conceded to PTT Post. The appropriate minister (Transport and Public Works) 
retains powers to issue general directives to the concessionaire which must submit an annual 
report. Postal rates are set by agreement between the concessionaire and the minister. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
PIT Nederland, a private undertaking since 1993 (previously 100% State-owned) is 
divided into two branches, PIT Post and PIT  Telecom. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The law entrusts the concessionaire: 
with transporting all addressed items within the country and abroad (up to 
certain weight, set by the government at 10 kg); 
with installing public mail boxes on the public highway; 
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with issuing stamps. 
The concessionaire may entrust these obligations to a subsidiary but remains responsible for 
the service. 
2)  The concessionaire must comply with the directives issued by the appropriate 
minister in terms of quality of service, rate structures, safety of dispatches, 
confidentiality and the provision of unprofitable services. The directives issued by 
the minister include the following obligations: 
charging uniform rates throughout the country; 
maintaining the post office network; 
observing a maximum distance between public mail boxes; 
distributing mail on every working day; 
distributing every letter the day after it is posted. 
3)  It must observe correspondence secrecy, as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The concessionaire enjoys a monopoly for transporting letters and postcards of up to 
500 g, and issuing stamps. 
2)  The concessionaire has exclusive rights for installing mail boxes on the public 
highway. 
3)  The concessionaire is entitled to financial compensation for unprofitable services 
provided at the express request of the government. 
VI - PORTUGAL 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The post office is a public service for which the State has responsibility. This service is 
organized by law and entrusted to CIT. It remains under the tutelage of the appropriate 
minister and a regulatory body, the Portuguese Communications Institute, which controls 
rates and service quality. 
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SECTOR STRUCTURE 
In 1992, the Portuguese post office, CIT, was separated from telecommunications (with 
which it used to form a single undertaking) and turned into a limited company, albeit State-
owned. In other words, it is a public undertaking. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The post office must provide a universal postal service throughout the country, i.e.: 
the collection, transportation and distribution of postal correspondence; 
the issue and sale of stamps; 
a fax service. 
2)  It must establish the infrastructure needed for this service. 
3)  It must respect correspondence secrecy. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  The post office enjoys a monopoly 
for collecting, transporting and distributing all addressed mail up to 2 kg; 
for issuing and selling stamps; 
for the fax service. 
2)  The post office is entitled to a State subsidy to offset its public service obligations. 
3)  For its infrastructures (post offices, public mail boxes), the post office has access to 
the public land and the right to compulsory purchase. 
VI - UNITED KINGDOM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The postal service is regarded as a public service and the State is responsible for it. It is 
entrusted by law to the Post Office which remains under government tutelage: the 
appropriate minister appoints its chairman and members of the board of directors. He is 
empowered to approve basic rates. 
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SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The main operator is the Post Office, a fully State-owned public corporation (the 
government recently withdrew its privatization Bill). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The Post Office must legally meet "all reasonable demands" for carrying mail throughout 
the country. This task does not extend to newspapers and is not translated by any distribution 
frequency obligations. The Post Office must respect correspondence secrecy. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RlGHTS 
1)  The Post Office has the monopoly for the collection, transportation and distribution 
of  letters (defined as written communications sent to a specific address other than by 
a telecommunications system). The appropriate minister may grant independent 
operators licences exempting them from the monopoly: he has already done so for 
express mail costing more than £1 per dispatch. 
2)  The Post Office has right of access to the public highway to instal mail boxes and has 
the right to compulsory purchase for buildings. 
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Section VII - TELECOI\1MUNICATIONS 
VII - GERMANY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
According to the Constitution, the State is responsible for organising the public 
telecommunications network and telephone service. This responsibility is entrusted by law 
to Deutsche T~lekom. Private undertakings may also offer other telecommunications 
services on the basis of a State licence. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Until recently merely a department of the Federal Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications, in 1989 Deutsche Telekom became a public undertaking. On 1 
January 1995 the undertaking was turned into a private law company while remaining 
State-owned. There are plans for gradual privatization beginning in 1996; private operators 
already exist. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  Deutsche Telekom is legally obliged to set up throughout the country sufficient 
infrastructures to make telecommunications services accessible to all. 
2)  It must provide everyone throughout the country with a basic vocal telephone 
service, with specific obligations: 
to provide a service 
to connect users 
to provide emergency and information services 
to offer minimum quality standards 
to publish directories 
3)  Undertakings with licences for other services have the same obligations in respect of 
those services; 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Deutsche Telekom has lost its monopoly for installing telephones. For the time being it 
retains on behalf of the State a monopoly for infrastructures and vocal telephone services but 
current legislative plans would end it. 
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VII - BELGIUM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A certain number of telecommunications services are still regarded as a public service and 
are entrusted by law to BELGACOM. For these activities, the undertaking remains under a 
certain State tutelage to which it is tied by a management contract setting out the tasks 
stemming from its public service tasks. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
BELGACOM is an autonomous public undertaking which in 1991 succeeded the RTT 
(Regie des Telegraphes et Telephones). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
A.  BELGACOM'  s general public service tasks are set by law. The undertaking must 
provide users with a regular, uninterrupted and equal service in the following areas: 
infrastructure 
public installations 
telephone and telegraph services 
telex 
mobile phone services 
radio messages 
B.  The management contract defines the detailed obligations imposed on the 
undertaking to execute its tasks: 
extending (with specific objectives for 5 years) the numerical network; 
extending (also with detailed figures) the mobile phone network; 
improving telephone connection times (aim: 5 days for 90% of cases by 
end of 1996); 
reducing and dealing more quickly with service interruptions; 
installing a minimum number of public telephone call-boxes; 
providing information and supplying directories; 
public service charges must increase more slowly than the consumer prices 
index and include social reductions (remote elderly persons, the disabled, 
etc). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  BELGACOM enjoys a monopoly for vocal telephone services. 
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2)  For its infrastructures, BELGACOM has the right to compulsory purchase, to 
establish easements and to use the public land. 
3)  BELGACOM receives a State subsidy to cover the losses resulting from its public 
service obligations. 
VII - DENMARK 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Telecommunications are regarded by law as a public service. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  A mixed economy undertaking (majority State ownership), Tele Danmark provides 
most telecommunication activities. 
2)  A private undertaking (Dansk Mobil Telefon) competes with Tele Danmark for 
mobile telephones. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
• 
Tele Danmark is obliged to connect anyone applying for a telephone, provide an 
information service and supply directories. 
Public service activities (mainly vocal telephones) must apply a uniform charge. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Tele Danmark has a monopoly for vocal telephones. 
2)  For its infrastructures, Tele Danmark may use public land and has the right to 
compulsory purchase (and to establish easements). 
VII- SPAIN 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Telecommunications activities in general are regarded as a public service and are State 
responsibility. The State entrust their execution to Telefonica de Espana by a concession 
contract. 
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SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Telefonica is a private undertaking but is State-controlled (one third State ownership). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
A. General tasks 
Telefonica must provide a telephone service in the public interest, i.e. continuously and 
permanently while ensuring that communications are of high quality, safe and secret. 
B. Specific obligations 
1)  Any user so requesting must be connected to the telephone network. 
2)  Public call-boxes must be installed throughout the country (at least one per 10 
inhabitants). 
3)  An information service must be laid on and directories published. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Telefonica has a monopoly for the public telephone network and for basic telephone 
services, including information services and directories. 
VII- FRANCE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A good many telecommunications activities are regarded by the law as public services and 
are therefore State responsibility: these include creating public networks and providing 
public interest services such as vocal telephone services and telex. By law these public 
service activities are generally entrusted to the public operator, France Telecom, in 
exclusivity but some of them may, after ministerial authorization, be run by other operators. 
Non-public service activities are not restricted. Tutelage over the public operator and the 
exercise of State responsibilities in the sector are ensured by the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications, assisted by the Commission Superieure du Service Public. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
1)  The telecommunications service, until1991 merely a division of the State 
administration of Post and Telecommunications, changed its name to France 
Telecom, became the "public operator", a public undertaking proper, while 
remaining a public State-owned corporation. 
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2)  Private operators (such as the Societe Fran¢se de Radiotelephonie) operate services 
not covered by the monopoly. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
France Telecom  Is public service tasks are set by law and specified in the form of detailed 
obligations to be found in the specifications laid down by the State. 
A. Public service tasks 
1)  to establish and operate the public networks needed for public telecommunications 
services and to connect these networks with foreign ones. 
2)  to provide all public telecommunications services while observing the principles of 
equality, continuity and adaptation, i.e. services throughout the country, treating 
users equally, providing a service in all circumstances and taking into account the 
government 
1 s local and regional planning policy. 
B. Public service obligations: 
to connect to the telephone network anyone so requesting, as quickly as possible, in 
reasonable and uniform fmancial conditions. 
to apply uniform communications rates regardless of the locality, which calls for 
equalization of cost differences; charges are subjected to government control. 
to install public call-boxes on public land in sufficient numbers to meet the 
population 
1 s needs. 
to publish telephone directories and provide an information service. 
to offer data transmission services and public radio telephone connections. 
to offer the best possible service and, in particular, deal quickly with interruptions or 
disturbances and provide user information. 
to assist State defence and public safety. 
to provide free transmission of emergency calls and radio communications at sea. 
to respect communications secrecy. 
to provide any other services the government may regard as in the public interest. 
117  PE 165.202 Publ~c undert~ngs and  publ~c service  act~vities in the European  Un1on 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  France Telecom has a legal monopoly: 
for installing public networks (except in cases of ministerial derogation 
granted to other operators, in case of public interest needs and provided 
that the obligations inherent in a public service activity are met); 
for the telephone service between fixed points; 
for the telex service; 
for telephone call-boxes on public land. 
Other telecommunications activities are open to competition (for example installing 
telephones, mobile telephone services, data transmission). 
2)  For its public service tasks, France Telecom has a priority for the use of State-
allocated frequencies. 
3)  France Telecom has received full ownership of the immoveable assets (depending on 
the State's public or private land) which the State previously put at the disposal of the 
former telecommunications department. It also has at its disposal the public land 
which it owns (and which is inalienable and not subject to limitation). 
4)  For its public service tasks, France Telecom has the right to compulsory purchase 
and to gain access to public land. 
5)  France Telecom receives financial compensation to offset those public services that 
are free of charge, especially those which the State imposes for certain users 
(reductions for the press, free emergency calls, telephone calls at sea, etc). 
VII- GREECE 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
By law, telecommunications are a public service activity. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The Telecommunications Organization of Greece <qTE) is a public undertaking in the form 
of a limited company - the State is the only shareholder. 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  OTE must connect to the telephone network all users at uniform prices. Any user 
situated more than 200 metres from the network must meet the extra cost. 
2)  OTE must provide the service at the same price but charges may vary for local, trunk 
and international calls. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  OTE has a monopoly for the network and fixed telephone calls (including 
information and directories); mobile telephones are open to competition. 
2)  To instal infrastructures OTE has the right to compulsory purchase. 
3)  By law financial compensation must be paid for losses resulting from public service 
obligations. In practice this has never had to be applied. 
VII - IRELAND 
GENERAL LEGAL FRA1viEWORK 
Telecommunications are regarded as a public service activity. The main operator, Irish 
Telecom, was set up by law and its management are government appointees. Telephone 
service charges are subject to ministerial approval. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
Irish Telecom, a State-owned public undertaking, provides most basic telecommunications 
services. Some independent operators provides other services. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The law gives Irish Telecom the task of providing the State and the population with a 
comprehensive and efficient telecommunications service. 
2)  Irish Telecom is obliged to connect all users to the network provided that the request 
can be reasonably met. 
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OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
Irish Telecom has a monopoly for fixed vocal telephone services, telex and satellite 
communications. 
Vll- ITALY 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Basic telecommunications services are legally regarded as public services and are 
exclusively State responsibility (Ministry of Post and Telecommunications). The State may 
concede their operation to undertakings. Charges are subject to government approval. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
In 1992 the former Telephones Corporation (ASTT) was turned by law into a private 
undertaking in the form of a company owned by the IRI (itself a corporation): the STET. 
The STET is the parent company of Telecom ltalia, which runs national telecommunications 
services, Italcable, providing international services, and Telespazio, in charge of satellite 
communications. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1)  The law has granted Iritel the public telecommunications service concession. This 
service is provided by the SIP which is entrusted with the national telephone service, 
including installing the network and public call-boxes, mobile telephones, 
information services and directories. International services are left to Italcable. 
2)  A ministerial regulation sets the SIP's specific obligations for a basic telephone 
service: 
a maximum of 60 days for a new connection (30 days when moving 
house); 
dealing with breakdowns within 2 days (with a 5% standing charge 
reduction for every day extra). 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Iritel has a monopoly for the network, basic services (vocal telephones and data 
transmission, including information services and directories) and mobile telephones 
(installing telephones and value-added services are operated in open competition). 
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2)  For its installations, Iritel has the right to compulsory purchase and to establish 
easements. 
VII - LUXEMBOURG 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Basic telecommunications services are regarded by the law as public services and State 
responsibility. The State concedes operations to the Post and Telecommunications 
Undertaking (EPI') which remains under government tutelage. Charges are subject to 
governmentapprov~. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
EPT is a public establishment, i.e. a public undertaking with leg~  personality, which in 
1992 replaced the State department which previously ran telecommunications services. 
These services are a division within the undertaking. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBUGATIONS 
As concessionaire for public telecommunication services, the EPf must: 
connect to the telephone network at a uniform price anyone so requesting, 
provided they are within the perimeter of municipal built-up areas. 
Outside that perimeter users must meet extra costs. 
provide a telephone service at uniform prices (equalization). 
provide an information service and supply directories. 
OPERA..TORS' SPECIALRIGHTS 
The EPT: 
enjoys a monopoly for the telephone network and vocal telephone services; 
is entitled to use the public land and to establish easements on private land. 
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VII - NETHERLANDS 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Basic telecommunications services are public services, State responsibility and organized by 
law. They are conceded to PI'T Telecom. The appropriate minister (Transport and Public 
Works) is still empowered to issue general directives to the concessionaire which must 
submit a yearly report. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
PTT Telecom BV is a subsidiary of PIT Nederland, a private undertaking since 1993 
(previously a public undertaking, 100% State -owned). 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The law obliges the concessionaire: 
to run the telecommunication infrastructure; 
to guarantee connection for all to the telephones network, at a uniform 
price; 
to provide basic services at a uniform price: telephones, telegraph, telex, 
directories. 
OPERATORS' SPECIAL RIGHTS 
The concessionaire has a legal monopoly: 
for building and running the network; 
for providing basic services (fixed vocal telephone services, telegraphs, 
telex). 
VII - PORTUGAL 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The law regards basic telecommunications services as public services for which the State has 
responsibility. These services are conceded to Portugal Telecom. 
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SECTOR STRUCTURE 
The only public service operator, Portugal Telecom is a public undertaking set up by 
law in 1992, in the form of a limited company under full State ownership, out of the 
telecommunications sector of CTI Goint post and telecommunications undertaking), 
to be merged in 1994 with the Lisbon and Oporto Telephones Company. 
There are private operators, especially for value-added services. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
The law and concession contract between the State and Portugal Telecom entrust the latter 
with: 
1)  the task of providing all telecommunications services; 
2)  the obligation: 
to provide a universal service throughout the country 
to guarantee equal access to the service 
to ensure continuity and service quality 
to guarantee the inviolability of communications 
to provide information services, directories, commercial assistance and 
maintenance. 
OPERATORSt SPECIAL RIGHTS 
1)  Portugal Telecom has a monopoly for the network and basic telephone services, 
including directory supplies. 
2}  In order to instal its infrastructures, Portugal Telecom may use the public land, has 
the right to compulsory purchase and to establish easements on private land. 
VII - UNITED KINGDOM 
GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The State retains its responsibility and the telecommunications sector is organized by law, 
providing for the issue of licences granted under certain conditions to operators. Controls 
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over operators are carried out by a public body, Oftel. 
SECTOR STRUCTURE 
British Telecom, a private undertaking (previously State-owned), provides most 
telecommunications services, in competition with some private undertakings, especially 
Mercury. 
PUBLIC SERVICE TASKS AND OBLIGATIONS 
According to its licence, British Telecom must: 
provide a universal telephone service throughout the country and some 
special services (emergencies); 
maintain sufficient numbers of telephone call-boxes; 
provide an information service; 
set prices according to an overall formula, without discrimination. 
OPERATORS  I  SPECIAL RIGHTS 
British Telecom has no special rights compared with ordinary operators. 
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Summary 
A. Analysis of the organization of major public service networks reveals widely varying 
situations from country to country and sector to sector. In respect of the appropriate 
authority: central State, federal States or regions, or local authorities. In respect of the 
operators in question: ministerial departments, public or private undertakings with a 
monopoly throughout the country, major oligopolistic undertakings, or a host of small 
operators with varying legal status. In respect of the tasks, obligations and special rights: 
ranging from very substantial and specific to negligible and vague, with a whole range of 
situations in between, formalized or implicit, resulting from public regulation (laws or some 
other form of regulation), or contracts between the authorities and operators, sometimes 
simply the product of customary practice and even, in some cases, (e.g. the shareout of 
areas of exclusivity) of agreements between the operators themselves. In respect of how 
activities are monitored in the public interest: by the public administration itself (the 
traditional "continental" method) or by an independent "regulatory" body, appointed by the 
authorities (British model). 
B. These criteria could be used to establish a national typology. 
1) We would have a first group of countries, mostly "southern" ones (Belgium, Spain, 
France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal) where: 
the concept of public service is well-established; 
the norm remains in most sectors (electricity, gas, railways, postal 
services and telecommunications) for almost exclusive central State 
powers and a major national public undertaking legally entrusted with 
specific and restrictive tasks and obligations, granted very substantial 
rights nearly always tantamount to monopolies; 
certain sectors (water and urban transport) are, on the contrary, the 
responsibility of local authorities and are run by a wide variety of 
operators; 
there is, however, a trend towards privatizing public undertakings and 
reducing both obligations and special rights. 
2) In a second group (United Kingdom, Ireland): 
the notion of public service is not traditionally formalized; 
until recently, however (early 1980s), the situation in reality was not so 
very different from the countries in the first group; 
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the recent privatization and liberalization trend has, especially in Great 
Britain, substantially changed the landscape so that it is now mainly 
composed of private operators subjected to "regulators" outside the 
authorities' control although they are appointed by them and act in the 
public interest; 
there remain, nonetheless, large areas within public ownership, subjected 
to public interest requirements and enjoying special rights. 
3) In a third group, all"northern" countries (Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands): 
in certain sectors (railways, postal services and telecommunications) the 
situation has always been similar to that in the first group, sometimes even 
with direct management by the national authorities; 
other sectors, on the other hand (electricity, gas, water and urban 
transport) were mainly regional or local responsibilities and a fair number 
of operators had exclusivity areas often determined by agreements between 
them rather than by decisions taken by the authorities; 
there is a current trend towards privatizing national public undertakings, 
while maintaining existing regional and local powers and, in general, a 
fairly high degree of public service obligations 
C. There is, however, a common feature to them all: nowhere do network activities have the 
same status as that applied to the production of ordinary goods and services. Even in the 
more anti-interventionist countries, they are not usually left to "free enterprise" or "the 
freedom of trade and industry  n  according to which: 
everyone is free to indulge in any form of production, without need of 
authorization, provided that applicable legislation is respected (safety 
rules, environmental protection, product definition, etc); 
the authorities do not intervene, allowing individuals to take (or not take) 
the initiative, such that the nature of the products and services in question 
and the very existence of the activity obey market laws. 
On the contrary, network activities are always placed, by law and sometimes even by 
the constitution, under the special responsibility of the authorities: the authorities must take 
action so that, regardless of private initiative and precisely when it is lacking, these activities 
will be fully ensured, according to strict rules. This responsibility is usually founded on the 
idea, often explicitly formulated, that the services in question meet the people's vital needs. 
The texts go as far as referring to the 
11right
11  to transport, mobility, communication, 
correspondence safety, etc. It would appear that there is a widespread notion that these 
services are not .,sociaJl' services aimed at the needy section of the national community but 
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come within the sphere of "fundamental rights" at the disposal of all citizens. 
The responsibility that is given to the authorities always brings with it special rights 
to intervene, mostly in the form of special legislation, sometimes contractual procedures. 
Nowhere are network activities simply covered by ordinary commercial or industrial law. In 
a nutshell, in none of these countries is there any legislation or public contract aimed at 
guaranteeing the production of steel, shirts or chocolate, but there are, of course, state rules 
applicable to undertakings intent on producing those products. On the other hand, 
everywhere. without exception. the State acts to ensure the existence, come what may, of 
electricity. gas and water distribution, railways and urban transport, and postal and 
telephone services. Whereas in the case of legislation on ordinary commercial and industrial 
activities, the authorities regulate so that these activities can operate without any concern as 
to whether or not they exist, legislation on public service activities ensures the very 
existence of the activities in question. 
The authorities deal with public service activities in a variety of ways but the 
virtually universal method is for the authority to limit access to the activity (which is 
subjected to authorization, or at least a licence), by an ultimate right to control investment 
and prices, by imposing upon operators any obligations justified by the public interest and 
granting special rights intended to reduce if  not to stamp out competition. 
There is definitely a general trend, at rates that vary from country to country, 
towards making these systems more flexible and less dependent on the authorities: 
a switch from services directly run by the authorities to a service with a 
minimum level of autonomy, to a public undertaking or, ultimately, to 
privatization; 
a switch from control by the authorities themselves to 
11regulation" 
entrusted to an independent body; 
a switch from monopolies to more or less open competition; 
a tendency to limit obligations. 
Everywhere, however, these activities continue to be covered by special rules 
preserving the role of the authorities. In countries (especially the United Kingdom) where 
direct government control has been replaced by "regulators". these regulators, appointed by 
the authorities, exercise the task of controlling a sector on behalf of the public interest in a 
way in essence not unlike the controls practised by the administration which they have 
replaced and often wielding considerable powers over operators. There are no ''regulators'' 
of the production of cars or biscuits, and rightly so. Nowhere have network activities 
become activities like any other, merely covered by ordinary legislation on industry and 
commerce. Whether or not the actual term is used, it is the concept of public service which, 
in principle at least, is always applied. 
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PART THREE 
PUBLIC SERVICES AND EUROPE 
The study of national situations has shown that economic network activities, 
regarded as in the public interest, are nearly everywhere carried out by the authorities. They 
ensure that these activities are organized according to certain principles and rules, even if 
the way of going about this may be approached differently (control by the State or by an 
independent regulatory body), the extent and nature of the obligations and special rights of 
operators vary enormously and the activities themselves are increasingly being partly or 
fully handed over from authority controls to be run by private undertakings. Although the 
expression 
11public service" is not used everywhere, it could be said that the idea at least is 
present in all European Union countries. 
It remains to be seen what place this idea may have at Union level itself. It could be 
purported that European powers in this matter exist in the Treaty of Rome itself. But for a 
long time these powers had no effect. It is more or less only with the creation of the internal 
market that the essential principles and rules set out by the Treaty for the economy as a 
whole, above all the freedom of movement of goods and services between the Member 
States and the specific requirements stemming from them, tended to be applied to network 
activities too. The notion of public service, impregnating these activities as it still does in 
most Member States, has been challenged. At the same time, the concept has taken on, for 
the first time, a European dimension offering food for thought as to how it might be given a 
common content and how common policy instruments in its connection might be devised. 
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CHAPTER I  EUROPEAN POWERS OVER PUBLIC SERVICES 
Does the European Union have powers to deal with public services'? To answer this 
question, we should recall that whereas the States automatically have full sovereign powers, 
the Union (like the Community before it) must be given these powers: those powers cannot 
be taken for granted but must be demonstrated by provisions in the Treaty. 
From this point of view, the situation is clear in terms of public undertakings: the 
Union has no powers either to help or hinder them. The Treaty of Rome (Article 222) 
enjoins neutrality as regards systems of property ownership - public or private. It is much 
less clear for public services which are only mentioned in those terms in one article of 
restricted scope. This leads on to consideration of a good many provisions in the Treaty 
which, without referring to the concept explicitly, indirectly concern it and may, therefore, 
be used as a basis for European powers in this area. We shall then take a look at the 
mechanisms that could be used to implement those powers. 
Section I  Fundamental powers: their basis in the Treaties 
I.  In the EEC Treaty 
A.  The Treaty of Rome only employs the expression "public service" once. It 
does so in Article 77 which, in the transport sector, legitimizes aids "if they represent 
reimbursement for the discharge of certain obligations inherent in the concept of a public 
service". The scope of this provision is limited since it only refers to only one of the sectors 
where the public service concept is usually applied. Nonetheless, it is one of the main 
sectors and the concept is recognized in one of its vital aspects: the legitimacy of public 
participation in its funding. 
B.  The Treaty does, in fact, recognize the validity of the concept for the 
economy as a whole but under another name, that of "services of general economic 
interest". Article 90(2) reserves a special fate for undertakings entrusted with running such 
services: they are only subjected to Treaty rules, especially those relating to competition "in 
so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of 
the particular tasks assigned to them". On the other hand, public undertakings and 
undertakings enjoying special or exclusive rights do not benefit as such from this derogation 
and paragraph 1 of the same article subjects them to all Treaty rules. 
C.  There are other Treaty provisions which, without referring to the concept 
of public service, even under another name, could obviously affect public services existing 
in Member States. They are some of the most important instruments of Community 
construction. They are: 
1)  The very aim of the internal market which requires the abolition 
between Member States of obstacles to the freedom of movement of goods. persons and 
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services (Article 3c, strengthened by Article 7a). 
2)  The prohibition of any measures restricting the movement of goods 
between Member States (quantitative restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect), 
on imports and exports alike (Article 30 and 34), albeit with the possibility of derogations to 
this prohibition on grounds of security or public health (Article 36). 
3)  The obligation to adjust monopolies of a commercial character so as to 
end discrimination between nationals of Member States: Article 37(1). 
4)  The prohibition on restrictions to the freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services (Articles 52 and 59), with the exception of activities connected 
'With the exercise of official authority and other activities determined by Council decision 
(Article 55), once again with the possibility of a derogation for reasons of security or public 
health (Article 56). 
5)  Provisions providing for legislation on transport: common rules 
applicable to international transport and conditions under which non-resident carriers may 
operate national transport services within a Member State (Article 75(1)). 
6)  The prohibition of anti-competitive behaviour by undertakings, 
agreements and abuses of a dominant position (Articles 85 and 86), with a possible 
exception for any agreement 
11Which contributes to improving the production or distribution 
of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit" (Article 85(3)). 
7)  The prohibition of State aids to undertakings - with a limited number 
of exceptions including (Article 92): 
aids having a social character; 
elements of local or regional planning policy: regional policy 
and industrial restructuring. 
8)  The aim of "economic and social cohesion" added to the Treaty by the 
Single Act (1986), later to become Title XIX (Article 130b and foil.) 
after changes brought about by the Treaty on European Union: it 
involves, in particular, reducing the backward development of the 
less-favoured regions and is based on the use of structural funds. 
D.  In other words, the Treaty contains quite a few provisions which, even 
when they do not refer to public service or a similar concept, are nonetheless very likely to 
have effects on the public services existing in the Member States. The Community may act 
on national public service activities and compel them to comply with the main provisions of 
the customs union and internal market: freedom of movement of goods, freedom of 
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establishment, freedom to provide services and competition rules. This brings us to the heart 
of the machinery which Community construction applies to challenge public services 
organized on a national scale: by requiring, for the purpose of creating a common or single 
market, the removal of any obstacle to the freedom to sell goods and services from one State 
to another and to establish on the territory of another State than one's own in order to 
produce goods or provide services, the Treaty could not but threaten the protection measures 
which States had taken in respect of certain activities for the sake of the public interest and 
which could be broken down into special or even exclusive rights limiting or fully removing 
the freedom to produce, buy, sell, transport, import or export. On the other hand, the 
derogation opportunities which the Treaty itself offers in order to mitigate these 
liberalization measures may be used to safeguard public services: 
1)  The exception to freedoms of establishment or to provide services for 
activities connected with the exercise of official authority seems to concern only 
administrative activities: justice, police, conventional administrative services. It is hard to 
see how they could be applied to economic public services. 
2)  On the other hand, it is conceivable that in order to protect national 
public services the derogations to the different freedoms (movement of goods, 
establishment, to provide services) on the grounds of security or public health could be 
used: postal services, telecommunications, electricity, railways and water distribution could 
all concern either or both of these notions. 
3)  Some of the exceptions applicable to the prohibition of agreements 
and public aids stem from considerations of public interest (technical progress, consumer 
interests, social policy, regional planning) and can therefore also be used to justify the 
existence of public services. 
4)  The aim of economic and social cohesion is generally regarded as an 
element of general interest and, as such, is very often cited to justify the creation of public 
services. It could perfectly well, therefore, be used as a basis for a Community policy for 
the defence of these services. 
5)  It is, however, obviously Article 90 which, by providing for an 
overall derogation to the Treaty rules in the case of services of general economic interest, 
offers the widest opportunities for protecting public services. 
ll.  In the Treaty on European Union 
Some of the provisions added to the Treaty of Rome in the Maastricht Treaty are 
liable to affect public services. 
A.  First of all, there are the two new objectives given to the Union: 
1)  consumer protection to be guaranteed at a high level (Title XI, Article 
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129a); 
2)  environmental protection (Title XVI). 
B.  At least equally important are the trans-European networks: 
1)  Nature and objectives of the networks 
It is planned (Title XII, Article 129b) that the Community should 
contribute to the establishment and development of trans -European networks of transport, 
telecommunications and energy infrastructures. These networks are obviously justified in 
the general aim of economic and social cohesion and one of their main goals is "to link 
island, landlocked and peripheral regions with the central regions  n. They are based, above 
all, on the interconnection and interoperability of national networks. 
2)  Method of Community intervention (Article 129c) 
The Community sets the guidelines for identifying "common interest 
projects", comprising objectives, priorities and the main thrust of activities. It may lend its 
support to the financial efforts of Member States for projects identified as of common 
interest in the form of: 
feasibility studies 
loan guarantees 
interest subsidies 
subsidies to transport infrastructures through the Cohesion 
Fund. 
These new powers are very significant from the public service point 
of view. Of course, they are not real powers to establish European level public services but 
only to create infrastructures. These infrastructures are based, nonetheless, on the idea of a 
European public interest and, just as nation States in the 19th and 20th centuries created on 
their O'Wil scale great infrastructure networks of railways, electricity distribution and 
telephone services which have been the basis of public services operating in those sectors, it 
might just be conceivable that European networks might, in turn, serve as a basis for 
European public services in the future. 
Section TI  Means of exercising powers: instruments and procedures 
The implementation of the powers granted by the Treaties to the Community or the 
Union to act on public services is carried out through the usual means of action at the 
disposal of the Community institutions. These means are of two kinds: individual, or one-
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off, interventions and general interventions, essentially legislation. 
I.  One-off interventions 
These consist in dealing with specific cases, either administratively or judicially. 
A)  By administrative channels 
These are in the hands of the Commission in its role of "guardian" of the 
Treaties. 
1)  First of all, the Commission has the general ability to intervene, the 
procedure in cases of irregularity, provided for in Article 169 of the EC Treaty and applying 
to all Treaty provisions imposing obligations on the Member States. When the Commission 
feels that a State has failed to fulfil one of these obligations it may, after inviting the State in 
question to submit observations, deliver a 
11reasoned opinion" requiring it to amend the 
wrongful act (law, regulation or practice). Failing compliance, the Commission may bring 
the matter before the Court of  Justice. 
2)  The Commission also enjoys special powers for applying competition 
rules. 
a)  In respect of undertakings (Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty). The 
Commission may: 
recognize that a given practice does not comply with the rules 
(a so-called "negative clearance" decision); 
exempt an agreement for one of the reasons stipulated in 
Article 85(3); 
or, on the contrary, order an undertaking to end an abusive 
practice, possibly by fining it. 
b)  In respect of States (Articles 92-94). The Commission may: 
regard state aids as compatible with the common market 
because they are covered by one of the considerations provided 
for in Article 92(2 and 3); 
or deem them incompatible and, after giving notice to the State 
concerned to submit its comments, call upon it to put an end to 
them.  -
3)  The Commission also has at its disposal special powers in respect of public 
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service activities under Article 90(3). The text expressly calls upon it to ensure the 
application of the Treaty rules on public undertakings and undertakings with special 
or exclusive rights entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest, which is a fairly good general definition of the public service sector, and 
enables it to take appropriate "decisions
11  and address them to Member States. As the 
Court of Justice has confirmed, these decisions may assert that a given State measure 
is incompatible with the Treaty rules and indicate what the State in question must do 
to rectify the situation. 
B)  Through judicial channels 
A case relating to a public service activity may come before Community justice (the 
Court of Justice or, more rarely, the Court of First Instance) by the following referral 
methods: 
1)  Referral before the Court by the Commission when a State has not 
complied with a reasoned opinion or a decision to end a state aid taken by that institution 
(Article 169). 
2)  Referral before the Court by a Member State which considers that another 
Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation (Article 170). 
3)  Referral before the Courts by the undertaking or State challenging a 
Commission decision against it (Article 173). 
4)  Referral before the Court by the Council, Commission or a Member State 
to review the legality of the acts of the institutions, especially legislative acts (Article 173). 
5)  Referral before the Court to give preliminary rulings (Article 177) by the 
court or tribunal of a Member State to interpret Community law (Treaty or application 
legislation) in a case before that court or tribunal. 
II.  General interventions 
The Community may also act on public service activities by means of general 
interventions. 
A.  Either declaratory or doctrinal texts, preparatory to the legislative process: 
communications, Community white or green papers, Council or European Parliament 
resolutions. 
B.  Or, of course, legislative measures themselves. 
1)  By applying the general provisions of the EC Treaty, legislation 
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(regulations or directives) is proposed by the Commission and adopted by the European 
Parliament and Council according to the respective powers of these two institutions and by 
implementing procedural methods that vary according to the subject. If  we take the Treaty 
subjects likely to be of interest to public services, we obtain the following four cases: 
a)  Legislation on transport (Article 75): procedure under Article 
189c, the so -called co -decision between Council and European Parliament. 
b)  Harmonising the legislative, regulatory and administrative 
provisions of the Member States to establish and operate the common market (Article 100): 
unanimity of the Council after consultation of the European Parliament. 
c)  Legislative harmonization to attain the objectives of the 
internal market (Article 1  OOa):  so~  called , cooperation 
11  procedure between Council and 
Parliament, introduced by the Single Act and according to which, by derogation to the 
previous procedure, the qualified majority of the Council suffices for adopting measures 
(procedure amended by the Treaty on European Union, to become Article 189b thereof). 
d)  Trans-European networks: 
decisions on guidelines: procedure of cooperation 
between the European Parliament and the Council (Article 189b) 
other decisions: co -decision procedure (Article 189c) 
2)  Apart from the ordinary legislative process, the EC Treaty also lays 
down for public services the Commission's own legislative powers: the 
11directives
11  which 
Article 90(3) enables it to issue in respect of public service undertakings could, as 
recognized by the Court of Justice, act perfectly as directives in the usual meaning of the 
Treaty, i.e. regulatory directives. 
* 
*  * 
This perusal of the relevant provisions of the Treaty reveals that the Community 
institutions have at their disposal a fairly wide range of powers and means of action to 
intervene in public service activities. Taken as a whole, however, they are relatively neutral: 
they either make it possible drastically to cut back the role of public services by submitting 
the activities in question strictly to the various economic freedom rules in the treaties, or to 
protect public service by applying all the exceptions and derogations provided for in the 
same rules; and there is a whole range of intermediate solutions in between the two 
extremes. Everything depends on the attitude adopted by the Community institutions 
towards the concept of public service. It  is this attitude that we must endeavour to clarify by 
studying their main decisions in this sphere. 
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CHAPTER II  THE USE OF EUROPEAN POWERS: THE COMMUNITY'S 
ATTITUDE TO PUBLIC SERVICES 
'Whereas the Treaty of Rome gave Community institutions, as we have seen, the 
means to act on public service, it is only in recent years that they have begun to take an 
interest in the activities covered by this concept and to deal with the issue of public service. 
As for the new powers granted to them in this respect by the Maastricht Treaty, which only 
entered into force in October 1993, they are still too recent to have given rise to anything 
other than the first signs of action. 
For thirty years or so the institutions created by the Treaty of Rome (1957) put 
public service "on the back-burner". 
1) This abstention is probably due in part to the fact that "public service  n and "public 
undertaking" were somehow lumped together, perhaps unconsciously. Public undertakings 
were protected by the Treaty's neutrality (Article 222) in their respect: a neutrality based, 
perhaps, on the concern that the Community could not be seen as "anti-socialist" or 
blocking State freedom to nationalize parts of the economy. Public undertakings were 
sacrosanct and public service, hidden behind them, benefitted from their "immunity". 
2) There is, however, probably a more fundamental reason: the fear of too direct a 
challenge to national sovereignty. Major public service networks closely depended, after all, 
by definition, on the official authorities that had zealously given them special protection. To 
apply market rules to them was tantamount to attacking that protection and, therefore, 
touching States' sensitivity much more than when dealing with purely commercial activities. 
The situation changed when, in the mid -1980s, the single market project pushed the 
common market logic as far as it would go, viz. by removing all obstacles to the complete 
liberation of economic movements within the Community area in order to create a 
genuinely integrated market. By wanting to enforce all the requirements lying dormant in 
the common market, the Community ended up by tackling the activities where the public 
service concept was applied and which had so far escaped the "Community liberation" 
trend. Of course, the Commission White Paper of  June 1985, the starting-point for the 
enterprise of creating an internal market aimed at its completion on 1 January 1993, made 
no mention of public services and did no more than scratch the surface of certain sectors 
where the notion applies (transport and telecommunications). But it did launch a policy 
which, by aiming to liberalize markets, could not avoid qealing with public services and, 
indeed, it was during the next few years that we were to see for the first time Community 
institutions directly intervening, through administrative, judicial and legislative channels, in 
public service activities. 
As far as legislation is concerned, this interventionist policy benefited from a vital 
procedural change which took place at the same time. The Treaty of Rome originally 
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required unanimity on the Council to legislate in this sphere and there is no doubt that 
certain States would have blocked any challenge to their public services if  ever the 
Commission had envisaged making one. It is the Single Act of 1986 that, by introducing the 
rule of majority voting on the Council to adopt most legislation on the internal market 
(Article 1  OOa EC), opened up the possibility to legislate in public service activities. 
Section I.  Administrative action 
This refers to initiatives taken by the Commission on the basis of the special powers 
(pointed out earlier) at its disposal to implement the Treaties. These initiatives have 
consisted in more or less challenging the special rights bestowed upon public service 
undertakings, especially exclusivity rights, on one hand, and public aids, on the other, 
wherever they contravened the relevant rules of the Treaties. 
I.  The Commission's intervention means 
A.  To challenge exclusive or special rights11 of public service undertakings, 
the Commission has relied either on competition rules or free movement rules. 
1)  In the case of competition, the base used has been the prohibition of 
abuse of dominant positions established by Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Of course, 
Article 85, prohibiting agreements, is valid for public service undertakings like any other 
and there are cases of understandings reached for reasons of public service (for example, the 
"demarcation agreements" under which German electricity distribution undertakings decide 
upon exclusivity areas). But in most cases public undertakings enjoy monopoly situations 
because they have been granted to them by an authority. It is Article 86 which, therefore, 
seems the most relevant and the Commission tends to consider that any monopoly given to 
an undertaking is tantamount to the abuse of a dominant position. 
2)  Free movement rules did not allow for opposition to production 
monopolies not concerning intra-Community trade as such. The Commission could 
obviously, on the other hand, base itself on the clear prohibition of any measure restricting 
the movement of goods between Member States, import and export alike (Article 30 and 34) 
and the obligation to arrange trade monopolies so as to end any discrimination between 
Community nationals (Article 37). 
B.  To challenge public aids granted to public service undertakings, the 
Commission has in general strictly applied the principle of prohibiting these aids laid down 
by the Treaty of Rome (Article 92). In particular, it has systematically attacked financial 
support given by States to those public service undertakings which are also public 
11.  Both terms feature in Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome but have different uses in derived legislation: this 
legislation tends to reserve the expression "exclusive rightsM to strictly monopoly situations, where 
particular rights are entrusted to one undertaking alone, whereas • special rights  • proper refer to rights 
given to more than one operator, in limited numbers a priori. 
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undertakings, generally the case until recently, considering that this support was tantamount 
to aid whenever it had been granted in conditions that would not have been accepted by an 
investor operating in the normal framework of the market economy. 
II.  Implementation 
These intervention means, attacking the problem from several angles, were not, 
however, fully implemented until the late 1980s. Only very late in the day and very 
gradually did the Commission take an interest in public service activities. 
A.  Until the mid-1980s, there was virtually no Commission action vis-a-
vis public service activities. The relationship between these activities and Community law is 
not really considered, whether to bring them under the ordinary law of the market economy 
or to strengthen their special status. The problem was simply swept under the carpet. 
1)  The Commission definitely carried out its duty under the Treaty of 
Rome (Article 37) to attack commercial monopolies but only in respect of activities outside 
public service: State monopolies concerning alcoholic beverages, tobacco and matches, 
traditional monopolies in several countries; monopolies concerning oil products. 
2)  The Commission is also particularly concerned with public 
undertakings. The Commission tends to feel that these undertakings often violate the Treaty 
rules which are, after all, expressly applicable to them. Suspicions focus on the financial 
support given to them by their State shareholders: this support is seen as a disguised form of 
public aid, something clearly prohibited by the Treaty. This concern was translated in 1980 
(on 25 June) by Directive 80/723 on the transparency of financial relations between Member 
States and public undertakings. This Directive, the first issued by the Commission on the 
basis of Article 90(3), compels States to inform the Commission of any financial support 
they give to public undertakings and is clearly seen as a surveillance instrument designed to 
heip the Commission track down any public aids given to these undertakings. But it is public 
undertakings which are in the firing line here, not public service activity. This activity 
seems to be spared such concerns: the Directive excludes from its scope energy, water, 
postal services, telecommunications and transport. This is close to the position expressed by 
the Commission in its 1976 report on competition12, which stated that there is no doubt that 
public undertakings may act on a national scale as an especially valuable instrument for 
pursuing aims of economic or social policy. At this stage, therefore, it would seem that the 
Commission's policy has regarded these public service activities as being covered, overall, 
by Article 90(2) and therefore not calling for any special investigation. 
3)  Mention should be made, however, of a test case where the 
Commission felt the need to challenge an exclusive right in a public service activity. It 
concerned the natural gas imports monopoly granted by Belgian law to the Distrigaz 
12.  page 166 
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company. The Commission contested this monopoly on the basis of Article 37 and Belgium 
withdrew it from its legislation in 1983. 
B.  Over the next few years, from 1985 to 1990, the Commission did begin to 
take real action to apply Community law to public service activities. 1985 was the year of 
the White Paper launching the enterprise of completing the internal market. It was also the 
year when the aforementioned Directive on transparency in relations between States and 
public undertakings was amended to include in its scope the main public service sectors: 
energy, water, transport, postal services and telecommunications. On these bases, the 
Commission could now act in these sectors, beginning by focusing on the latter two. 
1)  The Commission first set its sights on telecommunications terminals. 
Most Member States included the import and marketing of these terminals in the monopoly 
of their national post and telecommunications body. The Commission contested this 
exclusive right on the basis of Articles 37 and 86. It first took action in Germany, 
compelling it to end the monopoly for telephones in 1985 and, threatening it with a decision 
under Article 90(3), for modems connected to the public telephone network in 1986. Over 
the next few years it applied Article 169 to compel Belgium, Spain, Italy and Germany to 
alter their legislation and end any exclusive rights in respect of supplying terminals. In the 
telecommunications sector, the Commission also called upon Belgium's RTI to abandon its 
restrictions on granting third parties access to international data transmission networks 
(1990). On the other hand, in the same year, it granted a derogation to the ban on 
agreements in the case of such agreements between telephone companies for installing 
systems which seem to offer user advantages as set out in Article 90(3): management of data 
network services (MONS), a Europe-wide mobile telephone system (ECR 90) and the 
paging system linked to the Irish public network (Eirpage). 
2)  The Commission also tackled international express mail, a mail 
delivery service, which several Member States regarded as part of the monopoly of their 
national post office bodies, therefore preventing other undertakings from offering this kind 
of service. Judging this extensive practice of the postal monopoly to be contrary to Articles 
86 and 90(1), not justified by the public interest task requirements of the post office, and 
ruling out exemption under Article 90(2), the Commission intervened to end it in Ireland 
(1985), Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, which all changed their legislation in 1989-90 
after being the subject of formal decisions in this respect under Article 90(3). 
3)  Mention should also be made of the Commission's action in the 
transport sector. Under Article 7 and 90 (1), it challenged reduced fares on air and sea routes 
to and from the Balearic and Canary islands and the Azores and Madeira, reserved by Spain 
and Portugal to their own nationals residing in those archipelagos. Under pressure, the two 
governments changed their legislation to extend this benefit to all Community nationals 
residing there (1987). On the other hand, in 1987 the Commission again granted a 
derogation under Article 92(3) to aids given to public transport in the Basque Country and 
Andalusia. 
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C.  After 1990, the Commission's action in respect of public service activities, 
patchy and limited until then, became systematic and all-embracing. 
1)  There was now an overall policy on the subject. It is expressed, for 
example, in the annual reports on competition. The 1991 report refers to the need to open up 
these activities to competition and, for that purpose, to conduct a critical examination of 
regulations to verify whether the sectors concerned could not perform their public service 
task in the framework of less restrictive systems. It turns the abolition of obstacles in those 
sectors into a priority aim to be attained by making systematic reference to Article 90. The 
1992 report includes a new heading called "special or exclusive rights" and presents "de-
monopolization 
11  as one of the main challenges for completing the internal market, since 
"monopolies" are regarded as contrary to competition rules, the freedoms of movement of 
goods and provision of services and non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. 
Indeed, this heightens awareness of the relevance of the public service 
concept and clearly registers that it is justified by the different aspects of  public interest. For 
example, the 1992 report recognizes that, for the sake of Community cohesion, the 
maintenance of a universal service is especially important for peripheral or thinly populated 
regions. The 1994 report acknowledges that exclusive rights may be justified by a public 
service task whose fulfilment the Commission does not intend to challenge, while explicitly 
mentioning Article 90(2). There is the added concern that the provision of public service and 
its justifications should be appreciated no longer solely from a national perspective but also a 
Community one, in the interest of the internal market. According to the 1992 report, 
Community undertakings and consumers will not derive all the possible benefit of the single 
market unless regulated sectors are devised on a single-market scale. 
Nonetheless it must be recalled that the derogations granted by the 
Treaty to public service activities can only, like any exception to a rule, be interpreted 
strictly: as the same 1992 report states, they must be applied while searching for the least 
restrictive possible solutions from the point of view of competition and the fundamental 
freedoms of Community law. These freedoms remain the general norm for business activity. 
2)  Having devised its policy in respect of public service activities, the 
Commission also specifies the instruments it intends to implement it  with. That is how it 
renders systematic its means of controlling aids granted to the undertakings in question. In a 
Communication to the Member States on State aids to public undertakings, of July 1991, 
intended to make explicit application of Articles 91 and 93 of  the Treaty and the 
aforementioned Directive 80/723, it  precisely formulates the principle of the investor in 
market economies as a criterion for assessing any public funding granted to these 
undertakings: any funding not complying with the behaviour of a private investor operating 
in the normal conditions of a market economy will be regarded as an aid. 
Furthermore, the Commission regularly confirms that it always 
reserves the possibility of using its own powers, under Articles 90(3) and 169, especially in 
cases where the normal Community legislative mechanism proves ineffectual. 
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3)  On these bases, the Commission has carried out its action in the 
telecommunications and transport sectors. In its "Guidelines" on telecommunications issued 
in September 1991, it  warned that it would regard as an abuse of a dominant position any 
refusal to grant access to the network, discriminatory charges and cross subsidization. In the 
same year, it addressed a reasoned opinion (Article 169) to 3 States (Greece, Ireland and 
Italy) for failing to implement legislation allowing competition for supplying 
telecommunications services and called on France not to extend France Telecom  •  s monopoly 
to phonecard telephone call-boxes located on public land. 
In the case of transport, we should mention the notice served to 
Denmark which, on the basis of its railways monopoly, refused a shipping company access 
to a port to provide a ferry link to Germany: this refusal, regarded as an abuse of a dominant 
position (Articles 86 and 90(1)) led to a decision under Article 90(3) on 21 December 1993. 
The Commission has also acted against the exclusive rights of national 
airlines in respect of auxiliary services in airports. On the other hand, it judged compatible 
with the Treaty (its Article 92(3a)) a Portuguese government aid to TAP to offset public 
service obligations for its service to the Azores and Madeira. 
4)  The Commission has begun to take action in a sector which it had so 
far left practically intact: energy. In its 1989 report on competition, it announced its 
intention to take action in this sector more thoroughly than in the past with a view to the 
gradual integration of the energy market, while acknowledging that it had "special features" 
which might be taken into account under Articles 85(3) and 90(2). It specified that it 
intended to inquire into the public aids granted, especially to the electricity sector, and to 
apply Article 90(3) which, unlike Article 169, would enable it to take preventive measures. 
It also declared that it  had already begun examining electricity transmission and distribution 
monopolies. 
These declarations of intent were acted upon. The Commission 
prohibited (decision of 16 January 1991, under Article 85(1))13 an agreement between Dutch 
electricity companies which prevented distribution companies and industrial consumers from 
importing electricity. Above all, a "head-on action 
11  was taken against the electricity and 
natural gas import and export monopolies practised in several Member States. These 
monopolies were judged to be contrary to Articles 30, 34 and 37 and in 1991 were the 
subject of observations addressed under Article 169 to nine States. As six of them 
(Denmark, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands) had not offered satisfactory 
explanations, the Commission addressed to them a reasoned opinion (November 1992) 
compelling them to alter their legislation. Since five of these States (as in the meantime 
Denmark had decided to abolish its gas imports monopoly) were unable to point to 
legislative projects in this respect, the Commission took the case before the Court of  Justice 
in early 1994; the case is still pending. 
13.  Ijssel power-statioc decision 
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Section II.  The courts  r contribution 
Alongside the Commission's administrative action, the role of  the Court of  Justice 
had to be important in shaping a Community attitude towards public service. We know of 
the Court's major prerogatives, outlined above, within the Community's institutional 
system. They have, after all, been exercised in cases concerning the public service brought 
before the Court by the Commission out of concern to have its positions guaranteed (Article 
169), by a Member State contesting, on the contrary, a Commission decision (Article 173) 
or by a national court having to solve a dispute between domestic parties (Article 177). 
Generally speaking, the case-law which has resulted from these cases has lent support to 
the Commission's action. It is not the Court which has made the first move, if  only because 
it hardly had to state its position on the concept of public service until the 1990s, other than 
vaguely and occasionally. It is only in recent years that cases clearly with this concept at 
stake have become numerous and that, therefore, the Community courts have had a chance 
to start formulating a doctrine on this subject. 
I.  For a long time, the Court had no opportunity to state a position on the fate 
of public services in respect of Community law. It limited itself to applying the final 
paragraph of Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome, confirming that undertakings enjoying 
exclusive or special rights were subjected to the rules of the Treaty. 
A.  In 1974, in the Sacchi judgment (30 April), concerning an 
audiovisual-related case, the Court gave full scope to the principle, laid down by Article 
90, of the legality of exclusive or special rights, stating that nothing in the Treaty was 
opposed to the right of Member States, for considerations of public interest of a 
non-economic nature, to exempt radio and television broadcasts from the rules of 
competition, by entrusting the exclusive right to operate them to one or more 
establishments. 
The Court merely required that these rights be the result of a 
deliberate express step taken by the authority, as specified in the same year in the BRT 
judgment (27 March). But it stressed, at the same time, that these rights must be compatible 
with compliance with the rules of the Treaty, as Article 90 itself requires. The Sacchi 
judgment added that for the purpose of performing their task, however, these establishments 
fall, in that the performance of their task comprises economic activities, within the 
provisions referred to by Article 90. 
Seventeen years later, the ERT judgment (18 June 1981) confirmed 
this position, still in respect of the audiovisual. According to this judgment, Community law 
does not oppose the granting of television monopolies, for considerations of public interest 
of a non-economic nature. The ways of organizing and exercising such a monopoly must 
not, however, violate the provisions of the Treaty on matters of the free movement of goods 
and services or competition rules. 
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B.  It is the whole set of Treaty provisions that special or exclusive rights 
must comply with, even if Article 90 emphasizes competition rules. 
The Court has therefore condemned exclusive rights as contravening 
the free movement of goods governed by Articles 30, 34 and 37. This has been the case in 
particular of import or export monopolies in the following judgments:  Manghera, 5 
February 1976, lubricant refiners, 10 March 1983 and Campus Oil, 10 July 1984, on oil 
products; more recently, the so -called "telecommunications terminals" judgment of 19 
March 1991 condemning exclusive rights for importing, marketing, connecting, running 
and maintaining this equipment. 
The same is true of the freedom to provide services (Article 59): ERT 
judgment of 18 June 1991 condemning exclusive rights for broadcasting and retransmitting 
television programmes. 
But it is attacks on competition which have been behind the largest 
number of cases condemning exclusive rights, mainly in the form of abuses of a dominant 
position (Article 86). The Court has taken the position that this abuse occurs when a 
monopolistic undertaking does not, in fact, perform the task for which it enjoys the 
exclusive right while that same right by definition prevents other operators from making 
good any shortages (Hefner judgment of 23 April1991). It has also judged contrary to 
Article 86 the responsibility entrusted to an undertaking to set the technical rules applied to 
the goods and services which it produces or provides itself: the aforementioned 
11telecommunications terminals" judgment and the following: RTT of 13 December 1991; 
Lagauche, Decoster and Taillandier of 27 October 1993. 
Exclusive rights must also comply with the prohibition in principle of 
State aids (Articles 92 and 97), although case-law is very limited on this score. The Court 
upheld, with nuances, the doctrine of the private investor in market economies formulated 
by the Commission to assess State financial support for public undertakings (Alfa Romeo 
judgment of 21 March 1981 and EN! judgment of 21 March 1991). 
All these decisions condemn exclusive or special rights as 
contravening the rules of the Treaty. But in fact it  is difficult to see how they could not 
contravene them since their aim is precisely to shelter their beneficiaries from the 
mechanisms of the market economy, competition in particular. Whereas, therefore, virtually 
all exclusive or special rights violate the Treaty, they can only be accepted if  they are 
covered by the cases of derogation provided by the Treaty itself. 
II.  Only very late in the day did the Court acknowledge that undertakings 
enjoy exclusive or special rights contrary to the rules of the Treaty of Rome on the basis of 
derogations provided by the Treaty, be they special derogations or the general derogation of 
Article 90(2). 
A.  There are practically no cases where the Court has based its judgment 
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on special derogations: Articles 36 and 56 Gustification by reasons of security or public 
health for exclusive rights exempted from the freedom of movement of  goods, establishment 
or to provide services), 85(3) and 92 (exclusive rights exempted from the prohibition of 
agreements or public aids). If  anything we can offer an example a contrario: the ERT 
judgment (mentioned earlier) ruling out application of Article 56 to an exclusive right for 
retransmitting television programmes. The Court also cited, but again to reject it in this 
case, the possibility of using the case-law concept of "vital requirements" derived in 
particular from public interest (the 
11Cassis de Dijon" case-law) to justify an exclusive right 
exempted from a Treaty rule Qudgment Commission/The Netherlands of 27 July 1991). 
B.  It has, on the other hand, fairly often referred and, recently 
increasingly so, to the possibility of a general derogation provided by paragraph 2 of Article 
90 for "services of general economic interest". 
1)  Indeed the Court has long since made a very cautious use of 
this possibility. For some time it actually refused to acknowledge its direct effect, which 
meant that its use could only give rise to court controls in the case of appeals against inaction 
or proceedings for annulment, but not in cases of references for preliminary rulings. This 
was the position taken, in particular, in the Miiller judgment of 14 July 1971. It was altered 
by the 1974 BRT judgment (mentioned earlier) which recognized, on the contrary, that the 
national court was responsible for deciding whether an undertaking claiming to provide 
services of general economic interest in order to be exempted from Treaty rules really was 
providing such services. 
But recognition of the direct effect did not lead the Court of 
Justice at once to examine cases in depth in order to investigate the relevance of applying the 
concept of general economic interest. It tended to give States carte blanche in this matter. 
This is true of the Miiller judgment on a port operations monopoly, and was also the case of 
the aforementioned Sacchi judgment on the exclusive right to broadcast radio and television 
programmes. However, a particularly interesting judgment is that in the Steinike case, of 22 
March 1977, in which the Court recognized that, where it  applies, Article 90(2) may permit 
exemptions from all Treaty rules, including the prohibition of State aids. 
2)  The Court then moved towards a more thorough investigation 
of application of Article 90(2). For a time it seemed to think that labelling an activity as a 
public or general interest activity was mainly a task for the national courts (aforementioned 
ERT judgment). But, considering that the concept could not be exclusively national even if 
its content varied from country to country, it granted itself assessment powers. It therefore 
accepted application of the concept to a water distribution service (  n Anseau-N  avewa" 
judgment of 8 November 1983) and a public telephone network (RIT judgment, already 
mentioned, and the "Telecommunications servicesn judgment of 17 November 1992), and 
refused to do so for port operations ("Port of Genoan judgment of 10 December 1991), 
while accepting it in the "Miiller
11  judgment concerning the Luxembourg port of Mertert. 
At the same time, pointing out that the derogation in Article 
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90(2) is an exceptional one, in accordance with case-law tradition it adopted a strict 
interpretation. It required that the rules of the Treaty which an undertaking quoted for 
exemption, for the sake of its general interest task, should make that task not only more 
difficult but impossible. It has therefore regularly refused to apply a derogation when that 
impossibility was not established. A whole set of  judgments are based on this idea: British 
Telecom (20 March 1985), CLT (3 October 1985), Hafner (23 April1991), Port of Genoa, 
RTT-INNO and "Telecom services" (already mentioned). In the Port of Genoa judgment, 
the Court pointed out that even supposing (which it did not) that the port activities in 
question could be regarded as a task of general economic interest, neither the information in 
the case -file nor the observations submitted suggested that application of the Treaty rules, 
especially those on competition and free movement, would be likely to prevent the 
successful performance of such a task. Similarly, the RIT and "Telecommunications 
services" judgments, while acknowledging that the task entrusted by the authorities to an 
undertaking to put at users' disposal a public telephone network is undoubtedly a task of 
general economic interest, reject the idea that this task requires that the undertaking be 
granted a monopoly for the sale of telephone terminals or the provision of all 
telecommunications services. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, which 
often underlies its decisions, the Court feels that public service tasks must preferably be 
performed by the means least contrary to the rules of the Treaty and that exclusive rights 
should be avoided wherever possible. 
3)  Recently, the Court seems to have settled for a relatively well 
established doctrine for applying Article 90(2). In two very clear-cutjudgments, Corbeau 
(1993) and Almelo (1994), it brought the derogation fully into play for vital public services. 
In both cases, it acknowledged that exclusive rights clearly contravening the Treaty rules 
(freedom of establishment and to provide services, prohibition of the abuse of a dominant 
position) were justified by needs accruing from a general interest task entrusted to an 
undertaking by the authorities: postal services in the former case and public electricity 
distribution in the latter. It is worth quoting extracts from these decisions which signal the 
coming of age of the courts' position on the public service concept. 
a)  In the Corbeau judgment (19 May 1993), the Court began by 
defining the postal service in question as comprising the obligation to collect, transport and 
distribute mail, for all users, throughout the territory of the Member State concerned, at 
uniform rates and in similar quality conditions, regardless of any special situations and the 
economic profitability of each individual operation. It concluded that such an obligation 
called for the possibility of compensating between profitable sectors of activities and less 
profitable ones and thereby justified limits on competition from private undertakings in the 
economically profitable sectors. 
This contains in every element (continuity, universality, equal 
access regardless of cost, implying financial equalization) the conventional definition of a 
public service and signals its debut entry into Community law, in such a complete form. 
At the same time, for the sake of the very concept at the basis 
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of this definition, general or public interest, the Court imposes limits on the area of 
exemption. It excludes from it 
11Specific services, dissociable from the service of general 
interest", which meet the special needs of economic operators and which call for certain 
supplementary services which the traditional postal service does not offer, where those 
services do not risk upsetting the economic balance of the service of general economic 
interest provided by the exclusive right holder. In the case of the post office this refers to 
mail collection from homes and express mail distribution. 
b)  In the Almelo judgment (27 April1994), the Court pointed out 
that the undertaking in  question was entrusted by the authorities with the task of ensuring the 
uninterrupted supply of electrical energy, throughout the conceded territory, to all 
consumers, local distributors or end-users, in the quantities demanded at any time, at 
uniform rates and in conditions that could not vary other than according to objective criteria 
applied to all customers. It deduced that restrictions on competition from other operators 
must be allowed, wherever they proved necessary in order to enable the undertaking 
invested with this general interest task to perform it. 
The wording is the same as in the Corbeau judgment. This 
time, nevertheless, instead of deciding itself how to determine whether the exclusive or 
special right calling for a derogation from the Treaty rules (in this case an exclusive 
purchase clause compelling the municipalities to buy electricity from the company in 
question) is necessary for performing the general interest task, the Court leaves this 
responsibility to the national courts. It does take pains to point out to them that this should 
be determined by taking into account the economic conditions in which the undertaking 
operates, in particular the costs it must bear and any regulations, in particular relating to the 
environment, to which it is subject. This is, substantially, the concept of "economic 
balance" explicitly mentioned in the Corbeau judgment and vital for a realistic conception of 
public services. 
c)  These two mutually compatible judgments suggest that 
Community case -law is now clear as to its approach to the concept of public service. It 
gives the concept itself a safe place in the Community's legal order: public service is 
recognized in its vital elements, including its dimension of  economic balance, which means 
that it is a set of more or less profitable activities where those that are profitable compensate 
for those that are not. At the same time, limits are imposed on it since it must be confined to 
activities clearly related to the public interest and any services only meeting individual needs 
must be excluded, unless of course those services are necessary for the economic balance of 
the whole and, therefore, for the performance of a general or public interest task. 
This approach is, then, a fairly broad one, probably less limited than that 
in force in some Member States but clearly narrower than the Commission's which, rather 
than conceiving public service as a global activity tends to limit it to specific obligations 
imposed upon an activity that happens to be governed by market rules. It will be interesting 
to discover whether the Court will confirm this approach in the case of a major dispute: that 
between the Commission and five Member States, including Spain, France and Italy, which 
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have maintained electricity and natural gas import and export monopolies for the benefit of 
major national undertakings.  Against the Commission, which opposes this, the governments 
in question are citing Article 90(2) and claiming that these monopolies are necessary for the 
public service tasks entrusted to these undertakings. It  will be the first time that the Court 
will have to take a position on exclusive rights and public services of such a size and such 
economic and political scope. 
Section ill.  Legislation 
Unlike administrative action, a Commission prerogative, and judicial action, in the 
hands of the Court, legislation is nonnally the joint task of the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council. By studying it we can, therefore, find out the attitude to public 
services of each of these institutions. As we have seen, however, the Commission has its 
own legislative powers in this sphere (Article 90(3)) and has sometimes wielded them. More 
usually, however, it has applied the joint interinstitutional procedure of ordinary law, in 
which, short of decision-making powers, the role of initiative granted to it by the Treaty 
gives it considerable influence. 
Whenever the Commission has wanted to introduce legislation, it has, above all, 
been in order to extend to network activities the principles of the internal market: freedom 
of movement of goods, free provision of services, competition. It has decided that to 
achieve this, administrative and judicial action, consisting in directly applying the relevant 
provisions of the Treaties, was not enough: to end all the obstacles put up by national rules 
and practices, legislation was needed. Propelled by the Commission, the Community has 
passed a great deal of legislation, sometimes of a general nature but more often on a sector 
by sector basis. 
I.  Generallegislation 
The Community might have considered passing legislation on economic public 
services as a whole. This might have consisted in trying to regulate, overall, the 
relationships between these services and the authorities responsible for them: the fields 
concerned and means of setting them up, financing, tasks and obligations, exclusive and 
special rights. The Treaty provisions mentioned above (major "freedoms" of the internal 
market and competition rules) could, if  necessary, have provided a base. Such an attempt 
would probably have met with the resistance of national governments, given the extent to 
which public services li~ at the very heart of State activity: to legislate on public services as 
a whole would almost certainly have been seen as interference in a sphere which has 
fundamentally remained under national powers. 
The initiatives taken to do this could, therefore, only be modest, i.e. 
indirect or of limited scope. In fact, there are only two examples. 
A)  The example of an indirect legislative initiative was the 1980 Commission 
Directive on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and their public 
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undertakings (80/723 of 25 June). This text is the first case of the Commission's use of its 
own regulatory powers, given to it by Article 90(3). But, as we saw earlier
4
,  it only affects 
public service very slightly, especially in its original version which excluded from its scope 
the main network activities. 
B)  The example of an initiative on a limited aspect is legislation on public 
procurement contracts. As we have seen, public procurement contracts are not linked per se 
to economic public services. They are contracts through which authorities acquire goods 
(public supplies contracts) and services (public works contracts and services contracts) 
which they need in order to operate and they pay the suppliers the price of these goods and 
services. They are not required for the purpose of  executing a public service which is, after 
all, an activity of general economic interest operating, over a long time, not for the benefit 
of the administration itself but for users, who are the public at large. As such they are, 
therefore, quite distinct from contracts through which the same authorities entrust 
undertakings with the task of operating, for the public good, the public services for which 
they are responsible, procedures often called "public service delegations" which include, in 
particular, public works concessions and public service concessions. 
Nonetheless, the Community has endeavoured to subject these delegations 
to its legislation on public procurement contracts. 
1)  Initial legislation on public works contracts (Directive 71/305 of 26 
July 1971) quite logically excluded from its scope public works concessions. Unlike public 
works contracts, through which authorities have built those infrastructures not related to the 
operation of an economic public service, public works concessions are designed to entrust to 
undertakings not only the completion of a public work but also its operation, which often 
consists in providing a public service: for example a motorway, a port or a tunnel, which the 
undertaking will operate for the public and from which any earnings, raised from the public 
(tolls), will act as the undertaking's remuneration. 
However, the amendment to this Directive, in 1989 (Directive 89/440 
of 18 July) makes certain provisions of  the text, at least, applicable to concessions. Any 
authority considering the granting of a concession must be subject to the following 
advertising rules: 
to make its intention known through an announcement published in the 
Office Journal of the European Communities; 
to allow a period of at least 52 days between the dispatch of this 
announcement and the deadline for applications in respect of the concession. 
2)  Similarly, the Commission has tried to include public service 
14.  See page 138. 
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concessions in legislation on public procurement of services (Directive 92/50 of 18 June 
1992). In its initial proposal of 6 December 1990, the Commission, while acknowledging 
the difference between the two concepts, planned to apply to concessions with a certain 
annual turnover forecast (5 million or ECU or more) the advertising rules, at least, of the 
Directive: 
- an announcement in the Official Journal of the Communities; 
- minimum periods for each stage of the procedure of granting 
concessions and for communications with applicants; 
- publishing the result of the procedure in the OJEC. 
The amended proposal of 30 August 1991lowered the 
application threshold to 2 million ECU. 
What is astonishing, and probably the result of pressure 
exerted by the governments concerned, is that these proposals came to little. Any mention of 
concessions disappeared from the final directive which went as far as to specify, albeit in a 
confused way, although the intention is clear, that it does not apply to service contracts 
granted to a body which is itself an adjudicating authority, on the basis of an exclusive right 
which it enjoys pursuant to legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions. 
3)  These efforts to include public service delegations in Community 
legislation on public contracts were therefore clumsy since they confused quite different 
things. Nonetheless, they do translate, albeit in the fonn of an inappropriate instrument, the 
desire to submit, in part at least, to competition obligations those acts by which authorities 
entrust to undertakings the operation of public services and which were previously 
characterized by the discretionary powers ("intuitus personae") which the authorities were 
allowed for choosing their partners. 
This desire, moreover, probably played a part in the decision, 
maintained for some time, to exclude from legislation on public contracts those contracts 
concluded by undertakings in network sectors (water, electricity and gas distribution, public 
transport, telecommunications) holding exclusive or special rights. This exclusion was 
justified since the aim was to make legislative obligations bincting not so much on these 
contracts as on the very acts by which the undertakings in question had received their special 
rights from the authorities. Since the attempt failed in the case of public service concessions, 
it is quite natural that the undertakings in these so -called 
11 excluded" sectors should have 
been the subject of Community legislation, not because of the concession contracts that they 
are granted by the authorities but because of the contracts that they conclude with their own 
suppliers. This was recognition that the undertakings in question, to which public services 
were delegated, could also be regarded as adjudicating authorities and be compelled to have 
their contracts qualified by similar limitations to those imposed on the authorities. It was 
149  PE 165.202 Public  u.~dertak~ngs and  publ~c  serv~ce act~vities in the European  Un~on 
also a way of demonstrating an understanding of the distinction between public contracts and 
public service delegations, as the new legislation (Directive 90/531 of 17 September 1990) 
refers quite rightly (Article 2(2)) to networks intended to provide a service to the public. 
n.  Sectorallegislation 
This has affected all the major network sectors, apart from water distribution. 
A.  Electricity and gas 
In 1989, the Commission announced its intention to introduce legislation to 
open up the market in these two sectors. But legislative action began with texts of  limited 
scope before going to the heart of the special rights which undertakings entrusted with 
producing, transporting and distributing electricity and gas still commonly enjoy. 
1)  The first legislative action consisted in imposing price transparency. This 
was Council Directive 90/377 of 29 June 1990, according to which electricity and gas 
suppliers must communicate to the Commission the prices they charge to industrial 
consumers. The fact that it is limited to large consumers means this text has no real impact 
on the public service. 
2)  The "transit" Directives (90/547 of 29 October 1990 for electricity and 
911296 of 31 May 1991 for gas) challenge, on the contrary, an exclusive right, the 
monopoly of operating transportation networks, since they oblige all undertakings 
responsible for one of these networks to put it at the disposal of  other undertakings for 
energy exchanges between Member States (a border must be crossed). But these other 
undertakings themselves can only be electricity or gas operators and not customers of 
network operators. The distribution monopolies are not affected and these texts do no more 
than make compulsory those facilities already practised for a long time on a voluntary basis. 
3)  Of far greater impact on the public service are the legislative proposals 
presented in 1992 and still pending at the Council. 
a)  In their initial version (21 February 1992), they impose, for both 
energy sources: 
the abolition of exclusive production and transportation rights. 
the separation, in the case of integrated undertakings, of 
production, transmission and distribution activities, at least for management and accounting 
(the "unbundling" concept, i.e. dissociation), in order to control cross-subsidies between 
the different activities. 
and, above all, access for third parties to the network, at least 
for distribution undertakings and large consumers - in other words enabling these 
150  PE 165.202 Publ~c under:akings  and  publ~c service  activ~ties in the  European  Un~cn 
undertakings and consumers to use the network to buy their gas or electricity from other 
suppliers than the supplier holding exclusive rights. 
0 
Called upon to take a position on these proposals, on 30 November 
1992, the Council voiced certain doubts, making it known that, in its opinion, Community 
legislation establishing the internal energy market should respect not only the requirements 
of transparency and non -discrimination but also considerations such as security of supply, 
the protection of small consumers and the different supply systems in Member States. 
The European Parliament paid special attention to the Commission 
proposals. It examined the problem in depth in the form of a particularly important report 
drafted by its Committee on Energy, the DFSAMA report, the conclusions of which were 
reiterated for the most part by the Assembly itself in its Resolution on the subject. passed on 
17 November 1993. This text calls for the abolition of exclusive rights only for new 
production capacities which would be allocated by a call for tenders. It maintains the 
appointment of network management by the authorities and the authorities' right to concede 
transportation and distribution services, be they local, regional or national. It limits 
"unbundling" to accounting. Above all, it contemplates access by third parties to networks 
only for large end-users and in a negotiated form (instead of being compulsory). It also 
insists on the concept of public service, with explicit reference to Article 90(2) of the Treaty 
and stipulates that it  covers both security of supplies and central services to be provided to 
the public (supply obligation and price equalization). 
b)  In response to this critical reaction by the Council and, above all, the 
European Parliament, the Commission presented a revised proposal (10 December 1993). 
Negotiated access to networks by third parties and limiting "unbundling" to accounting are 
accepted in it. But the abolition of exclusive rights at all stages in the process, including 
distribution, is maintained. As for the public service, it is spelled out in the new text 
together with the conventional definition and justifications. In it, security of supply and 
consumer protection are said to call for a certain number of public service obligations whose 
fulfilment is not guaranteed by free competition alone. Among these public service 
obligations, the text mentions: supply obligation, the maintenance of security, the 
development of capacity to meet demand and equal treatment for end-customers. However, 
the definition of these obligations by the Member States must comply with precise 
conditions: transparency, non-discrimination and notification to the Commission. 
The Council responded to these revised proposals, limiting itself at first to 
electricity, and fairly quickly accepting the liberalization of production, accounts 
"unbundling", the provisions relating to the operation of networks and the criteria for 
defining public service obligations. But it  failed to reach a common position on third party 
access to networks as certain States, France in particular, focused on the alternative concept 
of "single buyer" according to which the States may continue to give an undertaking 
exclusive transportation and distribution rights: large consumers wanting to buy electricity 
from another supplier or independent producers intent on selling outside national territory 
must ask that undertaking to carry out these operations on their behalf (meeting of 29 
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November 1994). 
The Commission was very sceptical in respect of the single buyer 
proposal. In a document addressed to the Council of 22 March 1995, it held that this concept 
is not compatible with the Treaty unless the undertaking in question acts as a totally neutral 
intermediary between producers and consumers, which pre-supposes the following 
conditions: competition in production, total freedom for consumers to choose their 
suppliers, including in another Member State, and to build for that purpose direct 
transmission lines, an obligation for the single buyer to purchase all the requested quantities 
under specific conditions. 
At the beginning of 1996, the Council had still failed to reach a common 
position. At its meeting of 1 June 1995, it had admitted, however, that third party network 
access and single buyer could co -exist, allowing each State to choose its system provided 
that there was no discrinrination at any stage in the process and that the final version of 
legislation took into account the different national situations, in order to safeguard the public 
service obligations deemed necessary by the States. Apart from that, the national positions 
had not changed. At the meetings of 20 December 1995, 3 and 4 February and 7 May 1996 
ministers failed to reach a final decision. 
B)  Public transport 
As we have seen, the Treaty of Rome (Article 77) makes explicit mention 
of public service obligations in the transport sector. What remains to be known is the 
position this concept really occupies in the legislation applying·the Treaty. 
1)  For land transport, the first text on the subject was Council Regulation 
1191/69 of 26 June 1969 on the action of Member States in matters of obligations inherent 
in the concept of public service in railway, road and waterway transport. This text clearly 
refers to the conventional concept of public service since it stipulates that the obligations in 
question are intended to guarantee sufficient transport services, taking account, in 
particular, of social, environmental or regional planning factors, 'With a view to offering 
charge conditions determined to assist certain categories of passengers. It goes on to 
describe these obligations as one which the undertaking would not assume - or not to the 
same extent or in the same conditions - if it were considering its own commercial interests. 
It compels States to abolish these obligations or compensate for them according to common 
criteria. Another Regulation (1190/69), issued on the same day, stipulates the rule for 
railways. 
We should also mention Council Decision 75/327 of 20 May 1975 on 
reorganization of railway undertakings and harmonization of rules governing financial 
relations between these undertakings and States. Undoubtedly, above all, this text obliges 
States to grant these undertakings autonomy vis-a-vis their assets, budgets and accounts 
and calls for them to be managed in such a way as to strike a financial balance. But, at the 
same time, it points out the role that they play in the general interest and acknowledges that 
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States are entitled to define for that purpose public service obligations which must appear in 
the budget and accounts. 
The consideration, albeit very limited, of the concept of public service in 
these partial texts is hardly present at all in the railway legislation brought out when the 
single market was set up. Council Directive 91/440 of 29 July 1991 on the development of 
Community railways makes no mention of the public service. It is totally dedicated to 
opening up the rail services market. For this purpose, it reiterates prescriptions already 
included in previous texts: the budgetary and accounting independence of railway 
undertakings vis-a-vis the States, commercial-type management aimed at striking a 
financial balance. It even goes much further by organising the unbundling of infrastructure 
management and transport service operations. Not only must the two activities be separate 
from an accounting point of view but also the rail undertakings of several Member States 
may form international groups which would have access to infrastructures on the same 
footing as national undertakings (if they pay a non -discriminatory fee to the network 
management). This text displays nothing more than a desire to open up the market, without 
any reference to the public service. 
Both Directives adopted by the Council to apply Directive 91/440 are 
themselves essentially based on liberal policies. The first (95/18 of 19 June 1995) obliges 
Member States to issue operation licences to rail undertakings without any restrictions other 
than basic conditions relating to capacity and good repute. The second (96/19 of 19 June 
1995) calls for infrastructures to be shared out without discrimination, on the basis of 
commercial-type user fees. It does, however, authorise States to give priority of 
infrastructure access to services supplied in the public interest and, even, special rights if 
this is vital for ensuring a decent level of public service. 
The European Parliament has endeavoured to defend the cause of the 
public service in the railways. It has regularly claimed that railway undertakings had to be 
regarded as being in the public interest or destined for public service (see Resolution of 26 
May 1989 on railway problems) and maintained their character of undertakings focused on 
the common good in order to guarantee an appropriate supply of rail transport not only on 
main, profitable, lines but also in peripheral and thinly populated regions, according to a 
Parliamentary report on the future Directive 91/440 (the Simpson report of 30 November 
1990). 'While supporting the opening up of the market aimed at by this Directive, it tried to 
steer it  towards the notion of public service: one of its amendments calls on the States to 
guarantee that companies function in a way that is compatible with their public function (the 
Commission text prefers a reference to abiding by commercial principles); another allows 
States to subsidise unprofitable lines whose routes are based on political criteria (Legislative 
Resolution of 13 December 1990). We should finally point out Parliament backing for a rail 
initiative which can be likened to a sort of European-scale public service: the "Inter-Rail'' 
system allowing young people to travel in Europe at reduced rates. On 12 September 1992, 
the European Parliament asked the States and companies to endeavour to maintain this 
system. 
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2)  Legislation on air transport also refers to the public service. Its 
fundamental objective is once again to ensure that the market is opened up. But the basic text 
on this matter, Council Regulation 2408/92 of 23 July 1992, while essentially aimed at 
opening up, as of 1 April1997, access for Community operators to all internal air links in 
the Union, bears in mind public service needs. It makes it possible both to maintain public 
service obligations and special rights: 
on one hand, on routes deemed to be vital for the development of a 
region, a State may impose on operators services defined by standards of continuity, 
regularity, capacity and price which carriers would not comply with if  they were to consider 
only their commercial interest; 
on the other hand, for new public service links, a State may limit 
access to a single operator for a period of three years, albeit after a call for tenders. 
It should be noted that the European Parliament strongly insisted that 
public service be taken into consideration in air transport. In its Resolution of 20 Aprill993 
on the Commission report on the development of aid schemes in the sector, it set out a 
certain number of important principles in this area: 
The need for public service, including at Community level, is linked 
to regional planning, in particular aimed at peripheral regions. 
Public service links must be open to any undertaking, regardless of its 
status. 
The costs engendered by these links must be reimbursed by the 
authorities in a transparent way. 
The European Parliament agreed on the usefulness of defining air transport 
public service at Community level and called on the Commission to do so. 
The Commission replied to a certain extent to this invitation in its 
Communication of 1 June 1994 ("European civil aviation towards better horizons"). In it  the 
Commission recognizes that air companies provide a public service in the broader sense of 
the term, which it specifies by the following considerations. It states that: 
air transport must supply these services at a reasonable cost wherever 
people and undertakings need them; 
safety nets are required for cases where the market alone would not 
enable certain objectives to be obtained; 
some of the specific features of air transport may sometimes oblige 
the authorities to intervene either to adjust imbalances in the system or directly to attain 
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other objectives - i.e. a public service. 
3)  Similar concerns can be observed in the case of sea transport. Community 
legislation (Council Regulation 3577/92 of 7 December 1992) is mmed essentially at 
abolishing restrictions on the free provision of services within Member States. But it does 
also allow States to subordinate this freedom to public service obligations for links between 
the Continent and islands or between the islands themselves, and these obligations may 
cover 
11pOrts to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, 
rates to be charged and manning of the vessel  rr. 
4)  Community legislation on transport therefore gives primacy to opening the 
market but the concept of public service is paid attention, with more or less clarity, in all 
sectors. In order to appreciate the Community attitude to transport public service in general 
we should mention the Commission Communication of December 1992 on the future 
development of a common transport policy. Of the two vital objectives which the 
Commission sets in this text for the common policy, the first is undoubtedly the abolition of 
restrictions on providing services in order to bring about the completion of the internal 
market. But the second is the contribution to economic and social cohesion by increasing 
mobility. This second objective implies, according to the Commission, improving 
infrastructures in order to reduce disparities between regions and to strengthen links 
between remote regions (islands, peripheral and landlocked regions) and central regions as 
well as assisting less favoured persons. It ends by recognising the legitimacy of public 
service obligations compensated by the authorities, which must be allowed a derogation 
from the obligation to give the Community prior notice. The same ideas are reiterated in a 
more recent document, the Communication of 12 July 1995 on transport policy, under the 
expression of 
11 citizens' network" offering varied and high quality public transport. In these 
general texts we find vital elements of the conventional concept of public service. 
C.  Telecommunications 
As in the case of energy and transport, Community legislation on 
telecommunications has combined the desire to open the market and the concern to maintain 
public interest services. This dual aim is translated by two types of legislation: on one hand, 
"liberalization" measures taken by the Commission on the basis of its own powers and, on 
the other hand, texts aimed at nharmonizing" national rules adopted, according to the 
"normal" Community legislative procedure, by the Council and the Parliament. 
1)  The basic philosophy 
The dual concern with opening the market and maintaining public 
interest services is already fully developed in the Green Paper published by the Commission 
in 1987 to set out legislative actions planned in the sector (Green Paper on the development 
of the common market of telecommunications services and equipment, 30 June). 
This text states the fundamental need to extend to the sector the 
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principles of the internal market: the freedom of providing services and competition. It 
announces the measures involved: liberalization of the supply of terminals, a gradual 
opening up of the services market and separating, within national telecommunications 
administrations, regulatory and operational activities. 
At the same time it clearly expresses the need to maintain, regardless 
of market rules, services justified by considerations of general interest, related to 
Community cohesion. These "vital" services must be "offered universally", i.e. guaranteed 
throughout the territory ("general geographical cover'') and supplied to all users on the same 
terms regardless of their locality and, therefore, the cost of connection to the network. 
Ensuring these services is a "public service task" (this expression is spelled out). 
The Green Paper goes on to say that this task presupposes that those 
bodies enjoying "exclusive or special rights" should continue to do so. These rights, 
consisting of "reserved" services, are necessary because they enable the financial viability of 
universal type services (in the form of "cross-subsidies
11
). They must be applied both to the 
setting up and operation of networks and the supply of 
11basic services". 
This sets out a system in which the opening of the market, the 
dominant factor, is corrected by the concept of universal service and its necessary 
counterpart, exclusive or special rights. There is, however, a hint of the limits up against 
which these two correctives may collide and which quite simply depend on the extent to 
which they are applied: 
a)  Which activities will be submitted to universal service 
obligations and what will be the extent of those obligations? The Green Paper refers 
"essentially~~ to a single activity, local telephone communications; although it adds telex it 
does so "where necessary and provisionally" and only envisages that the obligation of 
egalitarian supply should be fulfilled 
11reasonably". 
b)  What reserved services will be maintained? The Green Paper 
specifies that these services will be limited in number and that the limits will be defined by 
the cases where exclusivity is necessary for the safeguard of the public service task. This 
limit is obviously fully in line with Article 90(2) but the text does add a rider: it refers to the 
exclusivity necessary "at this stage", which obviously seems to mean that, at a later stage, 
there will be no more need and that exclusive rights will no longer therefore be justified. 
The effective balance of the system should therefore depend on the 
concrete responses which future legislation might provide for these questions. Depending on 
whether it defmes closely or loosely the notion of universal service and whether or not it 
leaves its operators the sufficient resources to ensure it, it would compensate the opening up 
of the market with general interest correctives or would carry out a complete liberalization 
of the sector. We should say at once that, even if  the need for public service has always been 
present, the second situation has been generally favoured. 
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2)  The first liberalization measures 
Prepared in this way by the Green Paper, the first legislative measures 
consisted, in the beginning, in opening up the market. They were taken by the Commission 
in pursuance of the own powers which it enjoys under Article 90(3) of the Treaty. 
a)  By means of Directive 83/301 of 16 May 1988 on competition in the 
markets in telecommunications tenninal equipment the Commission put into legislation its 
administrative interventions in this area (described earliez-15) by abolishing special or 
exclusive rights for importing, marketing, connecting, putting into service and maintaining 
terminals: in the future, Member States must open the right to provide these various services 
to all operators. 
b)  The Commission then carried out an opening of  the market for all 
telecommunications services \vith the exception of vocal telephone communications. This it 
did by means of Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990. It compels Member States to abolish 
special or exclusive rights in these services. It does allow, however, official authorities to 
entrust certain operators with the establishment and operation of a universal network defined 
as having general geographical cover and being provided on demand and \vithin a reasonable 
period to all service suppliers or users. It also aclmowledges that this task may be translated 
by npublic service obligations u, relating in particular to conditions of permanence, 
availability and service quality, whose proper execution depends on financial resources 
which invariably come for the most part from the telephone service. Consequently, it 
accepts that this service should not yet be open to competition and should be the subject of 
exclusive or special rights. It should, however, be noted that this is the only exception, 
contrary to the Green Paper which had contemplated reserving other services such telex. 
Note should also be taken of the requirement, a conventional one in the Community 
conception of public service, that the authority responsible for controlling special rights and, 
generally speaking, applying regulation, should be separate from the operators. 
3)  Setting up the regulatory framework 
In order for liberalization measures to be effective, in particular to 
facilitate the provision of transfrontier services, it was necessary to harmonize at 
Community level conditions of access to networks. This is the goal of legislation known as 
open network procurement (ONP). 
a)  The main text in this respect is Council Directive 90/387 of 28 June 
1990 on the establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through 
the implementation of open network procurement. This is a framework text establishing the 
principle of harmonizing conditions of access to public networks. It calls for the 
examination, sector by sector, of restrictions which might subsist and, therefore, need 
15.  See page 139. 
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special legislative measures. It too, however, acknowledges that these restrictions might be 
justified by considerations of public interest which, in addition to the 
11essential 
requirements" of  a technical nature (security of operation and integrity of the network, 
inter-operability of services and protection of data), might be translated by public services 
entrusted by official authorities to one or more operators. Special or exclusive rights 
reserving the supply of these services are therefore accepted, on the condition however that 
they are compatible 'With Community law and that charges are based on costs. 
b)  In the framework set out by Directive 90/387, specific legislation has 
applied the principles of ONP to particular activities: 
rented lines (Council Directive 92/44 of Siune 1992); 
packet-s'Witched data transmission (Council Recommendation 
92/382 of 5 June 1992); 
digital service integration network (Council Recommendation 
92/383 also of 5 June 1992). 
c)  In respect of this Community regulation of telecommunications now 
under way, mention should also be made of a decision which is part of what might be called 
the creation of an embryonic European-scale public telephone service: Council Decision 
91/396 of 29Iuly 1991 to set up a single European emergency call number (112). 
4)  Liberalization and regulation of telephone communications 
In the area of telecommunications, it is the telephone which is the essential 
element of public service. That is why it had provisionally escaped, along with those 
network infrastructures needed for its supply, the liberalization decision taken in 1990. But 
since then it has been subjected to the general process: the abolition of exclusive or special 
rights, on one hand, and regulatory harmonization including public service objectives, on 
the other. 
a)  In 1992, the Commission presented a proposal for a Directive which 
set the consistency of a universal telephone service to be guaranteed by the Member States. 
But, unlike the Green Paper, there was no longer any question of allowing this service to 
enjoy exclusive or special rights. In the meantime the choice had been made by the 
Commission to extend liberalization to this previously spared sector. 
b)  In the same year, the Commission published a Communication on 
tariffs: "Towards cost orientation and the adjustment of pricing structures -
Telecommunications tariffs in the Community" (15 July 1992). As its title indicates, this 
document calls for a restructuring of charges, consisting in particular in raising charges for 
costly telephone services such as connecting to the network and local calls and lowering 
those services whose costs had diminished such as long-distance and international calls. In 
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addition to its liberal thinking, this position was justified by the desire to abolish the 
n surcharge  II on intra-Community communications vis-a-vis national communications 
over the same distance, the so-called "border effect". But it was obviously likely to hamper 
the provision of a universal service already based in several countries on a system of 
equalization. 
c)  The Commission guidelines were fleshed out following a public 
consultation in 1992 and 1993. These were set out in a communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the Parliament of 28 April1993 concerning consultation over 
examination of the situation of telecommunications services. 
In this communication, the Commission proposed fully opening up 
telephone services as of 1 January 1998. It does state that this opening should be 
accompanied by the maintenance of the universal service whose definition must be 
established at Community level. The text quotes as justifications for a universal service, on 
one hand its 
11Social function", i.e. the need to assist the poorer categories, and on the other 
its contribution to "social and regional cohesion". 
The universal service is regarded as being made up of services which 
are universally put at the disposal of the public, given their considerable role in society, 
which is translated by the following principles: 
universality: access for all users in approachable conditions; 
equality: access is given in the same terms regardless of the 
geographical location of users; 
continuity: the provision of a defined quality service is 
guaranteed without interruption. 
From these principles the text draws precise conclusions: 
as for the initial access: Member States must guarantee the 
provision of a telephone service and public telephone service. Users are entitled to gain 
access to a network and use it and are entitled to a contract specifying the service provided; 
the estimated time taken for putting it at their disposal must be made public. 
as for the service quality: Member States must see to the 
publication of quality objectives and surveillance of levels achieved in this matter by the 
operators. 
as for prices: charges must be based on cost but with special 
provisions for social purposes (people on low income, the disabled, the elderly, etc.) 
as for special obligations: 
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public call boxes allowing, in particular, access to emergency 
services 
directories made available to subscribers 
access to international services 
detailed billing 
as for satisfying users' demands: conciliation procedures or 
procedures for solving disputes must be provided for. 
In other words, while proposing the complete liberalization of the 
telephone service, the Commission repeated the conventional justifications and principles of 
the public service. 
d)  This dual approach is set out in another Commission communication 
published in the same year. (Communication to the Council, European Parliament and 
Economic and Social Committee on developing a universal service in a competitive 
environment, 15 November 1993). It reiterates the idea that liberalization calls for a 
Community definition of the universal service so that operators everywhere have the same 
obligations, specifying that although States must be allowed to add supplementary 
obligations, this may not be a source of restriction of access to the market. We find once 
again the same justification (promotion of economic and social cohesion of the Community) 
and the same elements of the content of universal service: 
supplying the service to anyone requesting it for reasonable purposes, 
at a uniform price not directly reflecting in each case its real cost 
service quality 
charges reflecting costs but with special schemes for social purposes 
special obligations such as operator assistance and emergency services 
machinery for solving disputes. 
Unlike the previous communication, this text deals with the problem of 
financing the universal service. It recognizes that the service is not always economically 
profitable for its operators. In order to fmance this extra cost, it envisages only two means: 
cross-subsidies, i.e. transfers from profitable services (for example 
long distance communications) towards loss making services (local communications), 
access fees payable by new operators. 
The text does, however, set limits on these practices. They must respect 
Community law (i.e. the various aspects of Article 90) and, above all, not interfere with the 
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"fundamental requirement" of restructuring charges, previously put forward, with the aim 
of greater cover of the universal service by its own revenue. 
e)  The Council has gone along with the Commission's concepts. 
By a Resolution of 22 July 1993 it adopted the guidelines of the first 
communication: liberalization of telephone calls on 1 January 1998 and the principles of 
universal service. It has even taken on board the far more detailed ideas of the second 
communication, in its Resolution of 7 February 1994. This Resolution takes up justifications 
(social and territorial cohesion), the definition (a minimum set of services, defined by a 
given quality, and the supply of these services to all users, at a reasonable price, wherever 
they are located) and the principles (universality, equality and continuity) of universal 
service. It also includes the elements of the detailed content of the service: 
- each user's entitlement to have a telephone linked to the network 
within the shortest time possible 
publication and control of quality objectives 
detailed billing 
accessible and cheap procedures for solving disputes 
supply of directories 
operator assistance and information service, including at European 
level 
a sufficient number of public call-boxes 
access to emergency services, in particular for the free European 
emergency call number 
special conditions for persons with special needs 
reverse charge or collect calls 
The Council also acknowledges that the universal service must usually be 
financed on a commercial basis according to market rules and that any deficit may only be 
covered by internal transfers or operators' access fees. 
In its latest Resolution on the subject, that of 18 September 1995, the 
Council confirmed that the regulatory framework to be adopted as of 1998 should, as well 
general competition, allow for the maintenance and even the development of the universal 
service, defined as a minimum set of services of a given quality at affordable prices. It stated 
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the need for common principles for financing this service while leaving Member States the 
choice between two alternatives: access fees or guarantee funds. 
f)  The European Parliament reacted to these Commission guidelines by 
approving everything concerned with decompartmentalizing national markets while, at the 
same time, making a strong case for the universal service. For the European Parliament the 
"crucial role" played by telecommunications services in the Community integration should 
apply to consumers as well as undertakings. This is the case in particular of telephone 
communications in which the Community must guarantee European citizens a quality service 
which is easily accessible and provided at a reasonable cost. This requirement presupposes 
that the liberalization process must be gradual and be accompanied by the highest possible 
protection of the universal telephone service. That means not only defining the service on a 
Community scale, for all European citizens, but also a cautious approach to the restructuring 
of charges recommended by the Commission: it must be ''gradual" and "controlled" in order 
to bear in mind economically weak or fragile consumers (the elderly or disabled) and less 
favoured regions (Resolutions of 20 Apri11993). 
g)  The Directive on telephone communications, finally adopted in December 
1995
16 (Directive 95/62 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 1995 
on the application of open network procurement to telephone communications), defines the 
elements of a public telephone service harmonized on a Community scale. 
The fundamental principle of this service is that all European citizens are 
entitled to access. In order to fulfil this right, States must see to it: 
- that telecommunications bodies provide a fixed public telephone 
network and a telephone service; 
- that users may obtain, upon simple request, a connection to the 
network at an affordable price and within determined periods, and that these access 
conditions should be the subject of public information; 
that charges for services, while being fundamentally cost-based, 
should allow for accessibility of the service, if necessary by imposing constraints on 
operators, for example special charges for social utilities (emergency services, small 
consumers, special social categories); 
that essential supplementary services are ensured, namely detailed 
billing, regularly updated telephone directories and the installation of call-boxes on the 
public highway in sufficient numbers and geographically distributed in a balanced way. 
16.  The proposal presented in 1992 by the Commission had been rejected by the European Parliament 
because of the insufficiently • communautaire" nature of  the application machinery that it provided for 
(comminees). An amended proposal had to be presented in 1994. 
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These obligations defined at Community level are applied by the national 
authorities which must, in certain cases (connection deadlines, service quality, time taken 
over repairs, etc.), specify them with numerical objectives. However, there are plans to 
establish common indicators to assess service quality on a Community scale. 
5)  Liberalization of infrastructures 
Once the principle of ending restrictions on competition for telephone 
services was accepted, telecommunications networks were the only part of the sector still to 
escape liberalization. 
a)  In another Green Paper (on the liberalization of telecommunications 
infrastructures and cable television networks), published in two parts in October 1994 and 
January 1995, the Commission proposed to submit them to it. For this purpose it planned 
the process in two stages: 
for those services already liberalized (satellite 
communications, mobile communications, certain fixed land communications), a speedy 
liberalization of "alternative" infrastructures, i.e. both existing infrastructures other than 
those of public telecommunications bodies (in particular the networks of railway, electricity 
and water companies, motorways and cable television) and new infrastructures; 
for all services, liberalization of all infrastructures on 1 
January 1998. 
The Commission claimed at the same time that the achievement of this 
liberalization in the right conditions called for the establishment of a Community regulatory 
framework. Initially this framework would include common principles for the universal 
service: 
for the time being its content was limited to telephone 
communications but could evolve according to technical developments and users' needs. 
all operators should contribute to its provision or financing. 
For this financing the Commission excludes all but two alternatives (other than, of course, 
cases where universal services were self-financing): access fees or an independent fund, 
expressing its preference for the latter method. 
Regulation should also include the principles of inter-connection and 
inter-operability of networks and services together with the general framework of licence 
issue. 
b)  By a Resolution of 22 December 1994, followed up by another of 18 
September 1995, the Council approved the deadline of 1 January 1998 for general 
liberalization and recognized the need for the proposed regulatory framework. As for the 
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early opening of alternative infrastructures for already liberalized services, it left it to the 
Commission to take the decision on the basis of its own powers. 
c)  Parliament also approved the proposals in the Green Paper while 
insisting on the requirements of universal service (Resolutions of 7 April and 19 May 1995). 
It insisted that prior to liberalization this service should be the subject of Community 
regulation in the form of a directive to include: 
a definition of the universal service consisting of a minimum 
level of infrastructures and quality services provided at a price affordable by all Union 
citizens; 
the obligation on all operators to provide this service; 
the financing of this service in the form of national funds fed 
by all operators in proportion to their market share. 
d)  On the basis of this Parliament and Council backing, the Commission 
took the planned liberalization measures on the basis of Article 90(3) in the form of 
amendments to its original Directive, 90/388: 
a.Qolition as of 1 January 1996, of restrictions on the use of 
television cable networks for supplying already liberalized services (all services other than 
telephone communications) (Directive 95/51 of 18 October 1995). 
abolition as of 1 July 1996, of restrictions on using other 
alternative networks as well as constructing and operating new networks for supplying 
liberalized services (Directive 96/19 of 13 March,1996 on the achievement of full 
competition on telecommunications markets). 
and abolition (by the same Directive 96/19) on 1 January 1998 
of the same restrictions in respect of telephone calls. 
It should be emphasized that this Directive 96/19, the final stage of 
liberalization, specifies the measures that Member States must take in order to make 
liberalization effective within set deadlines: 
any procedures connected with licences, general authorizations 
or declarations must be based on objective, non-discriminatory. proportionate and 
transparent conditions. 
the number of licences may only be limited on the basis of the 
need to manage the frequency spectrum. 
any discrimination in the granting of passage rights must be 
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abolished. 
exclusive rights for supplying directories must be abolished. 
a procedure of appeals to the national regulatory authority or 
another independent body in the case unresolved disputes involving telecommunications 
bodies must be set up. 
wherever they still exist (i.e. telephone calls until1998) 
exclusive or special rights must be determined by means of regulation and made public. 
6)  Other liberalization measures 
Furthermore, on the basis of specific Green Papers, the Commission has, 
again by amending Directive 90/388, liberalized two other sectors, both for infrastructures 
and services. 
a)  Satellite communications (Directive 94/46 of 13 October 1994). 
b)  Mobile and personal communications (Directive 96/2 of 16 January 
1996). It must be pointed out that the European Parliament has shown a special interest in 
this sector. In its Resolution of 19 May 1995 on the Green Paper presented by the 
Commission on the subject, it stressed the important role which mobile communications 
might play in the provision of the universal service because they enabled a solution to be 
found for the problem of connecting isolated, disabled or less favoured persons and remote 
regions: provided that any obstacles to inter-connection between mobile and fixed 
networks were lifted and that service obligations were imposed on operators. The 
Parliament also highlighted the need, in the long run, to create a European authority for 
frequency management. The Directive does not take up this idea but does take on board 
some of the European Parliament's concerns by allowing States to impose public service 
requirements and by guaranteeing inter-connections. 
7)  Pursuit of legislative harmonization and examination of the question of 
universal service 
a)  At the end of 1995 the Commission presented proposals to further 
legislative harmonization in the form of the complete liberalization of the sector: 
a proposal for a Directive on inter-connection and 
guaranteeing the universal service (19 July 1995); 
a proposal for adapting Directive 90/387 (14 November 
1995); 
a proposal for a Directive on the issue of licences for operating 
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networks or services (27 November 1995). 
The proposal on inter-connection is aimed at effectively ensuring 
access to networks and services by guaranteeing the right of all operators to obtain this 
access on the basis of commercial negotiations. Operators in place, mainly former 
telecommunications monopolies, which are in a position to control access by new operators 
(because they hold, for example, rights of passage on the public highway, the use of 
frequencies or the use of national numbering) must allow these operators to be connected to 
their networks by accepting any commercially reasonable demand. The text also allows for a 
sharing of universal service obligations with all operators meeting some of these obligations 
or contributing to their financing. 
Once again the European Parliament reacted by insisting on universal 
service. The report which it adopted as the basis of its opinion on the Directive (the Read 
report of 26 January 1996, approved on 14 February) is actually in keeping with the 
conventional concept of public service since it takes pains to point out that the issue is not an 
aspect of consumer protection nor even a social policy, i.e. directed at the needy, but a 
matter of citizenship. It refers to the right for citizens to enjoy all essential resources 
necessary for their integration in the societal 'network' of our times. It insists that this 
citizenship service should be devised at European level in the form of a specific Community 
regulation including a definition, the tariff scheme and the means of financing. It confirms 
the European Parliament's preference for financing through independent funds rather than 
direct operator fees. It also reiterates the demand, an old European Parliament chestnut, for 
a European authority entrusted with application of the regulation. 
The proposal on issue of licences leaves powers in this subject to 
Member States but imposes on them a specific guideline, which is very liberal. Preference is 
given to a regulatory regime (setting the essential requirements, universal service 
obligations and inter-connection rules) imposed on operators without their having need for 
individual authorizations, on simple declaration or even without any formality. If  they opt 
nevertheless for a system of authorizations or licences, States must limit their application to 
particular situations, particularly those stemming from the physical constraints of the 
networks such as the availability of frequencies or rights of passage, and furthermore they 
may only limit their number in strict ratio to those constraints. 
b)  In a recent communication to the Council and the Parliament (13 
March 1996), the Commission set out a summary of its position on the universal service as 
must be maintained, even developed, in the context of the complete liberalization of 
telecommunications. 
This text recalls that the universal service is, above all, inspired by a 
desire to avoid a "two-speed society" in the area of information, and therefore in access to 
modern communications. This access must be guaranteed at similar levels throughout the 
Community, above all because its economic and social cohesion cannot tolerate excessive 
differences of service levels between the Member States but also in order to facilitate the 
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emergence of Europe-wide services. In other words, this is a fundamental element of 
Community telecommunications policy going "hand in hand" with liberalization. 
The text concludes that the content of the universal service must 
essentially be set at Community level. For the time being this content has been limited to 
access to the fixed public telephone network and the provision at prices affordable by all 
users of a basic service including the use of fax and modem, operator assistance, access to 
emergency services, the supply of information, e.g. in the form of a directory, public call-
boxes in sufficient numbers and the publication of information on conditions of access, 
prices and service quality. Even thus limited, this service is quite an achievement: for many 
regions in the Community it is still a distant goal and the priority is, therefore, to apply it 
everywhere. It is too soon to broaden it at present. However, given technical developments, 
future broadening should not be ruled out: the situation should, therefore, be re-examined 
by 1998. 
The text does acknowledge, however, that overall the financial means 
for ensuring the universal service defined, in this way, on a Community scale has to be set at 
Community level, in the shape of general methods: independent funds or direct operators' 
fees paid to service providers. The choice between these methods and the detail of their 
operations would be left to Member States. This responsibility obviously includes that of 
ensuring an "affordable price" for the universal service. This is a tricky notion which is not 
necessarily synonymous with equalized uniform tariffs: it may be possible to comply by 
other means, such as the use of machinery to limit charges (price capping) or special charges 
for certain users  (the elderly, people on a low income, or ''small" consumers). 
The Commission recognizes that special services are probably called 
for in addition to the universal service guaranteed by the Community: for less-favoured 
regions which pose a crucial problem; for the disabled for whom telecommunications are, as 
it puts it, a vital link with the community in which they live. But it maintains that these 
services may not be financed by the means planned for the universal service: they must be 
dealt with by the social policies of the Member States. 
D.  Postal services 
Less complex and far more recent than the texts relating to 
telecommunications, Community postal legislation nevertheless resembles it by its emphasis 
on the concept of universal service and the decision-taking pattern: general guidelines in 
the form of a Green Paper, a pre -legislative document setting out choices, and finally a 
proposal for a directive. 
1)  The Green Paper on the development of the single market for postal 
services, published by the Commission on 11 June 1992, justifies Community intervention 
in the postal sector by the concern for applying to it, as to all economic activities, the 
principles of the internal market. Here, too, it is necessary to remove obstacles to the free 
provision of services and to competition. But, as in other network activities, pure 
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liberalization is not enough since the postal activity essentially includes a very strong general 
interest component. Good postal services are a factor of social and economic cohesion and 
as a result come under "public service tasks": this is a fundamental 
11political principle". 
After all, cohesion is no longer assessed only at domestic levels but at Community-wide 
levels. That is why any disparities from one Member State to another in the definition and 
level of postal services disturbs the operation of the internal market. It is vital to reduce 
them and, all in all, access to communications, of which postal services are a part, for all 
citizens, all undertakings and all organizations in the Community is a fundamental social 
requirement. 
Driven by this conviction the Commission goes as far as seeing in it 
the justification for an integrated Community postal administration with identical conditions 
of access, levels of service and charges. The idea is rejected as premature but is noteworthy 
as a case where the creation of a genuine European public service has been contemplated. 
At this stage, the public postal service will still be organized at 
national level. But its contents must be largely defined on a European scale since a minimum 
of harmonization is necessary in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market and the cohesion of the Community. To designate the public postal service, i.e. the 
content of the general interest of the postal service, the Commission uses, as it does for 
telecommunications, the expression 
11 universal service 
11
,  which it defines as an accessible 
postal service which must continue to exist in the Community, both for national services 
within the Member States and for transfrontier services between two Member States. This 
universal service must, it says, be provided at an affordable price, offer a satisfactory 
quality of service and be accessible to all. 
This universal service therefore applies both to internal services and 
intra-Community services and essentially has three elements: 
general accessibility: the text refers to possibilities for 
collection and distribution at all points of the Community; 
reasonable prices; 
a satisfactory quality of service. 
But the Community definition of universal service cannot be boiled 
down to these general objectives. In order to be effective it  must include specific 
obligations: 
a)  concerning access conditions which must be equal for all and 
made public; 
b)  concerning quality: Community standards will be necessary. 
for example at least one collection and distribution per working day and delivery the 
168  PE 165.202 Public  undertak~ngs and  public service  act~vities ~n the European Union 
following day for domestic mail, three days for intra-Community mail, with compliance 
with these standards being monitored by a common body wielding disciplinary powers; 
c)  concerning charges which should be brought closer together; 
d)  concerning technical aspects such as classifying 
correspondence, envelope size and postal codes. 
Defined in a common way, the universal service must, according to 
the Commission, be the cornerstone of Community policy in the postal service. But in order 
to achieve this in satisfactory conditions, the imposition of objectives and even detailed 
obligations on Member States and, by them, on postal administrations, is not enough. It is 
also necessary to ensure financial viability, i.e. give the bodies to which the universal 
service will be entrusted the economic means to comply with one of its essential 
components: the maintenance of prices affordable by all. For this purpose these bodies must 
be guaranteed a sufficient volume of activity in order to share out such costs, which make 
the service unprofitable in certain areas, and thereby to obtain lower unitary costs. This 
leads on to granting them exclusivity of certain services -i.e. the notion of "reserved 
services". 
The extent of these reserved services must be defined at Community 
level because, if  all freedom to do so is left to the Member States, the opening up of the 
market, which remains nonetheless, alongside universal service, a fundamental objective, 
would be called into question and it must be acknowledged that, at present, certain States 
have set the exclusive rights of the postal administrations at an excessive level vis-a-vis 
the needs of the universal service. But, in order to respect the requirements of the internal 
market, freedom of service and competition, the Community definition must itself be strictly 
limited to what is necessary for the objective, the principle of "proportionality  .. which 
requires a search for the "least restrictive" solution for freedom. That is why logically the 
reserved service must only cover a part of the universal service. It would only include so-
called standard postal communications defined by the personal nature of dispatches 
(essentially letters and postcards) and weight and price limits. Without doubt, it would not 
include publications, merchandise, express mail and international mail, and probably 
addressed advertisements and intra-Community mail. 
This European definition of reserved services would therefore be a 
maximum: the States would not be able to go beyond it unless they could justify doing so 
under Community law (on the basis of Article 90(2) of the Treaty). But it would not be a 
minimum: the States could remain below it. Therefore, it would be more accurate to refer to 
"reservable
11  services. as the guarantee given to the universal service would still be within 
national powers and therefore dependent on the attitude of the States. 
The relationship between universal service and reserved (or 
reservable) service is in fact conceived in a somewhat ambiguous manner, both in terms of 
content and financing. The provision of the reserved service defined at Community level 
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will be regarded as being part of the universal service and therefore to be compulsorily 
ensured at national level. On the other hand, a State may ensure a wider universal service 
than the Community reservable service but may not reserve that supplementary service 
without legal justification. Furthermore this non-reserved universal service may not 
receive any subsidies from the reserved sector. It must, therefore, be financed separately 
and, in principle, be self-sufficient. It will normally operate according to  the market rules, 
which may lead to different charges according to locality, but may also maintain a uniform 
charge throughout the territory and, for that purpose, allow for equalization provided that 
this is exclusively internal and transparent. However, if  some of these services are not 
profitable it may be possible for the authorities which have imposed them to pay subsidies. 
We should add to this the rule of separating the functions of regulation 
and operation, conventional in Community law on network activities, and obviously 
demonstrative of the will to open the markets up to different operators acting in the greatest 
possible competition. The choice of liberalization remains the dominant feature despite the 
weight given to universal service because of the very strong limits imposed on the reserved 
service which it was supposed to guarantee. 
2)  The guidelines of the Green Paper were specified in a "pre -
legislative" communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
published on 2 June 1993, entitled Guidelines for the development of Community postal 
services. 
These contain a restatement of the general interest dimension of postal 
services,  which it describes as an essential instrument of communication and exchange, 
vital for all economic and social activities, fostering social cohesion by facilitating links 
between geographically distant citizens and undertakings. They also feature the choice of a 
universal service defined on a Community scale in order to harmonize the quality of the 
service, which varies widely from one State to another especially in the case of transfrontier 
mail, so as to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. 
The basic elements of the definition of this service are the same, as are 
the obligations which may be imposed in order to ensure the level (in the case of  the 
transfrontier service, Community standards with an independent body to monitor their 
compliance; in that of domestic mail, national standards compatible with the Community's). 
But the content of the universal service is specified. It should include, in the case of 
transfrontier and domestic services alike, all addressed mail weighing under 2 kg for 
correspondence (letters, postcards, addressed advertisements, catalogues, books, 
publications and other printed matter) and 20 kg for parcels, as well as the registered mail 
service. It would therefore exclude express mail, self-mail, self-distribution, unaddressed 
items and any new services. 
The initial guidelines for reserved services are confirmed. Defined at 
Community level, as a sub-set within the universal service, they would include basic 
correspondence within certain weight and price limits. A new development, however, is that 
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addressed advertisements and transfrontier mail, which the Green Paper opposed, are this 
time given consideration for inclusion. 
There is also a new development in the financial relationship between 
the two sectors. Although the principle remains that of a system of cost -linked charges for 
each service, it is acknowledged that cross-subsidies from the reserved sector to the non-
reserved universal sector may be allowed if  necessary for the latter
1 s execution. 
3)  The legislative proposals logically following on from these study and 
guidance documents were slow in coming out. This is partly a result of hesitations on the 
Commission's part over certain basic points, especially the extent of the reserved service but 
also the form of legislation to be adopted, since the Community Executive had seriously 
envisaged bringing out legislation solely on the basis of Article 90(3). The Council and the 
European Parliament, of course, called loudly for using normal legislative channels and 
called for the swift presentation of proposals along these lines. It should also be pointed out 
that during this waiting period, the Parliament debated the issue at length: in particular, in 
its Resolution of 22 January 1993 (adopted on the basis of the Simpson Report), it approved 
the basic principles of the Green Paper but came out in favour of  maintaining addressed 
advertisements and all transfrontier mail within the reserved service. For its part, the 
Council backed the idea of a minimum quality service ensured on a European scale for all 
citizens of the Union, for the sake, in particular, of the requirements of cohesion, and a 
reserved service enabling reasonable prices to be maintained (see its Resolution of 7 
February 1994). 
The Commission finally completed the drafting of  its legislative 
proposals in July 1995 although they were not published until the beginning of December of 
that year. The proposed legislation takes the form of a Parliament and Council Directive 
based on Articles lOOa for the basis and 189b for the procedure. In the "communicationn 
which accompanies the proposal and in the explanatory memorandum, the Commission 
reiterates its decision to strike a balance between two essential considerations. First of all, 
the "public service requirementS
11
,  whose conventional principles of universality, equality, 
continuity and adaptability are explicitly repeated and which must be translated by the 
definition, on a Community scale, of a universal service, especially necessary for less 
favoured and peripheral regions. The Commission vehemently insists on the novelty and 
scope of such a "Community postal service
11
:  given the heterogeneity of the level of services 
between Member States, a guarantee of service quality throughout the Union would make a 
vital contribution to the completion of the internal market by facilitating transfrontier 
communications for business and would be a step forward for the mass of local mail users in 
less developed countries. In these documents we may detect a very clear awareness of doing 
a 
11European public service", i.e. ensuring that an essential economic service is guaranteed 
at equivalent levels for all citizens of the Union. An important point which differentiates the 
attitude here from that adopted for telecommunications: the guarantee is not regarded as 
solely comprising obligations imposed on service suppliers but includes an assurance of 
durable financing in the form of the mechanism of "reserved services". This guarantee of a 
European universal service is qualified as a 
11principal objective" of the legislation, the other 
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objective obviously being applying to the sector the principles of the internal market. From 
this dual viewpoint, the recitals of the proposal for a Directive definitely reassert the very 
marked dimension of general interest of the postal service and the resulting universal service 
requirements, including the maintenance of reserved services, but they specify that the latter 
must be set without prejudice to application of the competition rules of the Treaty. 
a)  The text of the proposal for a Directive fleshes out the concept 
of universal service. The general definition it offers grants users a "right" which Member 
States must satisfy. It obeys the by no means negligible principles of public service which 
are: equality (identical services offered to all users), continuity (without interruption except 
in cases of force majeure), adaptability (development in accordance with technical, 
economic and social changes and users' requests) together with the special obligation of 
inviolability and correspondence secrecy. Its content echoes and specifies the suggestions 
made in the "guidelines". It includes the collection, transportation and distribution of 
correspondence, plus addressed books, catalogues, newspapers and periodical writings, 
weighing up to 2 kg and parcels up to 20 kg, as well as the dispatch of registered mail and 
items with a declared value, for both transfronti.er and domestic services. All services must 
be guaranteed at least five times a week, with, in particular, a collection from specific points 
and distribution to private homes or corporation premises at least once a day, except in 
exceptional circumstances or geographical conditions. The requirement to provide these 
services at all points of the territory brings with it the obligation to allow for a sufficient 
density of "contact points" and "collection locations". Quality standards for transportation, 
and the regularity and reliability of services will be fixed by the Commission for intra-
Community services, and by the States for national services. The Directive obliges States, in 
the case of intra-Community mail, to delivery mail within three working days for 90% of 
dispatches and five days for 99% and sets as an objective for national mail a deadline of one 
working day for 80% of dispatches. The rules on rates selected for the universal service take 
up the idea set out in the "guidelines". Prices must be cost -linked for each service, also 
thereby obliging service suppliers to hold separate accounts for each element of the reserved 
service and for non-reserved services. But these rates must also be affordable, which leads 
to the possibility of charging uniform rates throughout a given country's territory. 
b)  The definition of the services likely to be reserved was awaited 
with bated breath, given its crucial importance for the viability of the universal service as 
well as the hesitations and controversies to which it had already given rise. As expected this 
includes domestic correspondence, limitations on prices and weights (previously announced 
but without specification), being set respectively at five times the basic rate and 350 grams. 
Also included are the rights to instal letter boxes on the public highway and to issue postage 
stamps. Incoming transfrontier mail and, an essential element because of its economic 
importance, addressed advertising are also included, albeit within certain limits: on one 
hand, this must be necessary for the fmancial balance of the universal service, which permits 
administrative and judicial controls; on the other hand, it is only until31 December 2000, a 
deadline which can only be extended by decision of the Commission. Moreover, the whole 
composition of the reserved service will be re-examined some time in the year 2000. 
Within these limits, States may decide which services they reserve and designate the bodies 
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to benefit from them  . .All other services are free with the rider, however, that the official 
authorities may submit them to declaration. They may even subordinate them to 
authorization but within objective conditions or to universal service obligations, possibly 
with contributions to a compensation fund. 
c)  Non-reserved services may be offered by operators on the 
basis of non -discriminatory procedures (declarations or authorizations). As expected, the 
job of seeing to the application of the Directive and ensuring compliance with competition 
rules is entrusted to "national regulatory authorities" which must be legally and functionally 
independent from the operators. 
4)  The European Parliament adopted a relatively critical attitude vis-a-
vis the proposal for a Directive (Simpson Report and its amendments approved on 9 May 
1996). Although it took on board the general guidelines, in keeping with its previous stances 
it voiced its concern for the universal service. Confirming that this service must, in its 
opinion, be regarded as a public service, in other words a service of general economic and 
social interest whose provision is entrusted to certain undertakings such that those offering 
the service have a vocation to serve the public interest, it came out in favour of 
strengthening the reserved service which is a guarantee of it: 
first of all, by including among those services likely to be 
reserved addressed advertising and incoming transfrontier mail, on the same footing as the 
other elements: i.e. no obligation for financial justification and no time limit (viz. scrapping 
the deadline of the year 2000 beyond which reservation could only continue if  the 
Commission so decided); 
then, by scrapping the automatic re-examination of all the 
reserved services in the year 2000; 
and, finally, by enabling States to reserve other services, if 
necessary for maintaining the universal service. 
ill.  The trans-European networks 
Linked to sectoral legislation are the decisions taken by the Community in respect of 
trans-European networks. The Community has now begun to exercise the new 
·responsibility given to it by the Treaty of Maastricht to create these networks in the sectors 
of transport, energy and telecommunications. 
A.  General guidelines 
1)  The basic ideas are set out in the 1994 Commission White Paper 
"Growth, Competitiveness, Employment", which focuses on the networks. This text 
endeavours to establish the meaning of the Community
1 s role, namely that of integrating 
national operations in the broader framework of Community interest. In the particular case 
173  PE 165.202 Publ~c undertakings  ar~ publ~c se~ice act~vities in the European  Onion 
of transport this integration consists in giving a Community dimension to high quality public 
services. This clearly emphasizes the importance of these networks for establishing a 
Community general interest which might lead to the creation of European scale public 
services. 
2)  The political fillip has been given by the European Council, in 
particular at its meetings in Copenhagen (December 1993), Corfu (June 1994) and Essen 
(December 1994). 
B.  Sectoral legislative action 
This has begun to take shape mainly in the sectors of transport and energy, less 
clearly in that of telecommunications. 
1)  Transport 
The main texts are: 
a)  The Council decisions of 29 October 1993 (93/628, 629 and 630)17 
establishing in particular a combined transport network referred to as the "citizens' 
network" and a road network including, in particular, the construction of missing links. 
b)  The proposal for a Council and European Parliament decision on 
Community guidelines for developing the trans-European transport network18• 
Presented initially by the Commission in March 1994, it has been 
amended and is currently being adopted by the Parliament and the Council. Its aim is to 
establish the main thrust of action needed to complete the network and to pinpoint common 
interest projects which should be part of it. It gives the network the objectives of ensuring 
the mobility of persons throughout the Community by offering them quality infrastructures. 
c)  The proposal for the Council Directive on the inter-operability of the 
European high-speed train network19• 
Following on from a Council resolution on the subject of 17 
December 1993 and the insistent demands of the Parliament, this was presented by the 
Commission in Apri11994 and is currently being examined by the Parliament in second 
reading. It is aimed at fostering the inter-connection and inter-operability of national 
high-speed train networks in order to create a European network whose national 
components ("sub-systems") will be managed by the Member States with common 
requirements to be respected. 
17.  OJL305of10.12.93. 
18.  COM(95) 298. 
19.  OJ C 203 of 8.8.95. 
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2)  Energy 
a)  A proposal for a Council Regulation on a declaration of European 
interest to facilitate the completion of trans-European networks in the area of electricity 
and natural gas transportation
20
• 
Presented by the Commission in February 1992 and currently being 
discussed at the Council, it defines the declaration of European interest as recognition that 
the completion of a given electricity or natural gas transportation project falls within a set of 
guidelines established by the Council. Aimed at facilitating the private financing of the 
project, the declaration is to be made by the Commission. 
b)  Commission communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Community guidelines in matters of trans-European energy networks (19 
Januarv 1994)21• 
This text highlights the inadequacy of national actions in order to 
justify the need for a "guidance action" by the Community adopting concepts and actions 
which exist in Member States and which can be more effectively tackled at Community level 
in the future leading to integration of the Community area. Its general objectives are: 
to~  in gaps at the borders of national networks; 
to develop inter-connections; 
to connect isolated countries and regions or those which are 
inadequately supplied; 
to achieve the inter-operability of networks on a European 
scale and the maintenance of service quality, in particular continuity of supplies. 
c)  European Parliament and Council Decision establishing a set of 
guidelines on the trans -European networks in the energy sector22. 
Proposed by the Commission in February 1994 this Decision recently 
(7 May 1996) reached the end of its adoption process; it  contains: 
an action plan in which the Community identifies common 
interest projects and then helps to create favourable conditions for their realization. 
sectoral objectives which are: 
20.  OJ C 124 of 6.5.93. 
21.  COM(93) 685. 
22.  OJ C 205 of 10.8.95. 
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for electricity, connecting very high voltage networks 
and developing their inter-connection. 
for gas: 
introducing natural gas into regions where it is 
not supplied; 
connecting isolated networks; 
increasing transportation, reception and storage 
capacities. 
C.  Telecommunications 
In June 1995, the Commission presented a legislative project for trans-
European telecommunications networks. Once again this project takes the form of a 
proposal for a European Parliament and Council decision concerning a set of  guidelines23 for 
these networks, which is now being adopted. Like the parallel proposals for the other 
networks it is aimed at establishing objectives, priorities and the main thrust of the planned 
actions. Among the main priorities selected are applications contributing to economic and 
social cohesion, actions aimed at less favoured regions, in particular rural and peripheral 
regions, and the elimination of weak points and missing links in order to complete inter-
connection and inter-operability of the network. 
Section IV.  General positions on the public service 
While the Community institutions have, in fact, largely dealt with the public service 
sector by sector in their administrative, judicial or legislative actions, they have taken very 
little global action. There has been practically no sign of any overall intervention by the 
Council or even the Commission. Only the European Parliament, in addition to the positions 
it has taken in the framework of its participation in sectoral legislation, has endeavoured to 
adopt a general approach to the subject. 
I.  We should first of all mention its 1993 Resolution on the role of the public 
service in the completion of the internal market (12 February 1993). In it, the Assembly 
asserts that: 
it is the responsibility of the public sector to provide public services 
(energy, water, transport, etc.) of high quality, meeting the needs of the population and 
generally economic interest; 
23.  OJ C 302 of 14.11.95. 
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- competitiveness must also be assessed in terms of the collective needs 
of the citizens; 
- the Community must ensure that every citizen enjoys equal access to 
goods and services of general interest. 
It therefore asks the Commission to define the concept of public service 
and general interest and, in its competition policy, to safeguard the principle of freedom of 
access to the public service on the basis of criteria such as financial accessibility and quality. 
This resolution is an important one since it is perhaps the first case of an 
official text referring to the principle of equal access by all European citizens to goods and 
services of general interest, the very principle of a European public service, and calling for 
a common definition of this service. 
IT.  Later in 1993 (27 April), the European Parliament held a hearing on 
public undertakings to discuss the balance between competition and public sector 
obligations. 
ill.  In 1994 (6 May), in a Resolution on public undertakings, privatization and 
public services in the Community, based on the Speciale report, the European Parliament 
makes a distinction between public manufacturing undertakings and public enterprises which 
run public services at local or national level, in that whereas the former respond more to the 
requirements of economic development the latter meet the need to perform public tasks, 
although both of them serve the general interest. 
It adds, with concern, that in the current state of affairs, the concept of 
public service and that of general interest have still yet to be defined and that the competition 
policy and other policies linked to the market must be made compatible with the recognition 
of the public interest and the citizens' right to be offered public services accessible to all and 
complying with standards of homogeneous quality, so that in particular genuine equality 
between European citizens is guaranteed". 
In order to meet these objectives, the European Parliament calls for three 
actions: 
1)  The inclusion of the public service in the Treaty at the time of the 
review scheduled for 1996; 
2)  The adoption by the Union, at the Commission's initiative, of a 
"European public service charter" which would include the following aspects, inter alia: 
- identifying the common principles to be met by public services in 
Europe in order to meet the requirements of a genuine European citizenship; 
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- uniform treatment for all users in different services distributed on a 
national basis but with a supra-national dimension; 
- quantitative and qualitative standards to be guaranteed by all 
services; 
- forms of control by user-consumers; 
- a list of services to which these principles must be applied on a 
European basis. 
3)  The creation of a temporary parliamentary committee entrusted with 
examining the problems of public services in Europe, to operate at least until the charter was 
adopted. 
N.  Finally, the Parliament Resolution on the inter-governmental conference 
on revision of the Treaty on European Union (Bourlanges-Martin Report of 17 May 1995) 
contains a whole passage explicitly referring to public service. In point XI of Part One, 
(
110bjectives and Policy of the Union"), the text calls for this concept to be introduced into 
the Treaty. It says that the position of the public service in the framework of European 
Union actions should be asserted by introducing new articles defining the notion and scope 
of "universal servicen, guaranteeing each citizen the right of equal access to services of 
general interest and by 
11ad hoc'' provisions taking into account the special nature of public 
service undertakings. 
Conclusion on the Community's attitude to the public service 
Following on from examination of the Treaties, that of the policies pursued seems to 
suggest that the public service is both part of the Community's concerns and within its 
powers. Indeed, the very logic of European construction which was, in order to bring about 
a single market, that of bringing down all barriers to the free movement of goods and 
services, could not help but challenge those obstacles which were the special rights created 
by national States in order to protect their public services. But, at the same time, the 
Treaties bore in mind the existence of services of general economic interest and allowed for 
them a series of possible exemptions to the rules on free movement and competition. For a 
long time the problem was barely posed in practice because the logic of the common market 
had not been pushed to its extreme. It was the undertaking to complete the internal market 
which, as of the mid 1980s, affected the so-called network activities where the bulk of 
economic public services are concentrated. The Community institutions then began to 
examine the compatibility of the exclusive or special rights enjoyed by these services with 
Community law. 
I.  The Commission has exercised its administrative powers to challenge these 
privileges, in particular in telecommunications, postal services and transport. Since 1990 it 
has even done so systematically in all sectors, including energy. Its general attitude has been 
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to attach some importance to public service while considering that special rights ought to be 
ended. 
II.  The Court of Justice seldom delivered judgement until the late 1980s. Even then it 
initially was very cautious in its use of the exemptions provided for by the Treaties for 
public services. Very recently, however, it has relied on Article 90(2) to acknowledge the 
public service in its essential elements, including its dimension of economic balance. 
m.  Mainly inspired by the Commission and sometimes determined by it in the 
framework of its own powers, Community legislation on network activities has been largely 
aimed at applying to them the principles and rules of the internal market. 
A)  The idea of public service is probably considered but in a very watered 
down form compared with many national situations. It is indeed regularly stated in its 
conventional elements: a definition relying on reference to the notion of general interest and 
the constituent principles of equality of access, continuity and adaptability. However, at 
other times, some decisions seem to suggest that it is perhaps not understood in its full 
dimension, that of an overall activity provided in full by the authorities in order to ensure 
that it exists for the public's benefit and not only in order to regulate its operation, as is the 
case of ordinary commercial activities. Community texts (legislative and pre-legislative) 
often refer therefore to  "commercial regulations" in connection with intervention by the 
authorities aimed at imposing general interest obligations on the activities in question. This 
expression is ambiguous: taken literally it would signify that sight has been lost of the vital 
difference between the creation of a public service and the various forms of regulating 
economic activity and that, in the end, public service obligations and those obligations 
stemming, for example, from the rules for the protection of public health, safety or the 
environment, or labour law, are being confused. Another reduction of meaning: the texts 
seem often to regard the public service as aimed at the 
11needy" part of the population and, 
therefore, as having a "social" application, whereas fundamentally is to supposed be at the 
disposal of all citizens and of an essentially "civic" scope. 
B)  This adulteration results in the reduction of the content of public service. 
From a comprehensive activity placed under a single responsibility and entrusted to a single 
operator, the traditional standard, it is now subjected to a breaking up process usually 
carried out in the following stages: 
1)  Separating the function of regulation or control from that of 
operation. 
2)  Separating, within the operation itself, at least for accounts and 
management, infrastructure, on one hand, and the service, on the other, so as to switch the 
infrastructure from its traditional condition of an asset for the exclusive use of a single 
operator to that of a common medium for the activity of several operators competing with 
each other: this is the fundamental notion of "common carrier", the Commission's 
philosophy on network activities according to which the operators of energy, transport or 
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telecommunications distribution must offer their services by using gas and electricity mains, 
railways and telephone lines in the same way as road hauliers use roads. 
3)  Possibly, breaking up the supply of the service itself (for example, 
between production, transmission and distribution). 
4)  Liberalizing the activity, both for the supply of the infrastructure and 
the supply of services to the public. Including the abolition of special rights granted 
traditionally to operators to enable them to ensure a better service, this liberalization 
obviously has tended to challenge the overall viability of the system. Its consequences 
include making it very difficult or even prohibiting (by banning 
11 cross-subsidies 
11  and 
encouraging an exclusively cost-based system of charges) the maintenance of uniform 
prices for users in an extensive territory achieved through equalization between loss-
making and profit-making regions. 
5)  Last but not least, reducing the public service to a limited area within 
a given activity: in the form of either obligations aimed at a restricted section of the public 
(certain categories deserving special treatment because of their age, state of  health, 
resources or geographical situation) or a broad 
11universal service
11  in terms of target public 
but with a fairly thin consistency. 
C)  There are nuances from one sector to another 
1)  It  is probably the sector of telecommunications which has been most 
liberalized. The universal service has been maintained there but only in the form of 
relatively restricted obligations, and special or exclusive rights will gradually be phased out 
once competition is extended to all activities: the only area still to have escaped, telephone 
calls, will in turn be liberalized in 1998. 
2)  This liberalizing trend is far less advanced in the energy sector: only 
transport monopolies have been affected, in the form of a transit obligation; access by third 
parties to the network, implying the full abolition of exclusive production and transport 
rights and the reduction of these rights for distribution, is still under discussion at the 
Council where it  is meeting with strong resistance by certain States. 
3)  Legislation on railways, while partly opening the markets, is such that 
a special place in access to the network has been retained for operators offering a public 
service. 
4)  Undoubtedly, it is the project on postal legislation which is most 
generous to public service by focusing to a large extent on the 
11universal service
11  and 
guaranteeing its economic viability by a fairly substantia1
11reserved service". It remains to 
be seen, of course, what will remain of this reserved service after the intermediary period, 
scheduled to end in the year 2000. since the proposal for a Directive does not guarantee its 
maintenance beyond then. 
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IV.  In this general trend, where liberalization has been dominant, the different 
institutions have not played identical roles. The Commission has largely led the way with a 
fairly clear doctrine: serious attention paid to services of general interest no doubt, but with 
priority to opening up the market, leading to a reduction - if  not an abolition - of the 
privileges on which these services often relied. The Court had previously backed the 
Commission's policy but recently it seems to have taken a clear position in favour of the 
special rights needed for the public service. The Council is obviously more divided since it 
brings together governments with widely differing views on the subject, ranging from 
partisans of a maximum opening of the market to the defenders of the most conventional 
public service. Generally speaking, it has watered down the Commission's proposals in 
order to allow special rights a place in general interest activities at the cost of slowing down 
the adoption of texts, many of which are still being examined. Finally it is the European 
Parliament which has most strongly backed the public service and its requirements in terms 
of special and exclusive rights. It has done so in the different sectors, when examining 
specialised legislation, in particular in connection with energy, telecommunications and the 
postal services. But it has also done so in a general way, by defending in several resolutions 
and reports both the notion of public service itself and the idea that it should be defined so 
that it can be protected at European level and so that the essential services stemming from it 
can be guaranteed at the same level for all citizens of the European Union. 
* 
*  * 
V.  Any conclusion that the public service has been reduced as a result of Community 
action must, however, be finely tuned in two ways: 
1)  On one hand, it should be pointed out that the expression "public service" 
itself, until recently seldom used when not contested, has been widely disseminated in the 
Community sphere. It now has its rightful place there and it could be considered to have 
advanced the idea which it encapsulates: witness a greater awareness general interest 
requirements in the more recent texts. 
2)  On the other hand, whereas there is no doubt that the leeway given to 
national public services has been reined in and that this may be considered irreversible, 
there are already hints of the introduction of Community-scale compensation in the form 
primarily of "minimal level services" (sometimes, as it  happens, superior to those found in 
certain Member States) guaranteed for all Union citizens and, potentially at least, in the 
form of common supervisory authorities: i.e. the first signs of a possible European public 
service in the full sense of the term. 
181  PE 165.202 Publ~c undert~ngs and  publ~c service  activ~ties  ~n the European  Un~on 
CHAPTER ill  ELEMENTS OF A EUROPEAN PUBUC SERVICE POLICY 
Whether it is a hope or a fear, European intervention in the field of the public service 
is no longer speculation. It has largely become a fact. Based on powers well established in 
the Treaties, it has been the subject of considerable applications and is likely to develop 
further. Indeed, on one hand, the extension of the principles and rules of the internal market 
to major general interest networks is inevitable, since the Treaty of Rome provides for it, as 
long as their special mission is protected. On the other hand, more recent objectives added 
to the Treaties, such as economic and social cohesion, environmental and consumer 
protection, the creation of European citizenship and of trans-European networks also 
require Europe to act in the sphere of public services. 
Therefore, the question is no longer whether European intervention exists in this 
field. It is whether that intervention is coherent, something involving all the major 
Community institutions together with the varied and complex provisions of the Treaties. 
Another question is the direction or orientation of that intervention: it may, after all, be 
more or less ambitious and decisive; it may, above all, concentrate more or less on public 
service according to whether intervention is within a moderately or strictly liberal 
perspective. 
The question raised is, in a nutshell, that of a European public service policy. The 
following considerations are an attempt to help to define that policy, by making proposals 
(or at least setting out options) in respect of both the aspects implied: 
1)  Its possible content, i.e. the goal which it may set and the means of 
attaining it. 
2)  The necessary instruments, which means examining the existing machinery 
and, if  it is inadequate, contemplating new ones. 
Section I The content of a European public service policy 
European intervention in the field of the public service presupposes that the 
Community institutions have their own particular idea of that notion. In individual cases 
submitted to them, the Commission and Court will be hard put not to reach a decision on 
whether or not to apply an exemption to the rules on free movement and competition for the 
sake of services of general economic interest. It is difficult for them to do so without 
defining the content and limits of those services, which is tantamount to a minimum 
European def'mition of public service. Similarly, when it adopts texts on network activities a 
Community legislative authority will make a choice to strike a certain balance between 
opening up the market and maintaining any restrictions dictated by the need for a public 
service. This choice is obviously based on a certain conception of general interest. This is 
the first task of any European policy, indeed its overall objective: agreeing on the basis of a 
minimum common conception for maintaining a certain level of public service in economic 
activity. 
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Once that general objective has been defined, the second task will be that of deciding 
the method for attaining it, i.e. the application measures. Given the European decision-
making context, this means operating a share of powers and determining what will be 
decided by common action and what will remain the responsibility of the Member States. 
I. General objective: The maintenance of a sufficient level of public service in economic 
activity 
The first imperative for any European public service policy is to agree on a common 
definition of this notion. It seems that thought could be given to doing so in a relatively 
ambitious way, i.e. by setting the objective of maintaining an appreciable level of concerns 
of general interest in economic activity. It may be claimed that the bases exist to reach an 
agreement on this objective. As has been seen, despite the different ternililology in use and 
varied legal forms and technical administrative solutions existing in the Member States, the 
notion of economic activity or general interest is understood and applied in them all. It 
should, therefore, be possible to agree on the idea that certain economic activities are in the 
general interest and as a result require intervention by the official authorities: this is what is 
generally understood by public service since that is quite simply the justification for it. 
These are the vital elements of the concept on which agreement might be reached: 
A.  The notion of activity of general economic interest 
1)  Definition 
As the justification of authority in a democratic society, the concern of general 
interest inspires action by that authority in all areas within its powers including economic 
intervention. Alongside the regulations covering all economic activity, this intervention also 
consists in organizing (or having organized) production activities operating in the general 
interest. These "economic public services" have two aspects: 
a)  On one hand, they are activities which, to a large extent, fall outside 
market rules and profit-making logic since they are regarded as so important that they must 
be ensured in any case and made accessible to everyone, which means both proximity to 
users and reasonable prices, and also because, by their nature, they are ill suited to 
competition and often justify special rights; 
b)  On the other hand, these activities remain economic activities, generally 
ensured by undertakings and not administrations. As such they are billed to the user at a 
price which takes account of costs, something that differentiates them from social services 
which are based on the idea of assisting the needier and, if  not free of charge, supplied at 
least in return for a contribution that is not cost-related. These services are dispensed not 
only to the less favoured but to all citizens regardless of their economic and social level. 
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2)  Components of general interest 
Given this definition, the notion of activity of economic general interest covers a 
variety of components which may be divided into two main categories: 
a)  The first is related to integration, which is connected with people's well-
being and their integration into society and may be qualified as a concern for democratic 
citizenship or the solidity of social links. It includes the following considerations: 
social cohesion according to which all citizens, regardless of  their 
age, physical state (illness, disability), means of existence and geographical location, are 
guaranteed access to the services which are regarded as essential for taking part in social 
life, in order to feel a member of society or, thanks to solidarity,  to strengthen the social 
unit and avoid social disintegration and exclusion; 
territorial cohesion which makes it impossible to leave entire areas 
without those basic services necessary for modern social and economic life, which would 
condemn them to lower levels of activity and living standards than the rest of the country, a 
situation which, particularly in the case of peripheral or island regions, would eventually 
threaten national unity (the notions of regional planning and territorial continuity); 
the desire to ensure the effective enjoyment of certain fundamental 
freedoms vital for participation in social. life: freedom of movement, which implies the 
existence of frequent, extensive and cheap transport; freedom of expression, which calls for 
cheap and reliable means of communication (traditional postal services protected by 
correspondence secrecy, a public telephone system, etc.); freedom of the press, which must 
be supported by certain facilities granted in the context of the public postal service. 
b)  Collective efficiency which is more concerned with the interest of society 
taken as a whole. This includes: 
overall economic efficiency leading to the search for solutions 
benefiting society as a whole and sometimes contrary to individual economic rationale: for 
example, certain exclusive rights enabling optimum yields; 
long-term concerns making heavy investment without immediate 
profit more acceptable; 
controlling non-renewable or rare resources and environmental 
protection; 
the requirement to manage the public domain which belongs to the 
community and so is put at the disposal of public services or the public directly: roads, 
railways, airspace, the airwaves, etc.; 
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- finally, national security which also relies on the organization of 
certain economic services, particularly communications. 
3)  These concerns imply serious constraints: 
a)  ensuring the service in all circumstances, which means allowing for 
the corresponding demand and investment; 
b)  serving all users, regardless of location or time, even when demand is 
lower and, furthermore, when the service runs at a loss; 
c)  practising reasonable (and preferably uniform) prices. 
These constraints were often reflected in the traditional principles, defined 
above, namely continuity, equality and adaptation. These principles are still valid since they 
lie at the very heart of the public service. They are also sufficiently general to be adapted to 
new problems, as some consequences only appear over time. It could, therefore, be 
purported that the principle of equality carries with it a requirement of simplicity, which 
means that the service remains comprehensible and, as a result, within the grasp of the 
majority of the population. In this sense it  is by no means certain that it is in the interest of 
the general public to be faced, according to a certain trend, with large numbers of different 
operators, for telephone services or electricity for example, offering no end of price and 
service combinations. Complication - and the resulting risk of confusion - are not in the 
spirit of public service. 
On the other hand, the conventional conception must be enriched. In fact, 
it has been open to legitimate criticism for its basic reliance on an administrative and 
technical approach: we were satisfied with a basic service, offering minimum services, often 
ensured rigidly and impersonally and we were more concerned with technical performance 
than consumer needs while tending to overlook good management. Economic and social 
developments have made us more demanding: 
- the concern for service quality, calling for improvements (regularity, 
punctuality), diversification, in order to meet a variety of  customers~ needs, and target 
setting; 
- respect for users (transparency and responsibility): information, 
repairs or swift compensation for any faults, procedures for solving disputes, allowing 
services to be monitored by independent bodies; 
the concern for good management perhaps not in terms as strict as 
those for purely commercial activities but constantly aimed at balancing the books. 
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B.  Identifying activities of general interest 
The decision to consider an activity as being one of general interest and, therefore, 
creating a public service at local or national scale naturally lies primarily with the authorities 
concerned. But intervention by Community law in general interest activities calls for an 
agreement on the scope of the activities in question. The response has been given by the 
executive or legislative action of the Community itself. The activities concerned are, as we 
have seen, the major networks affecting the general public: public transport, electricity, gas 
distribution, postal services and telecommunications. On the other hand, European 
intervention has not affected the distribution of water: this is because it is essentially 
organized at local level without any exclusive rights on a national scale and therefore did not 
call for any special action when the internal market was being created (in fact all that 
Community law has done is to ban national discrimination in the choice of operators, issue 
regulations on the quality of drinking water and pass legislation on public contracts for 
operators). 
However, even though there is a consensus among the Member States to consider 
these activities as qualifying for public service treatment, there is a definite trend to insist 
that only a part rather than the whole of the activity should be run as a public service. 
a)  This part would comprise, first of all, the infrastructures which may not 
always be entirely left to private initiative and competition especially since they often entail 
privileges such as the occupation of land, including the sub-soil (use of public land, 
easements or compulsory purchase of private land) and, for economic, technical and 
ecological reasons, it may be difficult to increase their numbers or size. The most obvious 
cases are railways, electricity transmission and gas transportation. To take the example of 
railways, not only is it very difficult to increase the number of lines and traffic capacity but 
also infrastructures and rolling stock are so well adapted to one another that they must be 
integrated if they are to be properly run: if  more than one operator were to run a service on 
a single infrastructure extremely detailed planning would be called for, including 
complicated controls, and the result would be greater safety risks and a waste of time and 
energy. The fact that it is impossible to store electricity and the need for supply to meet 
demand continuously and without fault heighten the need for its transmission to be run in an 
integrated way. 
b)  It might also cover the minimum service to be guaranteed ·for all users, 
what is known as the universal service. 
c)  The remainder, i.e. the operation of numerous aspects of the activity, 
would be left to the free initiative of operators. 
This trend is making serious inroads into the traditional concept of public 
service in many Member States. That concept was both global and unitary: the service was 
always entrusted, usually without time limits - or at least for a long period - to a single 
undertaking which was responsible for the whole activity, its operation as well as the 
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infrastructures; this gave the undertaking an overview of the activity and enabled it to adapt 
the infrastructure to long-term service needs by making appropriate investments, spreading 
the cost over time and space, and as a result to practise uniform charges (by equalization, 
i.e. the profitable sectors compensating for unprofitable ones). 
The trend towards a restrictive concept limiting the public service to the management 
of the infrastructure and some operational obligations has been very marked in a number of 
Member States, the United Kingdom in particular. As a result of action by the Commission, 
the Community has adopted it  to a large extent in its administrative and legislative measures. 
As a result of this dominant trend, the European conception of the public service will can 
never be as broad as that which prevailed in the Member States most attached to the notion. 
C.  The inability of private initiative to respond spontaneously to general requirements 
Whatever, however, the differences of opinion on the extent to be given to the notion 
of  public service, there must at least be agreement on the principle that private initiative 
cannot define that service; it is not for private initiative to decide whether a given economic 
activity is in the general interest and is therefore to be regarded as a public service. 
1)  First of all, it has no legitimacy to do so because it represents vested 
interests. 
2)  Nor has it the ability to do so. Its objective is to make profits, not to serve 
the general interest. It is indifferent to the considerations of social cohesion and regional 
planning. It tends to ignore the long term ("shortsightedness of the market") and does not 
spontaneously indulge in activities whose profitability is by definition uncertain, or even 
non-existent, and which often call for heavy investment to boot. We could give the 
example of private electricity undertakings in France before the war: they totally neglected 
electrification in the countryside, which is costly, and concentrated on highly profitable 
urban operations instead. 
D.  The need for public intervention 
1)  Given their legitimacy (which in democratic regimes is bestowed by 
elections), only the authorities are in a position to speak on behalf of the general interest and 
can decide whether to create a public service and define its content. They may be central, 
federal or local authorities, according to the special features of the constitutional systems 
and administrative organization of the Member States. 
2)  Given this very legitimacy, they alone have the power to impose 
obligations resulting from public service on the (public or private) undertakings entrusted 
with them and to grant those undertakings any special rights which might be necessary for 
the fulfilment of these obligations. 
3)  Furthermore, they alone have the ability to set up control or regulation 
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bodies to supervise public service activities, whether they be a part of public administration 
or separate from it. 
IT.  Achieving the aim: sharing responsibilities between the European Union and the Member 
States 
An agreement at European level on the general aim of maintaining a substantial level 
of public service is one thing. Another thing is to achieve that aim, i.e. choosing the means 
of attaining it. We are no longer dealing with public service as an abstract principle but 
public services in the practical sense of the term, such as they operate in the different sectors 
of the economy where they exist. This operation probably calls for a share of European 
decision-making but it is difficult to see how a great deal of leeway could not be left to 
Member States given the very strong attachment of many countries to their traditions and 
achievements in this field. The share-out of powers between European and national levels 
must, therefore, take into account as much as possible the principle of subsidiarity, which 
means that it will vary from sector to sector. Those sectors which are mainly organized at 
local level, for example water distribution and refuse collection, will have to remain within 
national powers. On the other hand, those reliant on strong centralization to be properly 
run, such railways or postal services, might be suitable for a sizeable share of European 
intervention. 
A.  The Union's.role 
A European Union role in the operation of public services is necessary for at least 
two reasons: 
First of all it  is dictated by the internal market: its rules of free movement 
and competition give the European institutions a say in the obligations and special rights 
which characterize public service activities. This say takes the form either of case-by -case 
surveillance or legislative harmonization. 
Moreover, the objectives of economic and social cohesion and consumer 
protection and the notion of European citizenship call for an assurance that all Union 
nationals, regardless of the country or region where they live, have access on an equal 
footing to a number of fundamental services - what might be called the right of the 
European citizen to public service. These justifications of general interest, the foundations 
of the public service, set out above, are now being taken into account, at least in part, at 
European level; there is a trend towards recognition of a "European general interest". This 
again may be achieved by harmonizing national legislation but may, in the end, lead to the 
setting up of genuine European public services. 
1)  Case-by -case surveillance 
This refers to action by the European institutions aimed at the proper 
application of those provisions in Treaties affecting the public service: competition and the 
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freedoms of the internal market. This action is necessary wherever these provisions have not 
given rise to secondary legislation aimed at harmonizing national rules in the different 
sectors in question: sectors which have not been harmonized and, where they have been, 
those aspects left within the powers of Member States. 
a)  Surveillance is primarily guaranteed by the administrative action of 
the Commission. As we have seen, its powers in this area, in particular those which it enjoys 
under Articles 90(3) and 169, are very important. They may be exercised on the basis of an 
all-out interpretation of the rules on competition and free movement, allowing the public 
service only a tiny place, leading in the long run to sharp cuts in national public services 
through a ban on the exclusive or special rights from which they benefit. The Commission 
may, on the other hand, apply in full any permissible exemptions and, in so doing, 
safeguard existing public services as far as possible. In between the two options, a whole 
range of intermediary solutions are obviously possible. 
b)  Judicial intervention may also be more or less favourable to the public 
service, according to the Court of Justice's view of the extent of its control. 
It may choose to leave it for the national courts to decide 
whether an activity is a ngeneral economic interest servicen in the sense of the Treaty or not, 
in which case national public services will probably be given favourable treatment. 
It may, on the contrary, decide that it should apply the notion 
to practical cases: depending on whether its definition is minimalist or, at the other extreme, 
catch-all, i.e. excluding or demanding the application of exemptions, it will either cut back 
or boost national public services. 
2)  Sectoral legislative harmonization 
Legislative action aimed at harmonizing national rules sector by sector is 
obviously far more important than case-by-case surveillance since it influences the whole 
of a sector of activity in all the Member States at the same time. It may adopt a whole range 
of options listed here, in order of intensity of the "communitarization., of the public service: 
a)  The Union could take an extreme view and more or less rule out 
public service in a given sector and call for total liberalization; 
the absence of any obligation imposed on a European scale; 
a ban on any special right and any funding of general interest services 
outside the strict market machinery. 
At present there are no examples of this extreme solution. 
b)  On the contrary, the Union may give the States complete leeway for 
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organizing the public service: this is largely true of  local public services (urban transport, 
water, sewage). 
c)  In certain sectors, the Union might think it expedient to compel the 
Member States to comply with a certain number of public service (or "universal service") 
obligations by calling for a given solution to their financing, a solution which may or may 
not include the possibility of reserving certain services to a given operator (exclusive or 
special rights constituting a "reserved service"): this is the option which has been chosen for 
electricity, gas and telecommunications. 
d)  This exercise of setting common public service obligations may be 
taken to the point of constituting the blueprint of a European public service in a given sector, 
by defining with precision (for example in quantitative forms) the minimum level of services 
to be ensured for all Union nationals and imposed on the Member States, even if  the 
guarantee is not the direct responsibility of the Community institutions themselves but that 
of the national authorities. The legislative proposals relating to the postal services resemble 
this solution. The trans-European networks might also accommodate the emergence of 
fledgling European public services. For example an integrated rail network does not call 
only for modifications to the infrastructure in order to carry out inter-connection: i.e. 
adapting existing lines (with a single gauge) and even building new lines (missing links). If 
inter-operability is to be ensured, it also requires more harmonization of rolling stock 
(uniform dimensions, a single system of electricity supplies or, at least, adaptable engines 
avoiding locomotive changes at borders) and signalling systems. 
3)  The creation of genuine European public services 
In order for these "fledglings" to become full-blown European public 
services, it would obviously be necessary to go beyond the definition of obligations and 
special rights and for the Union to take responsibility for setting up the service and 
monitoring it. This would mean: 
a)  That the Union itself, by "European public service delegations" (in the 
form of unilateral decisions or conventions) would entrust the provision of a given service 
on a European dimension to one or more operators: it might be considered for certain 
passenger rail services (high speed European services) or even for telecommunication 
sezvices or the transportation of electricity or gas; 
b)  that the Union would set up European control (or "regulatory") 
authorities: this has been contemplated in the case of railways, telecommunications and civil 
aviation. 
B.  Leewav given to States 
Excepting the extreme solution of ruling out public service altogether, all options for 
European action are admissible in principle: the choice of one or the other must depend on 
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the special features of the activity in question. It should, however, be recognized that the 
creation of comprehensive European public services is only a possibility to be studied with 
caution, applicable to certain limited activities and not in any case for several years to come. 
On the other hand, it goes without saying that local public services must remain outside 
European legislative intervention. In fact, most sectors will be subject to limited 
harmonization consisting in basic rules for defining obligations and special rights and for 
financing the service, leaving the Member States a fairly wide berth for specifying those 
rules and, in particular, the main responsibilities for setting up and monitoring the service 
(choice of operators, legal instruments and method of monitoring). 
1)  The extent of obligations and special rights 
a)  Obligations 
When European legislation imposes public service obligations in a 
sector, calling it for example a "universal service n, these obligations should preferably not 
be seen as a ceiling but, on the contrary, as a minimum guarantee by the Union which 
Member States must always be free to exceed by imposing supplementary requirements 
dictated by special national needs. This question is self-evident when legislation provides 
for no obligations. 
This means that the Union must not have a monopoly for defining 
"general economic interest services" in accordance with Article 90(2): States must be able to 
de:fme these services themselves in addition to European legislation as long as, of course, the 
Court of Justice has the ultimate say over those definitions. 
b)  Special or exclusive rights 
On the other hand, when European legislation allows operators to 
enjoy special or even exclusive rights, under the name for example of "reserved servicesn, 
this should be considered as a ceiling not to be exceeded because these are exemptions from 
the rules on competition and free movement. If  the States do go further they must be able to 
justify this on the basis of exemptions provided for by the Treaty, and once again the 
ultimate control will lie with the Court of Justice. 
When legislation makes no provision it may be taken for granted that 
the States are given some leeway to confer upon operators prerogatives falling outside 
ordinary law: compulsory purchase, occupation of the public domain, even exclusive 
operation rights. There are those who claim that their public services can be managed 
without applying special rights. On the contrary, others feel that these rights are necessary 
not only for managing the infrastructure but also for operating the service. They point out 
that undertakings cannot be expected to take on the heavy commitments inherent in the 
public service (for example, ensuring in all circumstances the provision of a service at a 
uniform price) unless they are offered a certain market, i.e. exclusivity over a given 
territory (and that territory must also be sufficiently large so that there is a balance between 
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profitable and unprofitable areas). A certain diversity seems legitimate, taking into account 
national, legal and administrative traditions but, of  course, must always be compatible with 
the framework of the Treaty rules and under the control of the Court of  Justice. 
2.  Financing 
In other words: who must pay for the public service? The commonly 
acknowledged objective, that of most European legislation, is that the service should offset 
its costs with revenue, i.e. the price paid by users. This objective must be tempered by the 
requirement of charging reasonable rates, affordable by the greatest number of people, a 
vital principle, of course, of the public service and an obligation currently imposed by 
legislation. It can only, therefore, be attained where services make a profit, for example in 
densely populated regions where costs are low vis-a-vis revenue. Where services are not 
profitable, for example in thinly populated regions, the maintenance of a reasonable charge 
will lead to a deficit. Account must also be taken of particular obligations imposed on 
operators by the authorities, in particular reduced rates or even free services for certain 
categories of users: for example large families, the disabled and war invalids in public 
transport. 
Union law (legislation or the direct application of the Treaty rules) must 
allow for the means to finance these deficits and even give the Member States the possibility 
of choosing between one or more of  the following methods: 
equalization: the operator applies uniform charges in a given 
territory, which means that the profitable regions subsidize the loss-makers. 
market access fees imposed on those operators exempted from public 
service obligations and paid to operators which are subject to these obligations. 
an independently-run guarantee fund fed by all operators in 
proportion to their size. 
a contribution by the authorities themselves which may be justified in 
certain cases, in particular to compensate for particular burdens imposed on operators by 
those authorities. 
3)  The choice of operators 
The Union may legitimately, on the basis of its competition principles, make it 
compulsory to separate "operators" and "regulators". In particular, it may demand that, 
when operators are public administrations themselves or public undertakings, that 
administration or undertaking should not at the same time be entrusted with the task of 
regulating or monitoring the sector, a situation that could give rise to the abuse of a 
dominant position. But, with that rider, it must be neutral as to the quality of the operators 
(public or private), if only in application of Article 222 of the Treaty of Rome. States must, 
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therefore, be able to continue to choose between the different ways of running public 
services. 
a)  Direct management by the authority 
This system, sometimes called a 
11corporation", in which the authority 
itself operates the service using its own assets and staff, was for a long time the usual 
practice for running public services. Not so long ago in certain Member States it was still 
the case for the major national services (postal ~rvices, telecommunications and railways, 
etc.). Its disadvantage is its unwieldiness, since the rules of public administration are applied 
to budgets, accounting and staff management. It has been virtually phased out in network 
activities, with the notable exception of certain local services (public transport, drinking-
water supplies, refuse collection, etc.). 
b)  Management by public undertakings 
These corporation-run services have often been handed over to other 
bodies, leading to the creation of a good number of public undertakings. Other public 
undertakings were created by nationalization and some from scratch. In any case, regardless 
of their origin, most public services in Union Member States are still run by public 
undertakings. 
c)  Management by private undertakings 
Prior to the "historic nationalizations", many vital public services 
(railways, gas and electricity distribution, etc.) were run by private undertakings. This is 
once more and increasingly the case as several States have followed the lead taken here by 
Great Britain, the first European country massively to privatize public service undertakings. 
This solution is supposed to offer the user higher quality and cheaper services, because it 
flexibly adapts to needs and is cheaper to operate. But it seems to be less appropriate for 
activities calling for large-scale investment whose profitability is uncertain or long-term, 
never an attractive prospect for private capital. 
4)  The choice of legal instruments to set operators' obligations and rights 
The European Union may impose on States a certain degree of 
transparency in setting operators' rights and obligations. In the past these rights and 
obligations had sometimes been uncertain, especially since they had become established by 
custom, or even mere practice, rather than written decisions. It is a welcome development 
that they should be clearly defined and made public, in order for users to know what they 
are; this calls for their inclusion in documents of legal value. But the nature of that 
document must be left to the free choice of the Member States which will act according to 
their own constitutional rules or legal traditions. 
a)  The chosen instrument might, therefore, be a unilateral State decision: 
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a law or government decree. This is the most usual procedure when services are entrusted to 
public undertakings: in that case it is the decision to set up or nationalize an undertaking that 
usually determines its tasks and rights. 
b)  Contracts are required when services are run by private undertakings 
since they must, of  course, consent to them. But contractual procedures are becoming 
increasingly widespread, as we have seen, with public undertakings. Given their flexibility 
it would seem more appropriate and better adapted to a modem way of thinking than 
unilateral procedures. A point to be emphasized in respect of the procedures for concluding 
these public service contracts, which are very much favoured by local authorities: until now 
these procedures have always been characterised by the absence of any constraint for the 
authority in question, not only as to the final choice of co-contractor but even as to 
competition between several candidates prior to that choice. Current developments on this 
score should be highlighted: as we have seen, national legislation tends to call for at least an 
obligation to advertise the contract prior to its conclusion. It would be legitimate for 
European legislation to generalize this obligation, for the sake of the general rules of 
freedom and competition of the internal market. But it must allow States to maintain the 
traditional principle of allowing authorities to choose the operators to which they entrust 
their public services. It should be reiterated that, in their substance, public service contracts 
are not public procurement contracts and should not be submitted to the very strict rules 
applicable to the awarding of the latter. 
5)  Means of monitoring the execution of public services 
The execution of public services must be subject to special monitoring, 
first of all because they are created by the authorities in the public interest and those 
authorities have the right and duty to ensure that they are properly run; secondly because 
any special rights granted, such as the allocation in certain cases of public funds, obviously 
require their use to be supervised. European legislation may legitimately include provisions 
relating to these controls, if  only to impose, as we have often seen, the principle of 
separating regulators from operators. But, while respecting these general principles, it must 
allow the Member States the possibility to choose among different procedures: 
monitoring carried out by the administration itself 
monitoring by an external body appointed by the administration 
monitoring by composite bodies representing the interests in question: 
authorities, customer undertakings and individual users. 
Section IT.  Instruments of a European public service policy 
In order to pursue a public service policy whose objective is to maintain a substantial 
level of activity of general economic interest while giving Member States considerable 
leeway as to the practical means of achieving it, the existing European instruments are 
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applicable but in need of strengthening. 
I.  Making better use of existing instruments 
As seen, the Treaties include a good number of provisions affecting public service 
and the Union authorities have made considerable use of them in their administrative, 
judicial and legislative action. However this action, far from having the aim of strengthening 
the public service, has been based instead on a limited conception of the notion. Regarded as 
a system of exceptions to the principle of ordinary law that was to remain that of freedom of 
movement and competition, the public service has been confined to a narrow area of 
network activities: infrastructure management, which was to be separated from operations 
and, in the case of the latter, a limitation to one-off obligations or a skeleton "universal 
service". There is therefore, to start with, room for a more ambitious use of existing 
machinery. 
A. Role of the Court of Justice 
It is to be hoped that the Court of Justice will keep to its recent trend (Corbeau and 
Almelo judgments) and put all its efforts into the derogation allowed by Article 90(2) of the 
Treaty in favour of services of general economic interest. That would probably urge the 
Commission to correct its tendency to apply single market rules to public services without 
any differentiation, as if  they were ordinary economic activities. This would also be a step 
towards recognition of a special place for public services in European construction. 
B.  Legislative action 
The Commission's legislative proposals on network activities should be carefully 
examined by European legislators. Since the Council is weakened by differences between 
the Member States over the issue, special responsibility lies with the European Parliament 
which should have two concerns: 
1)  to preserve a sufficient level of public service in each sector in question, 
defending a broad conception of the notion, as a system of substantial tasks and obligations 
offset, if  necessary, by special or exclusive rights. 
2)  to defend the trend towards European public services: either in the 
framework of sectoral legislation or on the basis of the trans-European networks. That 
does not necessarily mean that the Union should create public services itself: that 
prerogative will be left for mostly in the hands of the Member States even if  the possibility 
of common regulatory authorities might be contemplated. But it could, at least, define those 
services with enough precision to ensure, in all Member States, a minimum of identical 
services, the idea being that equal access to these services is part of Union citizenship and a 
logical aspect of European integration. 
A litmus test is the proposal for a Directive on postal services currently being 
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discussed. It might be the first example of truly European legislation on public service since 
the tasks and even the detailed obligations and special rights of the service are defined at 
European level, although implementation is left to the Member States: this is an embryonic 
European public service. 
C. However, even though better use could be made of the existing instruments, they are 
insufficient. The provisions in question are scattered throughout the Treaties and are 
generally presented as exceptions to the rule. In order to be applied coherently and 
vigorously, they call for a global guidance framework. But to overcome resistance, a means 
of  motivation is also needed. In other words, if  the existing instruments are to be used in the 
appropriate way new ones have to be created. 
IT.  Setting up a new system 
Existing Community machinery can only play a part in helping public service 
activities under two conditions: 
1)  If  the concept of public service is established as one of the basic principles 
of the European Union, i.e. at "constitutionar level, which calls for guidance texts. 
2)  If  a system of incentives is created, with political/administrative bodies 
acting as factors of coherence and vigilance in the public service field. 
A. Guidance texts enshrining the concept of public service at European level 
1)  Amending the Treaty 
As long as public service's position in the Treaties is nothing more than an 
exception to the rules of freedom of movement and competition, its administrative, judicial 
and legislative protection will remain flimsy. It should be turned into a concept in its own 
right and on an equal footing with those rules in the creation and management of the internal 
market. There are several ways of doing this. A given term should be adopted: public 
service, public utility service or, the expression already used by the Treaty, "service of 
general economic interest". There is also the question as to which Treaty provisions to 
amend: the aims of the Community (Articles 2 and 3), definition of the internal market 
(Article 7a), Article 90 or the procedure applicable to legislation relating to the internal 
market (Article 1  OOa). 
The proposals made so far, which have naturally been coming thick and fast with the 
approach of the IGC - Intergovernmental Conference - meeting in 1996 to revise the 
Treaties, refer with varying degrees of precision to the~e different solutions. 
a)  Many of these proposals contain very general aims: 
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- None of the official contributions by the national governments to the 
preparation of the IGC mentions public service with the exception of Spain's, which 
includes in the areas where the rule of unanimity in the Council should be maintained the 
degree of quantitative and qualitative development of the public services, closely linked to 
the special features and prosperity of each Member State
24
• However, according to the 
report drafted by the Study Group set up to prepare for the IGC, a majority of Member 
States' representatives recommended that the IGC examine the strengthening of  the notion 
of public services of general interest, as one of the principles of  market criteria25• It should 
also be noted that the Belgian Minister for European Affairs, Mr DERYCKE, recently 
(early February 1996) called for the principle of public service to be integrated into the 
Treaty. 
- The European Commission, which had barely referred to the subject 
until then, set aside a small place for the subject in its opinion on the convening of the 
Conference (28 February 1996). It stated that citizens' access to universal services or 
services of general interest, contributing to the aims of solidarity and equal treatment, were 
among the values common to all European societies, but did not call expressly for any 
particular amendment to the Treaty. 
- The European Confederation of Trade Unions, in a resolution on the 
challenges of the IGC (14 and 15 December 1995), called for the principle of service of 
general interest and the right of access to a quality service and the recognition of its role as a 
pre-condition for European citizenship to be enshrined in the Treaty. 
- In its "Appeal by representatives of civil society", of 27 February 
1996, the International European Movement did no more than ask for the role of services of 
general interest to be recognised in the Treaty. 
b)  As part of its preparation for participation in the IGC, the European 
Parliament has regularly called for full introduction of the concept of public service into the 
Treaty. 
- It did so first in its basic resolution for the conference, the 
Bourlanges-Martin report of 17 May 1995, suggesting that a set of new provisions to this 
end should be added to the Treaty. It said that the place of public service in European Union 
actions should be laid down by introducing new articles defining the concept and scope of 
the "universal service", guaranteeing every citizen the right to equal access to services of 
general interest, and "ad hoc" provisions taking into account the special features of public 
service undertakings. 
24.  Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: some thoughts". 
March 1995 
25.  Study Group repon, 5 December 1995. 
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The resolution of 14 December 1995 on the IGC agenda with a view 
to the European Council in Madrid, asked for the terms of reference for the conference to 
include, among other priorities set by the Parliament, the definition of a role for public 
services of  general interest in the economic and social fields and the introduction of a 
universal right of  access to those services. 
The resolution of 13 March 1996 (on the EP's opinion on the 
convening of the IGC and the assessment of the work of the Study Group) is more specific 
than any other official position on the subject. Asserting that Community action must not 
only focus on the establishment of a competitive system but also on serving the general 
interest and, therefore, include tasks aimed at strengthening economic and social cohesion 
and consumer and user protection, it calls for: 
amendments to Article B of the TEU and 90 and  lOOa of the 
EC Treaty to include services of general interest; 
and the addition to the Treaty of the fundamental principles of 
public service, i.e. accessibility, universality, equality, continuity, quality, transparency and 
participation. 
c)  Among more specific proposals, we should mention those of the "Initiative 
pour des services d'  utilite publigue en Europe  n  (ISUPE). They are aimed, on one hand, at 
ending the current situation of the public service, i.e. an exception to the principle of 
competition, and giving it a place of its own while, on the other hand, fostering the 
emergence of European public services26. 
Title V of the Third Part of the EC Treaty would be amended to 
include activities of general economic interest. It would then be called "Common rules on 
activities of general economic interest, competition and approximation of legislation" and 
would include a new chapter on these activities. This chapter would contain the following 
provisions: 
a Council regulation would set for each sector the minimum 
general interest obligations which might be imposed by a Member State on an undertaking; 
in accordance with that regulation, the States could define the 
tasks for undertakings entrusted with a service of general economic interest which would 
then be granted a derogation from the Treaty rules, especially those on competition; 
the Member States could set obligations of general interest 
other than those set out in the Council regulation provided they complied with the Treaty 
26.  These proposals can be found in the article by S. RODRIGUES. "Comment integrer les principes du 
service public dans le droit positif communautaire". Revue Fran~  de Droit Administratif No 2. 
March-Apri11995 
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rules; 
the Community would aim to create services of general 
economic interest at European level. 
- The following sentence would be added to paragraph 1 of Article lOOa 
outlining the procedure applicable to legislative harmonization measures taken in the 
framework of the internal market: 
"These measures take into account, by applying in particular the principle of 
economic and social cohesion, the considerations of public utility that may justify an 
adjustment to the competition rules enacted by the present Treaty". 
d)  A fairly similar proposal, but one based on a much more thorough 
examination, was made by the European Centre of Public Enterprises (CEEP) in a report 
published in June 1995, entitled "Europe, competition and public service". It is also aimed 
at including the principle of public service in the Treaty on the same footing as that of 
competition, in order to give the Community institutions support for intervention, in 
particular through legislative channels, in the sectors where this principle is to be applied. 
To comply with existing provisions and in order to have as broad a terminology as possible 
in the different countries, it also suggests using the expression in Article 90: "service of 
general economic interest". It consists of a new Chapter ll  (comprising a single Article 94) 
coming after the chapter on competition (in Title V of the third part) and entitled "Services 
of general economic interest". This new chapter would include: 
- recognition of national powers for setting up services of general 
interest on the basis of common arguments (economic efficiency, social cohesion and 
preparation for sustainable development); 
a list of the obligations likely to be imposed on services of  general 
economic interest on behalf of traditional principles (equality, continuity, adaptability and 
quality) or new ones (transparency and consultation); 
assertion of the possibility of granting special or exclusive rights for 
the proper execution of those obligations; 
assertion of the application of competition rules by reiterating the 
terms of the current Article 90; 
recognition of the European Union's role in the matter, both to 
harmonize the way in which these services function on a national scale and to coordinate 
those services on a Union scale with the prospect of establishing services of general interest 
at European level. 
In April1996, in an opinion on the IGC, the CEEP referred to this 
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proposal and added the following requests for amendments: 
- addition, in Article 77, of the features of public service in the 
transport sector; 
- extra provisions on an energy policy and telecommunications policy 
giving public service a place. 
e)  The Comite europeen de liaison sur les services d 'interet general also gave 
its view on 24 November 1995 in a document entitled 
11Services of general interest and the 
Intergovernmental Conference~~. It came out in favour of  including the concept of public 
service or general interest services among "fundamental human rights" and the subsequent 
inclusion of the concept in a number of Treaty provisions: 
- Article 3 (Community action) 
- Part Two (citizenship of the Union) 
- Article 37 (adjustment of State monopolies) 
- Article 90 (competition) 
- Title XI (consumer protection) 
- Title XII (trans-European networks) 
- Title XII (industry) 
- Title XIV (economic and social cohesion) 
- Title XVI (protection of the environment). 
Of particular note is the proposed amendment to the second part of the Treaty by 
adding an Article 8f: 
11 All citizens of the Union must have access to certain goods and 
services deemed vital and whose definition is covered by a system of services of general 
interest". By linking the right to services of general interest to citizenship, it is based on one 
of the surest foundations of the concept of public service. By making it a right of Union 
citizens, it lays the basis for a European public service. 
f)  All of these proposals vary in terms of their technical solutions (the choice 
of  Treaty provisions to be amended or added to) but most of them agree on the aims which 
are invariably: 
- on one hand, a "defensive" concern: putting public service on an 
equal footing to other Community principles (i.e. the freedoms of movement and 
competition), while preserving Member States' possibility to maintain their public services; 
- on the other hand, a more "constructive" concern: putting forward the 
principle of equal access for all Union citizens to a minimum of essential services, fostering 
the emergence of European public services. 
These two concerns are linked to the proposals for amendments to the Treaty which 
in the final analysis seem the most relevant: 
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amending Anicle 90 to turn public service into a principle of the internal 
market on the same footing as the others rather than merely an exception to them. 
above all, possibly adding an article to the second part on "Union 
citizenship" making equal access to public services defined and guaranteed by the Union, at 
least in general terms, a right to be enjoyed by all European citizens. 
2)  A European public service charter 
The next Treaty text would establish the public service at a "constitutional" level in 
the Union, both as a fundamental citizens' right and a principle of Community action and 
legislation on a par with the freedoms of movement and competition. But the content of that 
concept would still have to be specified, i.e. the arguments, principles, objectives and scope 
of the notion. This would then make available a sort of European "doctrine" on public 
service acting as a reference for administrative and judicial action and for legislation. That 
should be done in a single text of general scope, called a "charter". 
The expression has a European precedent in another field: the Social Charter, or, to 
give it its official name, the "Community Charter of Workers' Fundamental Social Rights", 
adopted by the Heads of State and Government on 9 December 1989. In the sphere of public 
service it has several national precedents which tend to cover, however, a broader area than 
that of economic public services (administrative, social, health and cultural services, etc.): 
The French Government's Charter of public services (1992). 
The Citizen's Charter, presented by the British Government in the form of 
a statement to Parliament in 1991. 
The Italian Government's Public Services Charter (Prime Minister's 
directive) of 1994. 
Without using the exact word, in 1993 the European Parliament asked the 
Commission to defme public service and the Community to ensure all Union citizens equal 
access to goods and services of general economic interest (Resolution of 12 February 1993). 
The explicit request seems to have come firstly from the French Government in a 
memorandum of July 1993 calling for such a charter to set the general principles common to 
all public services. The European Parliament supported this idea in its Resolution on "public 
undertakings, privatization and public services", of 6 May 1994. The Commission seemed 
for a time to go along with it. 
The main features of this charter could be as follows: 
In its form, it would either be a declaration of principles adopted by the Council or 
rather, like the Social Charter, by the European Council. 
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In its content, it would comprise four parts: 
a)  a justification of public services (in the form of recitals, for example), i.e. 
considerations in favour of the very concept of public services and European public services 
developed above, in particular: 
a concern for integration and democratic citizenship including a 
number of ideas: 
the idea of social cohesion and the campaign against 
fragmentation and exclusion; 
the idea of territorial balance and equal access by European 
citizens, whatever their home region, to high-quality basic services; 
safeguarding certain fundamental freedoms. 
a concern for collective efficiency: 
collective  economic interest; 
long-term planning; 
controlling rare resources. 
b)  The main principles and objectives with which public services set up by the 
Member States must comply: 
equal access; 
continuity; 
adaptability or flexibility; 
quality; 
transparency and responsibility; 
control. 
c)  The types of special rights likely to be granted to operators. 
d)  A list of the fields where the concept of public service applies~ 
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- postal services; 
- telecommunications; 
transport; 
- water, gas and electricity distribution. 
The scope of this charter would be political rather than legal. It would provide, in 
particular, a framework for legislation to be adopted in the various sectors, which would, of 
course, be binding on the Union and the Member States. But it  would also act as a reference 
for interpreting the Treaty provisions by the Commission or the Court. 
B.  Prompting bodies 
In order to lend efficiency to these doctrinal and legal guidelines set out in basic 
texts, political/administrative structures should be set up to guarantee their implementation 
and act as 
11advocateS
11  for public services: 
1)  A European Parliament committee on public services called on to issue 
opinions on any relevant legislation. 
2)  A European public services committee, comprising representatives of 
public service undertakings and users: it would act as a consultative body for the 
Commission and an 
110bservatory" of European and national public services, producing 
analyses, assessments and proposals. 
3)  A Commissioner and Commission Directorate with special responsibility 
for public services, in particular for preparing legislation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Public services must not be confused with public undertakings. The latter are defined 
not by any special type of activity, but simply by the fact that they are controlled by the 
authorities, mainly through ownership. Therefore, there may be public undertakings 
exercising activities as a result of individual enterprise and, therefore, quite like those of 
private undertakings. In market economies these public undertakings may benefit from no 
particular privileges. They must abide by the ordinary legal rules applying to industry and 
trade, especially competition rules. Indeed nothing should stand in the way of their 
privatization, a basic trend in most Member States where, before long, public undertakings 
taken as a whole will probably only account for some 10% of the Union's non-agricultural 
economy. 
Public services, on the other hand, are not linked to any type of ownership. They are 
characterized by the task they perform: ensuring an economic activity of general interest, as 
a result, therefore, of a defined public initiative, set up and controlled by the authorities 
which usually grant them special rights deemed necessary for their proper execution. They 
are not linked to any one type of operator: they may be provided directly by the public 
administration itself, entrusted to a public undertaking or, increasingly, to private 
undertakings. If  we wanted to label the bodies in question, we might well choose that of 
public service operator or  undertaking. 
It is glaringly obvious that public services have even less in common with the civil 
service, i.e. those activities run by State employees and other official authorities. Many 
public service operators employ staff covered by labour law: this is by definition the case of 
private undertakings; but it is also that of public undertakings which, alongside civil 
servants, have always employed - and are increasingly employing- staff enjoying a 
special status or covered by "private law". 
All European States recognise the concept of public service even if  they do not all 
use the same expression to describe it. Everywhere it has been decided that certain economic 
activities are so vital for the population that they must be ensured, come what may, 
continuously and in a way that is accessible to everyone. It was not possible only to regulate 
their operation, as is the case of the production and provision of "ordinary" goods and 
services. Their existence had to be guaranteed, which meant that they had to be seen to by 
the authorities since there could be no certainty that private enterprise would take the risk. 
Of course, the specific nature of the activities in question could vary from place to place and 
time to time, according to the value systems of societies, their economic resources and 
technological developments. But in modern times and in European countries, this has always 
been the case of services relying on major infrastructure networks: electricity, gas and water 
distribution, railways, urban public transport, postal services, telecommunications. The 
organizational methods and level of these services may vary, sometimes wildly, from one 
country to another. But nowhere have they been left entirely to private initiative, nor have 
they fallen entirely under ordinary industrial and trade law. They have always been the 
subject of special legislation aimed at ensuring their proper operation in the public interest: 
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controls by the authorities over investment and prices, limits on the number of operators, 
the imposition on them of special obligations and sometimes the granting of rights falling 
outside ordinary law, permanent supervision ("regulation") by the public administration or 
independent bodies with restrictive powers. Whatever the terminology, the legal categories 
and practical methods used, public service occurs whenever a political community decides 
that an economic activity vital for the public interest cannot be ensured by the machinery of 
the market alone. 
The special rights granted to public service operators in the Member States, when 
they are national obstacles to the rules of free movement and competition, had to be 
challenged by the very logic of European construction which aimed to establish a common 
market, and later on an internal market. All Treaty rules on the creation of that market were 
tantamount to powers given to the Community to act on public service activities. The 
Community has not shirked from doing so: acting through administrative, judicial and 
legislative channels, it  has extensively liberalized the major networks. This phase of  relative 
"destruction 
11  of national public services was a necessity for Community integration, just as 
the Member States, over centuries of formation, had gradually phased out most of the public 
services that may have existed in any previously autonomous or independent political entities 
(fiefdoms and principalities) absorbed by national unification. 
However, the Treaty of Rome does not ignore public services. Through special 
derogations to the rules on free movement and competition or the general derogation of 
Article 90(2), it allows 
11services of general economic interest", to an extent compatible with 
the proper functioning of the internal market, to enjoy those privileges absolutely necessary 
for the performance of their task. On this basis, the Court of Justice has recently shifted its 
case -law towards a recognition of the legitimacy of national public services. For its part, 
the Commission tended, in its administrative action, to use the rules on free movement and 
competition to restrict public services by "whittling them away"Z7.  But, partly with 
European Parliament backing, it has instigated Community legislation on network activities 
that lends the notion of general interest some importance, allowing Member States to 
establish public service obligations and even in certain cases to grant special rights to 
operators, although the means vary quite widely from sector to sector. The Community 
concept of public service, usually in the form of a "universal service
11  with fairly scanty 
content or obligations aimed at restricted user groups, is undoubtedly less ambitious than the 
one applied in several Member States. All the same, it emerges that the Community has 
moved away from a suspicious attitude towards public services, whose privileges were 
systematically regarded as infringements of the Treaty rules, towards an (at least partial) 
acceptance of national public services that States are now allowed to maintain in certain 
conditions. 
The Community has gone further. More recent provisions of the Treaties (Single 
Act, European Union) give it objectives similar to those that presided over the constitution 
27. Cf an article by Professor Kovar (see the bibliography) 
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of national public services: economic and social cohesion, consumer protection, 
environmental protection, European citizenship, objectives to be translated in particular by 
the creation of trans-European networks of energy, transport and telecommunications. 
Using these new powers, the Community has stopped just allowing Member States some 
possibility of preserving their public services. In certain cases it has imposed maintenance of 
those services and even their development, by setting minimum obligations sometimes 
superior to those existing in certain countries. Such is the case of the legislation being 
adopted on the postal services. 
Through this extensive harmonization, the Community is creating the blueprint of a 
European public service. By narrowing the gap in the quality of services from country to 
country it is endeavouring to guarantee all Union citizens, wherever they live, equal access 
to those services regarded as vital. This is fully in keeping with the concept of public 
service, transposed to a European scale. 
Europe could even go further still. It could pay more attention to general interest in 
its administrative action and legislation. In certain areas it could even consider setting up 
genuine European public services, which would mean no longer just defining the service 
while leaving responsibility for its creation and control to States, but assuming that 
responsibility itself by dealing directly with operators and creating European level 
regulation bodies. Progress made in legislative harmonization in certain sectors (postal 
services, telecommunications) could lead to this, just as the - albeit difficult -
establishment of trans-European networks could lead to the appearance of European public 
services in railways or even the transportation and distribution of electricity and gas. 
A European public service policy of this kind would require an agreement to 
maintain a sufficient level of general interest in economic activity. This agreement on the 
aim is possible since the very concept of general interest, its essential components, its 
traditional or new requirements and the activities to which it must apply are the subject of a 
fairly broad consensus among the Member States. Meeting this aim obviously calls for a 
balance of responsibilities to be struck between the Union and the States. This balance must 
in any case preserve the Commission and Court of Justice
1s role of supervising the case-
by-case application of the Treaty provisions. Apart from that, i.e. the legislative 
harmonization, it should be established sector-by-sector on the basis of the principle of 
subsidiarity. Wherever the States are the best qualified to act, as is the case of local public 
services, European intervention should be minimal. In other sectors, the Union could define 
public service obligations and special rights with more or less precision, leaving it to States 
both to add to the definition and take full responsibility for setting up those services (choice 
of operators and f'mancing) and controlling them. In certain cases, to be contemplated with 
caution, it could assume all responsibilities and create genuine European public services. 
This policy would probably be greatly facilitated by a European 
"constitutionalization" of public service in the form of an enshrinement of the concept in the 
Treaty and a charter acting as a doctrinal guide for the legislator, the administration and the 
courts. It would also have to be given organized political and administrative support within 
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the European Parliament and the Commission. 
* 
*  * 
After a phase of "destroying" any public service to be found in the States, the Union 
might contemplate a phase of "constructing" a public service with a European dimension, to 
respond on a wider scale to the two main concerns which in their day, originally motivated 
the creation of national public services: 
the concern for social and territorial cohesion, more vital than ever given 
the risk of social fragmentation and exclusion, and the casting aside of whole areas, remoter 
rural regions and marginalised urban neighbourhoods alike. 
the concern for collective efficiency, guaranteeing, in particular, the 
long-term supply and management of rare resources, a common asset. 
It might, therefore, be said that, if we accept the logic and requirementS of European 
construction, the public services thrown off balance by that construction can only be put 
back on a firm footing if they become European. 
In turn, Europe might flnd in public services a factor of identity and legitimacy. First 
of all, it will be seen as true to itself by taking over a basic tradition found in all its 
component countries and distinguishing it from other parts of the world. Secondly, it would 
bring itself closer to its citizens. From the outset, European construction has greatly focused 
on trade and enterprise, the production of goods and services. As a result, the Community 
has tended to be more in contact with big business than with the public as a whole. This the 
public has made quite clear by recently showing a certain dissatisfaction with the European 
idea: witness the referendums on ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in certain Member States. 
One way of reconciling public opinion with Europe, making it more tangible for the bulk of 
the population, might well be to redirect European construction towards the concept of 
public service. 
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